Report privately through GitHub's advisory form. Please do not open a public issue for anything exploitable.

Expect an acknowledgement within five working days and an assessment within fifteen. This is a side project maintained by one person: that is the honest figure, not a service commitment.

Anything that would let a configuration send a user somewhere they did not choose, or that would weaken one of the controls below. In particular: a project key or base URL that survives validation and reaches a rule unescaped; a way to install a rule without the corresponding host permission; a way to make an imported configuration arrive armed; an injection in the options page or popup.

A report is most useful with the exact input, the resulting rule or destination, and which control you think it bypasses.

• A redirect requires host access to its destination. Nothing fires until the user grants that origin in a browser prompt naming it. This is the control that neutralises a hostile import, a compromised sync account and a malicious update alike — and why the extension never requests access to all sites.
• Project keys and base URLs are the two security functions. A key is concatenated literally into a regex filter, so it is held to a closed character set; a base URL becomes a redirect target, so it is refused rather than cleaned when it cannot be used exactly as written. Both are validated on every path in, including reads from storage and imports — never trust your own storage.
• Rules apply to top-level navigation only. Were they to apply to sub-resources, any web page could probe your internal network with an <img> tag and learn which hosts answer.
• The destination path is fixed. A shortcut always resolves to <base>/browse/<KEY-N>, so an attacker who controls a destination cannot choose a more convincing or more dangerous path.
• Extension pages cannot reach the network (connect-src 'none'), build no HTML from strings, and create links only from re-parsed http(s) URLs.

The extension ships no third-party code: no runtime dependency, no bundler, no CDN. A test fails the build if one appears.

CI never clones an external repository, runs with least-privilege tokens, pins every action by commit SHA, installs with --ignore-scripts, and never exposes a secret to pull-request code. Releases attest their provenance and publish SHA-256 sums; publication waits behind a protected environment with a human reviewer.

The latest release. Fixes are not backported.