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rhyru9/README.md

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Rey

Bug hunter. Most of the work is in a proxy: replay a request, change one assumption, see what the server still allows.


about

I look at how web apps and APIs fail in production — mostly through bug bounty programs and CTFs.

The useful bugs sit between what the UI claims and what the HTTP actually does. Between reports I write small tools, because recon eats the night if I let it. If I’ve done a step twice by hand, it tends to become a script.

where the time goes

web

Access control first: IDOR, BOLA, hidden admin routes, CORS that reflects origin and still sends cookies. Then identity — session reuse after logout, reset-link poisoning, MFA that only lives in the UI, JWT alg / kid / none, OAuth redirect_uri treated as decoration.

Injection sits next to that. SQLi, NoSQLi, XSS (reflected, stored, DOM), SSTI, command injection, XXE, header/CRLF. CSRF on state-changing requests that never got a token. Uploads that trust Content-Type. Path traversal and LFI. Open redirects that become XSS or token theft two steps later. Request smuggling and cache deception when the proxies disagree. Prototype pollution and DOM clobbering on heavy frontends. Business logic is slower — you have to understand how the product makes money before you can make it spend money wrong.

api

REST and GraphQL (introspection left on, batching, depth, a nested field that skipped the check the REST route had). JWTs trusted too hard. OAuth as “redirect and hope.” A field that wasn’t in the docs until I sent it anyway. Mass assignment, parameter pollution, SSRF, races. Deserialization — pickle, Java, PHP unserialize — and webhooks that were never verified.

cloud

Private buckets that aren’t. Default creds, debug, directory listing, stack traces. Forgotten subdomains. CI printing a token into a log. Outdated deps with a CVE that already has a name. Exception handlers that leak or fail open.

OWASP Top 10 (2025) is the starting map. Named version is in the index.

index

access control (A01) — IDOR, BOLA, privilege escalation, forced browsing, missing function-level checks, CORS with credentials, CSRF, cached pages that belong to someone else

authn / session (A07) — session fixation, reuse after logout, credential stuffing, weak reset, Host-header reset poisoning, MFA bypass, JWT none / alg confusion / kid, OAuth redirect_uri / missing state, cookie flags (Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite)

injection (A05) — SQLi, NoSQLi, XSS (reflected / stored / DOM), SSTI, OS command injection, XXE, LDAP, header injection, CRLF

files, fetch, proxy — path traversal, LFI / RFI, unrestricted & polyglot uploads, SSRF, open redirect, request smuggling / desync, Host header, web cache poisoning & cache deception

crypto (A04) — secrets in transit or in the page, weak hashing, JWT that isn’t signed like it claims, home-rolled crypto

misconfig (A02) — default creds, debug / stack traces, directory listing, fat CORS, exposed .git / backups / admin, cloud bucket & IAM, subdomain takeover

supply chain & integrity (A03, A08) — outdated components, known CVEs, CI/CD secrets in logs, unsigned webhooks, insecure deserialization, prototype pollution, dependency confusion

design & logic (A06) — race / TOCTOU, missing rate limit, mass assignment, parameter pollution, business rules that trust the client, GraphQL depth/batching

logging & exceptions (A09, A10) — alerts that never fire, logs that store secrets, handlers that leak internals, fail-open on timeout, 4xx/5xx that skip authz

client-side — DOM clobbering, postMessage origin skips, clickjacking, tabnabbing, CSS injection, WebSocket with no auth

on the desk

Burp Suite for the request work. Nmap and Yakit for ports and assets. ZAP when I want a second proxy.

Python when the tool needs to exist today. Go when it has to stay fast. PHP when the target is PHP and matching the language makes the bug easier to see.

 

built

The recon steps that kept repeating turned into these.

  • GitSD · Go — exposed .git across domains and subdomains, then the contents: credentials, keys, source
  • KODOK · Go — hidden API endpoints in JavaScript, dependency chains, secrets with entropy
  • PathKit · Python — path classifier: human slugs vs UUID / hash / timestamp / base64

right now

Bug bounty on web and API. PathKit is the one still moving. GitSD and KODOK when a recon pass needs them. Notes from testing, when they’re worth keeping.

github


Website   ·   GitHub   ·   HackerOne   ·   YesWeHack

Pinned Loading

  1. CVE-2018-16431 CVE-2018-16431 Public

    CVE-2018-16431 mass scanner and single target scan.

    Python 1

  2. CSIRT-Tld CSIRT-Tld Public

    Repositori ini berisi daftar domain .go.id dan .ac.id beserta informasi CSIRT-nya dalam format CSV. Data ditujukan untuk keperluan riset keamanan.

    2

  3. GitSD GitSD Public

    scan domains for Git source code disclosure vulnerabilities

    Go 7 3

  4. kodok kodok Public

    Kodok is a Go-based JavaScript Security Scanner designed to help bug bounty hunters, penetration testers, and security teams discover vulnerable endpoints and exposed secrets/credentials within fro…

    Go 6 5

  5. Velarist/Glance Velarist/Glance Public

    Open large files (JSONL, CSV, logs 3GB+) without crashing or lag — lightweight Rust daemon with a developer CLI and IDE extension support.

    Rust 3 1