Thank you for taking the time to look into the security of this package. We treat security reports as a first-class contribution.
We follow Semantic Versioning. Security fixes land on the latest minor of the current major.
| Version | Status |
|---|---|
0.1.x |
✅ Active — security fixes land here. |
< 0.1 |
❌ No support. Please upgrade. |
When 1.0.0 ships, the table is rewritten and grace windows reset.
Please do not open public issues for security problems.
Use GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting instead:
- Go to the Security tab of this repository.
- Click Report a vulnerability.
- Fill in the form. Include reproduction steps and a proposed severity if you can — it speeds up triage.
The report stays private between you and the maintainers until a fix is published. If GitHub is unreachable to you, fall back to the contact details on the TegroTON organization page.
This package ships client-side library code that reads a public DEX API and builds transaction payloads for a user's wallet to sign. It is non-custodial: it never holds, derives, or transmits a private key, and it does not sign anything. With that in mind, in-scope issues include:
- A built transaction that does not match what the user intended (wrong destination, wrong amount, missing slippage floor) due to an SDK mapping bug.
- Amount-conversion bugs that lose or inflate value (
toUnits/fromUnits/applySlippage). - Loss of integer precision on the wire (BigInt serialization).
- The TON Connect adapter mangling or dropping a payload.
- Dependency vulnerabilities reachable from the published
dist/output. - Documentation that demonstrably leads a careful integrator into an unsafe configuration (e.g. trusting a server-supplied minimum without flooring it).
- Vulnerabilities in the Tegro Finance backend, smart contracts, or the TON network itself — report those through the Tegro Finance channels / contract security process.
- Vulnerabilities in a wallet's TON Connect implementation — report to the wallet vendor.
- Issues requiring an attacker to already control the consumer's process environment, secrets store, or DOM.
- DoS by sending the library extremely large payloads. Apply request limits at your HTTP layer.
Best-effort, no contractual guarantee:
| Event | Target |
|---|---|
| Acknowledge receipt | within 72 hours |
| Triage decision (in-scope / not) | within 7 days |
| Fix or mitigation for a confirmed issue | within 30 days for High/Critical |
| Public advisory + patched release | coordinated with reporter |
After a fix ships, a GitHub Security Advisory is published (with a CVE where applicable), the CHANGELOG references the advisory ID, and the reporter is credited unless they ask otherwise. If you have a disclosure deadline, tell us up front and we'll work to meet it.