fix(security): [CRITICAL] resolve open redirect vulnerability#90
fix(security): [CRITICAL] resolve open redirect vulnerability#90Tugamer89 wants to merge 1 commit into
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Patched `get_safe_redirect_url` in `core/security.py` to prevent open redirects where URLs with an HTTP/HTTPS scheme bypass validation due to missing netloc (e.g., `http:evil.com`). Co-authored-by: google-labs-jules[bot] <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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Severity: CRITICAL
Vulnerability: Open Redirect vulnerability bypass in
get_safe_redirect_url. Theurllib.parse.urlparsefunction parses URLs likehttp:evil.comorhttp:///evil.comwith a validscheme('http') but an emptynetloc(''). The previous validation logic permitted these URLs becauseparsed.netlocwas empty, thus skipping the strict host match. However, modern browsers interpret such strings as valid absolute URLs and will follow the redirect to external malicious servers, potentially compromising user tokens or performing phishing attacks.Impact: Attackers can trick users into clicking on malicious links containing crafted
nextorrefererparameters. The application would then redirect users to an attacker-controlled domain under the guise of an authenticated operation.Fix: Introduced an explicit condition
if parsed.scheme and not parsed.netloc:inget_safe_redirect_urlto reject URLs missing anetlocif they have a scheme, resolving the validation bypass.Verification: Verified the fix by invoking
get_safe_redirect_urllocally against inputs likehttp:evil.com,http:///evil.com, confirming they now appropriately return/. Lints pass without errors.PR created automatically by Jules for task 3813081336633118368 started by @Tugamer89