Build(deps): Bump sqlalchemy from 2.0.36 to 2.0.48#21
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Build(deps): Bump sqlalchemy from 2.0.36 to 2.0.48#21dependabot[bot] wants to merge 370 commits into
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- Move 7 docs from root to docs/ (AMBASSADORS, GLOSSARY, MANNERS, PROJECT_STRUCTURE, TESTING, TERMS_OF_USE, USER_GUIDE) - Add PROOF_INDEX.md at root — 788 evidence documents, entry point visible on landing - Remove TEST_RESULTS_6.0.0CC.md and VALIDATION_REPORT_v7.4.0CC.md (archived, versioned out) - Fix CHANGELOG and proof_sheets/INDEX.md test count: 720 -> 746 - Update .gitignore: v11.0.1 header, exclude raw MP4 recordings from screenshots - Update cross-references in README, CONTRIBUTING, MANNERS_COMPLIANCE, DOC_INDEX
- .github/dependabot.yml: weekly pip + GitHub Actions updates - .github/workflows/codeql.yml: Python SAST on push/PR/weekly schedule - requirements-dev.txt: dev/lint/test tooling (isort, bandit, pip-audit, coverage) - ci.yml: install requirements-dev.txt in code-quality stage, enforce isort (remove || true)
- QUICKSTART.md: 5-minute path from clone to first governance decision - Makefile: make test/test-unit/test-security/run/build/lint/clean - RBAC endpoint count updated to 150 (grep-verified: main.py, api/*.py, tenant_rate_limiting.py) - README, proof_sheets/INDEX.md, TB-PROOF-014 all updated to match - DOC_INDEX.md: added QUICKSTART, Makefile, PROOF_INDEX entries; fixed proof count 773->788
318 replacements across 51 public-facing .md files. DOC_INDEX: proof sheet count 773->788, three tiers, remove two archived test doc references.
PROJECT_OVERVIEW: test count 720->746, test module table rewritten with all 16 current modules and correct counts (was 10 modules with wrong names). PROJECT_STRUCTURE: test count 720->746, proof count 787->788, root file tree corrected (7 files moved to docs/, added QUICKSTART/Makefile/ DOC_INDEX/PROOF_INDEX/requirements-dev.txt), .github/ block added, deleted test docs removed from tree.
The StreamableHTTPSessionManager requires its run() async context manager to be active before handling requests. When mounted as a FastAPI sub-app via app.mount(), the inner Starlette app's lifespan is not invoked, leaving the anyio task group uninitialised. Fix: enter session_manager.run() inside the FastAPI lifespan so the task group is active for the full server lifetime. Requests to /mcp no longer fail with "Task group is not initialized".
StreamableHTTPSessionManager.run() can only be called once per instance. Tests create multiple TestClient(app) contexts per process, each triggering the lifespan. Reset _session_manager and recreate _mcp_asgi_inner at lifespan startup so every entry gets a fresh instance.
traefik:v2.11 ships Go 1.24.1 which carries CVE-2025-68121 (CVSS 10), CVE-2025-22871 (9.1), and ~15 additional HIGH/MEDIUM Go stdlib CVEs. traefik:v3 builds with a patched Go release that resolves these. All existing CLI flags and Docker labels are v3-compatible. No config changes required. ubuntu/* CVEs (open-webui, ollama) are third-party images outside TelsonBase scope — documented in Dockerfile.
mcp_server is attached to 4 networks. Without traefik.docker.network,
Traefik selects the first container IP alphabetically — telsonbase_ai
(172.21.x.x) — which Traefik is not connected to, causing silent
proxy timeouts on all requests through port 80.
Also adds PathPrefix('/') catch-all router rule for dev mode.
Production overlay retains Host-based routing.
README.md + huggingface_space/README.md: - Fix "Jouneaux et al." -> "Jouneaux and Cabot" (only 2 authors) - Add OversightLevel sentence and link to machine-readable spec agent-autonomy-sla-spec.json: add _license_note on schema attribution Website (frontend — local only, gitignored): new #research section added - Anthropic disposition dial quote connected to ClawCoat 5 tiers - Jouneaux & Cabot open challenge quote connected to OversightLevel adoption - Link to machine-readable spec JSON on GitHub
Shows numerical values (QUARANTINE=1.0 → AGENT=0.10) inline in prose so readers don't need to follow the JSON spec link to see them. Includes inverse relationship note: OversightLevel ↓ as Manners floor ↑.
- Em dashes throughout (hyphens replaced) - README stats: 6,254 tests, 162 API endpoints - HF README: 6,254 tests, v11.0.3 footer - Cihon et al. citation: full title and all five authors
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…unt, version strings Corrections verified against source code: - RBAC-protected endpoints: 149 → 143 (actual grep of Depends(require_permission) in source; docstring example in core/auth.py was being counted; openclaw_routes uses authenticate_request not require_permission) - Test files in standard run: 88/94 → 99 (100 total - test_mqtt_stress excluded) - Bandit lines scanned: 61,278/93,893 → 43,457 (actual scope: core/ api/ agents/ federation/ toolroom/ gateway/) - API endpoints: 161 → 162 (CI-verified) - Test count: 720/746 → 6,254 across all stale docs Version strings: - v11.0.1 → v11.0.3 in CONTRIBUTING, GOVERNANCE, SECURITY, SUPPORT, LICENSES/*, screenshots/README, toolroom/TOOLROOM - TelsonBase → ClawCoat in footer strings across all updated files - CHANGELOG title: TelsonBase → ClawCoat Proof sheets: - TB-PROOF-001: header 88 → 99 files; added 14 missing test files to table - TB-PROOF-014: corrected RBAC count 149 → 143 with accurate per-file breakdown - TB-PROOF-052: header 88 → 99 files; added 14 missing files to all sections; updated summary totals - INDEX.md: 149 → 143 RBAC endpoint count - tb-proof-053 through tb-proof-066: "720 tests" → "6,254 tests" Docs updated: README, FAQ, INSTALLATION_GUIDE_WINDOWS, PROJECT_OVERVIEW, SECURITY_GUIDELINES, SOC2_TYPE_I, COMPLIANCE_ROADMAP, TESTING
…ssion/RBAC invalidation
session_management.py:
- check_session/get_session/touch_session fall back to Redis on local cache miss
(sessions created on other workers are now visible to all workers)
- terminate_session evicts entry from local dict after Redis delete
(prevents memory leak; terminated sessions can't be re-activated from stale cache)
- terminate_all_user_sessions unions local cache + Redis user-session index
(kills sessions created on any worker, not just the current one)
rbac.py:
- _save_session maintains rbac_user_sessions:{user_id} index in Redis
- deactivate_user fetches all session IDs from Redis index and deletes them
(account deactivation now takes effect on all workers immediately)
- invalidate_session evicts from local dict and cleans Redis index entry
middleware.py:
- Rate limiter uses Redis Lua atomic token bucket (single shared limit across all workers)
- Falls back to in-memory bucket only when Redis unavailable (logged as warning)
- _get_client_key hashes full API key with SHA-256 instead of truncating to [:16]
(eliminates shared-prefix bucket collision attack)
tests/test_core_session_management_depth.py:
- Update 5 tests that expected terminated sessions to remain in _sessions dict;
corrected assertion is that session_id is NOT in _sessions after termination
H1 core/auth.py — JWT revocation fail-closed; Redis unavailable → revoke returns False, is_revoked returns True; removed in-memory fallback set H2 core/signing.py — agent revocation persisted to Redis; survives worker restart H3 core/secure_storage.py — integrity hash raises RuntimeError if not initialized; no silent fallback key H4 core/secure_storage.py — ephemeral key generation removed; raises ValueError if ENCRYPTION_KEY not set H5 core/session_management.py — role validated against VALID_ROLES allowlist on session creation H6 core/threat_response.py — _matches_pattern requires positive criterion (anomaly_type/severity/event_type); count_threshold enforced via prior event count in window H7 core/threat_response.py — ImportError in quarantine/isolate/escalate handlers re-raised as critical failure H8 core/anomaly.py — rate stats (avg/std/max) computed from _recent_records via EMA, not reset to zero H9 core/anomaly.py — baseline lazy-loaded from Redis on first access; not rebuilt from scratch each restart H10 core/rbac.py — API key stored in Redis as SHA-256 hash; plaintext stays in-memory only H11 core/rbac.py — zero-user bypass re-verified against Redis before allowing; Redis unavailable → 503 H12 core/rbac.py — require_permission checks JWT Bearer + session cookie, not only X-API-Key H13 core/config.py — MCP_API_KEY required at startup; missing key raises ValueError (was silently "MISSING_API_KEY")
File headers: auth, middleware, secure_storage, signing, audit, mfa, session_management, rbac, config, openclaw, identiclaw, secrets, identiclaw_routes → ClawCoat Functional renames: - audit.py: chain_id prefix "telsonbase_" → "clawcoat_" - mfa.py: issuer_name "TelsonBase" → "ClawCoat" - openclaw.py: governance comments updated - secure_storage.py: ENCRYPTION_KEY_ENV/ENCRYPTION_SALT_ENV → CLAWCOAT_*; legacy TELSONBASE_* checked as backward-compat fallback; default salt string updated - secrets.py: env_var names → CLAWCOAT_ENCRYPTION_KEY / CLAWCOAT_ENCRYPTION_SALT (Docker secret filenames kept for production compat) - config.py: DB URL default + redis_password default + production validation strings → clawcoat_dev - identiclaw.py + routes + auth.py: telsonbase_permissions field → clawcoat_permissions (DB column kept — requires migration) - conftest.py: encryption key env var + chain_id prefix updated - .env.example: header, DB URL default, MOSQUITTO_USER default, comment Docker secret filenames (telsonbase_*) intentionally unchanged — production filesystem paths. TELSONBASE_ENV env var intentionally unchanged — extensive test + runtime dependents.
CHANGELOG: Unreleased entry — H1-H13 security fixes, branding sweep details ENCRYPTION_AT_REST.md: checklist items updated to CLAWCOAT_ENCRYPTION_KEY/SALT SECRETS_MANAGEMENT.md: dev default strings updated to clawcoat_dev
…er, human review gate - threat_response.py: remove all cooldown/require_confirmation logic; every threat match quarantines immediately; add _persist_event/_load_events_from_persistence using SecurityStore; add resolve_threat(event_id, reviewed_by) — agents stay quarantined until explicit human review; _matches_pattern simplified to pure positive-criteria check - anomaly.py: replace counter-based anomaly IDs with uuid4 (safe across workers); persist _recent_denials to Redis so capability-probe counts survive restarts and are shared across all workers; load on startup - signing.py: add audit logging to clear_revocation() matching revoke_agent() pattern - tests: update depth tests for new zero-tolerance behavior; 127/127 threat_response pass
… fix MFA test - version.py + config.py + CITATION.cff: 11.0.3 → 11.0.4 - CHANGELOG.md: rename [Unreleased] → [11.0.4]; add MEDIUM security section for zero-tolerance threat response, UUID anomaly IDs, _recent_denials persistence, signing clear_revocation audit - tests/test_core_mfa_depth.py: update issuer assertion TelsonBase → ClawCoat (mfa.py issuer_name was renamed in branding sweep, test not updated)
…ion assertions (fields removed in zero-tolerance rewrite)
…nsistent with JWT/other secrets)
…alse in no-Redis CI environment (fail-closed behavior correct for prod, breaks unit tests without Redis)
…tion tests work without live Redis
The client fixture already cleared rate_limiter._buckets (in-memory fallback) but the Redis-backed Lua token-bucket key was never reset between tests. In CI where Redis is available, the same hashed API key accumulates requests across tests until the burst budget (20) is exhausted, causing compliance route tests to return 429 instead of 200/500. Fix: delete all ratelimit:* keys from Redis DB15 at the start of each test, alongside the existing audit-chain and RBAC flushes.
…state bleed AgentKeyRegistry loads signing:revoked_agents from Redis on __init__; tests that revoke agent-001 contaminate subsequent tests whose fresh registry instance picks up the revocation and raises PermissionError on register_agent. AnomalyMonitor loads _recent_denials from Redis on __init__; tests that record denials above threshold contaminate tests that expect zero denials below threshold. Flush signing:*, security:signing:revoked_agents, security:recent_denials, and security:threat_events in the conftest client fixture alongside the existing rate-limit and RBAC/audit-chain flushes.
…t bleed AgentKeyRegistry() calls _load_from_persistence() on init, loading signing:revoked_agents from Redis. Tests that revoke agent-001 or agent_a poison the next test's fresh registry instance, causing PermissionError on register_agent even though the test is starting fresh. BehaviorMonitor() loads _recent_denials from Redis on init. Tests that record >0 denials can push a subsequent test over CAPABILITY_PROBE_THRESHOLD before it records any denials itself. Fix: flush relevant Redis keys in the registry and monitor fixtures (test_core_signing_depth.py, test_core_anomaly_depth.py) and add an autouse fixture in TestAgentKeyRegistry (test_signing.py).
- Product rename throughout: all source files, docs, tests, proof sheets, CITATION.cff, README, CHANGELOG, HuggingFace app.py - GitHub repo renamed: QuietFireAI/ClawCoat → QuietFireAI/ClawFilters - Domain updated: clawcoat.com → clawfilters.com - Positioning: small business primary; regulated industries as quality signal - "The Manners Engine" brand name removed from public copy; scoring mechanism retained as "behavioral scoring/filter" — architecture unchanged - Audience broadened: "OpenClaw agents" → "AI agents" in public-facing copy - clawcoat_dev defaults → clawfilters_dev in config.py - Audit chain prefix: clawcoat_ → clawfilters_ in core/audit.py - clawcoat_permissions DB column unchanged (migration deferred) - CLAWCOAT_ENCRYPTION_KEY env var unchanged (internal implementation name) - TELSONBASE_ENV and telsonbase_* Docker names unchanged
…ed files) - M1: config.py line 380 error message now correctly names 'clawfilters_redis_dev' - L1-L4: REM headers in config.py, audit.py, auth.py, middleware.py - L5: .env.example header, DB/MQTT user defaults, Traefik/Telegram domain examples - L6: FAQ.md TOC anchor links, version bump to v11.0.4 - L7: TELEGRAM_GUIDE.md example bot name and webhook domain - L8: SECRETS_MANAGEMENT.md line 237 Redis dev default name - L9: test_api.py federation fixture URL - config.py default DATABASE_URL username/db updated to clawfilters - test_core_config_depth.py: match updated DATABASE_URL default - test_core_threat_response_depth.py: admin@clawcoat → admin@clawfilters.com - INSTALLATION_GUIDE_WINDOWS.md: note corrected for new name - agent-autonomy-sla-spec.json: all ClawCoat references + version updated
…ndabot) Closes Dependabot MEDIUM (requests insecure temp file) and LOW (cryptography DNS name constraint) alerts.
Bumps [sqlalchemy](https://github.com/sqlalchemy/sqlalchemy) from 2.0.36 to 2.0.48. - [Release notes](https://github.com/sqlalchemy/sqlalchemy/releases) - [Changelog](https://github.com/sqlalchemy/sqlalchemy/blob/main/CHANGES.rst) - [Commits](https://github.com/sqlalchemy/sqlalchemy/commits) --- updated-dependencies: - dependency-name: sqlalchemy dependency-version: 2.0.48 dependency-type: direct:production update-type: version-update:semver-patch ... Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
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Bumps sqlalchemy from 2.0.36 to 2.0.48.
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