fix(security): [HIGH] resolve open redirect bypass in get_safe_redirect_url#86
fix(security): [HIGH] resolve open redirect bypass in get_safe_redirect_url#86Tugamer89 wants to merge 1 commit into
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Prevent Open Redirects using malformed URLs (e.g. `http:evil.com` or `http:///evil.com`) where urlparse returns a valid scheme but an empty netloc. These were previously bypassing the `parsed.netloc != request_host` check because `parsed.netloc` was empty. Co-authored-by: google-labs-jules[bot] <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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Severity: HIGH
Vulnerability: Open Redirect bypass in
get_safe_redirect_urldue to improper validation of malformed URLs.Impact: An attacker could craft a malformed URL (e.g.
http:evil.comorhttp:///evil.com) which would be parsed with an emptynetlocby Python'surllib.parse.urlparse. Because thenetlocwas empty, it bypassed the host-matching check, and the browser would auto-correct the malformed URL and redirect the user to the malicious site. This could be used for phishing attacks or stealing sensitive tokens.Fix: Added an explicit check (
if parsed.scheme and not parsed.netloc) to immediately return the root path if a URL has a scheme but no network location.Verification: Verified with a script testing various malformed variations, ensuring they are properly rejected while valid relative and matching absolute URLs still pass.
PR created automatically by Jules for task 15640077484547076906 started by @Tugamer89