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Security: Sammyzyandev/StellarCred

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported versions

StellarCred is in active development. Security fixes are applied to the latest commit on main.

Reporting a vulnerability

Do not open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.

Email dahunsisamuel1st@gmail.com with:

  • A description of the vulnerability and its potential impact
  • Steps to reproduce or a proof-of-concept (private gist / attachment is fine)
  • Any suggested mitigations if you have them

You will receive an acknowledgement within 48 hours. If the issue is confirmed, a fix will be prioritised and you will be credited in the release notes unless you prefer to remain anonymous.

Scope

Areas of particular interest:

Area Risk
contracts/proof_registry Forged proofs accepted on-chain
contracts/issuer_registry Unauthorized issuer registration
app/api/issue/route.ts Server-side signing key exposure, credential forgery
In-circuit ECDSA (std::ecdsa_secp256k1) Signature bypass
Persona KYC relay Identity data leakage, bypass

Security model notes

  • ISSUER_PRIVATE_KEY must never have a NEXT_PUBLIC_ prefix — it is server-side only.
  • The issuer's secp256k1 signature is verified inside the ZK proof (std::ecdsa_secp256k1), and the contract checks the public key from public inputs matches the registered issuer key. A valid proof requires a registered issuer to have signed the credential.
  • prehash: false is required when signing — Noir uses the raw 32-byte commitment as the message digest. Changing this breaks all existing proofs.
  • Identity fields from KYC providers are used only to derive credential values and are never stored or logged after the API call completes.
  • The app sends a Content-Security-Policy. By default the enforced policy still permits inline scripts; a stricter nonce-based policy is sent in report-only mode, with sanitized violation reports delivered to /api/csp-report, and can be enforced with CSP_MODE=enforce. See docs/CSP.md.

See the full threat model and reviewer checklist in docs/THREAT_MODEL.md. For the boundaries of the privacy guarantee — what the system does not hide, recover, or guarantee, and what each party observes — see docs/LIMITATIONS.md.

Pre-Mainnet Security Checklist

Before deploying StellarCred to the Stellar mainnet, verify that all security parameters and operational keys meet the following production standards:

1. Administrative Key Management (Admin Key)

  • Multi-Signature / HSM Custody: The administrator key (contract admin) must NOT be a hot wallet stored in plaintext. It must be custody-secured (e.g., using a hardware wallet, an HSM, or a multi-signature account setup with appropriate thresholds).
  • Minimal Privilege & Revocation: Ensure the admin key is only used for contract configuration/upgrades and is distinct from operational issuer keys.
  • Upgrade Authorization: If the contract is upgradeable, confirm that upgrade authority is assigned to a multisig wallet or a community-controlled DAO address.

2. Issuer Cryptographic Keys (Issuer Key)

  • Secret Key Protection: The ISSUER_PRIVATE_KEY must be securely stored in production-grade environment secrets (e.g., AWS Secrets Manager, GCP Secret Manager, or Vercel Encrypted Environment Variables). It must never be checked into git or exposed to the client-side (do not prefix with NEXT_PUBLIC_).
  • Key Rotation Procedures: Test and document the key rotation procedure. Registering a new issuer key in IssuerRegistry must be validated, and the corresponding private key updated in the API environment without service disruption.
  • Revocation: Ensure compromised issuer keys can be immediately removed or revoked in IssuerRegistry by the admin.

3. Time-to-Live (TTL) & Ledger Close Times

  • Ledger Close Alignment: The verification caching duration (expiry / TTL) must be aligned with Stellar mainnet ledger close times (average 5 seconds per ledger).
  • Storage TTL Verification: Review the storage TTL (Time-To-Live) settings for contract instances and entries. Confirm they are set high enough to prevent state eviction (by invoking TTL extension on-chain) while optimizing fee costs.
  • Expiration Checks: Ensure proof submission expirations account for clock drift and network latency on mainnet.

4. Budget & Resource Limits

  • Gas and Fee Budgets: Verify that on-chain proof verification costs (CPU instructions and memory usage) fit comfortably within the mainnet limits per transaction and ledger.
  • Transaction Fees: Ensure that transactions are submitted with competitive base fees to prevent delays during periods of high mainnet network congestion.
  • Batch Size Constraints: If using batch submissions, ensure the batch limits (maximum 5 proofs) prevent transaction execution timeouts and stay well within the Soroban resource limits.

There aren't any published security advisories