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Enforce corporate_id claim in Penpot auth_request middleware #36

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Merged
UsamaSadiq merged 1 commit into from
Jul 13, 2026
Merged

Enforce corporate_id claim in Penpot auth_request middleware #36

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1 change: 1 addition & 0 deletions backend/src/app/config.clj
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -198,6 +198,7 @@
[:oidc-name-attr {:optional true} :string]
[:default-email-domain {:optional true} :string]
[:smb-default-workspace-name {:optional true} :string]
[:smb-corporate-id {:optional true} :string]

[:ldap-attrs-email {:optional true} :string]
[:ldap-attrs-fullname {:optional true} :string]
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206 changes: 123 additions & 83 deletions backend/src/app/http/auth_request.clj
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -28,9 +28,12 @@
[app.http.session :as session]
[app.rpc.commands.auth :as auth]
[app.rpc.commands.profile :as profile]
[app.util.json :as json]
[cuerdas.core :as str]
[yetti.request :as yreq]
[yetti.response :as yres]))
[yetti.response :as yres])
(:import
java.util.Base64))

(set! *warn-on-reflection* true)

Expand All @@ -54,6 +57,41 @@
:domain domain)
(str (first (str/split email-claim #"@")) "@" domain))))

(defn- check-corporate-id
"Validates the access_token's custom:corporate_id matches the configured
SMB corporate ID. Returns nil when the check passes (or enforcement is
disabled), or a 403 ring response map when it fails."
[request]
(let [expected (cf/get :smb-corporate-id)]
(when (and expected (not (str/blank? expected)))
(let [access-token (yreq/get-header request "x-auth-request-access-token")]
(if (str/blank? access-token)
(do
(l/wrn :hint "x-auth-request: corporate-id enforcement active but no access token present")
{::yres/status 403
::yres/headers {"content-type" "application/json"}
::yres/body "{\"error\":\"access_denied\"}"})
(let [parts (str/split access-token #"\.")
payload (when (>= (count parts) 2)
(try
(let [decoded (String. ^bytes (.decode (Base64/getUrlDecoder) ^String (nth parts 1)) "UTF-8")]
(json/decode decoded))
(catch Exception e
(l/wrn :hint "x-auth-request: failed to decode access token payload"
:cause e)
nil)))
is-corp (get payload (keyword "custom:is_corporate"))
corp-id (get payload (keyword "custom:corporate_id"))]
(when (or (not= is-corp "true")
(not= corp-id expected))
(l/wrn :hint "x-auth-request: corporate-id mismatch — denying access"
:expected expected
:is-corporate is-corp
:corporate-id corp-id)
{::yres/status 403
::yres/headers {"content-type" "application/json"}
::yres/body "{\"error\":\"access_denied\"}"})))))))

(defn- auto-join-team!
"_auto_join_workspace: ensure a ``team_profile_rel`` row for
the non-default team whose ``name`` matches PENPOT_SMB_DEFAULT_WORKSPACE_NAME
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -154,88 +192,90 @@
;; place that derives it from the resolved email local-part. We never
;; trust an upstream-supplied name (oauth2-proxy put the Cognito sub
;; UUID in x-auth-request-user), so there is nothing to forward here.
(let [email (resolve-email email-claim)
profile (try
(get-or-register-profile cfg email nil)
(catch Throwable cause
(l/err :hint "x-auth-request: error resolving profile"
:email email
:cause cause)
nil))]
(cond
(nil? profile)
;; Header email doesn't resolve to a profile (and auto-register
;; is off). No identity to switch *to* — pass through with
;; whatever wrap-session set.
(do
(l/wrn :hint "x-auth-request: no profile found for email, passing through unauthenticated"
:email email)
(handler request))

(:is-blocked profile)
(do
(l/wrn :hint "x-auth-request: profile is blocked, denying access"
:email email
:profile-id (str (:id profile)))
{::yres/status 403})

(not (:is-active profile))
(do
(l/wrn :hint "x-auth-request: profile is not active, denying access"
:email email
:profile-id (str (:id profile)))
{::yres/status 403})

;; Steady state — existing browser session matches the proxy-
;; asserted identity. No work to do.
(and session-pid (= session-pid (:id profile)))
(handler request)

;; Either no existing session, or the session points at a
;; *different* profile than oauth2-proxy is asserting. Re-key.
;;
;; This is the fix for the session-sharing bug: portal "log out
;; of all apps" clears the shared _oauth2_proxy cookie + Cognito
;; session but NOT Penpot's auth-token cookie on its subdomain.
;; Without this branch, wrap-session resolves the previous
;; user's profile-id from the stale cookie and this middleware
;; (under the previous always-skip-when-session rule) never
;; overrode it.
:else
(do
(when session-pid
(l/inf :hint "x-auth-request: proxy identity differs from existing session — re-keying"
:session-profile-id (str session-pid)
:header-profile-id (str (:id profile))))
(l/dbg :hint "x-auth-request: authenticating via forwarded header"
:email email
:profile-id (str (:id profile)))
(let [create-session! (session/create-fn cfg profile)
response (-> request
(assoc ::session/profile-id (:id profile))
;; Drop stale identity-carrying keys
;; so downstream code does not see the
;; previous user's data after re-key.
;;
;; ::http/auth-data — errors.clj logs
;; auth-data.claims.uid as
;; :request/profile-id; rpc/helpers
;; exposes the map to RPC handlers via
;; get-auth-data.
;;
;; ::session/session — read indirectly
;; by session/get-session, which is
;; called in update-profile-password's
;; invalidate-others path. Leaving
;; alice's session here means a
;; password-change RPC made on the
;; re-keyed request would invalidate
;; alice's sessions instead of bob's.
(dissoc ::http/auth-data ::session/session)
handler)]
;; Fresh auth-token cookie; replaces the stale one the
;; browser still has (if any).
(create-session! request response)))))))))
(if-let [corp-deny (check-corporate-id request)]
corp-deny
(let [email (resolve-email email-claim)
profile (try
(get-or-register-profile cfg email nil)
(catch Throwable cause
(l/err :hint "x-auth-request: error resolving profile"
:email email
:cause cause)
nil))]
(cond
(nil? profile)
;; Header email doesn't resolve to a profile (and auto-register
;; is off). No identity to switch *to* — pass through with
;; whatever wrap-session set.
(do
(l/wrn :hint "x-auth-request: no profile found for email, passing through unauthenticated"
:email email)
(handler request))

(:is-blocked profile)
(do
(l/wrn :hint "x-auth-request: profile is blocked, denying access"
:email email
:profile-id (str (:id profile)))
{::yres/status 403})

(not (:is-active profile))
(do
(l/wrn :hint "x-auth-request: profile is not active, denying access"
:email email
:profile-id (str (:id profile)))
{::yres/status 403})

;; Steady state — existing browser session matches the proxy-
;; asserted identity. No work to do.
(and session-pid (= session-pid (:id profile)))
(handler request)

;; Either no existing session, or the session points at a
;; *different* profile than oauth2-proxy is asserting. Re-key.
;;
;; This is the fix for the session-sharing bug: portal "log out
;; of all apps" clears the shared _oauth2_proxy cookie + Cognito
;; session but NOT Penpot's auth-token cookie on its subdomain.
;; Without this branch, wrap-session resolves the previous
;; user's profile-id from the stale cookie and this middleware
;; (under the previous always-skip-when-session rule) never
;; overrode it.
:else
(do
(when session-pid
(l/inf :hint "x-auth-request: proxy identity differs from existing session — re-keying"
:session-profile-id (str session-pid)
:header-profile-id (str (:id profile))))
(l/dbg :hint "x-auth-request: authenticating via forwarded header"
:email email
:profile-id (str (:id profile)))
(let [create-session! (session/create-fn cfg profile)
response (-> request
(assoc ::session/profile-id (:id profile))
;; Drop stale identity-carrying keys
;; so downstream code does not see the
;; previous user's data after re-key.
;;
;; ::http/auth-data — errors.clj logs
;; auth-data.claims.uid as
;; :request/profile-id; rpc/helpers
;; exposes the map to RPC handlers via
;; get-auth-data.
;;
;; ::session/session — read indirectly
;; by session/get-session, which is
;; called in update-profile-password's
;; invalidate-others path. Leaving
;; alice's session here means a
;; password-change RPC made on the
;; re-keyed request would invalidate
;; alice's sessions instead of bob's.
(dissoc ::http/auth-data ::session/session)
handler)]
;; Fresh auth-token cookie; replaces the stale one the
;; browser still has (if any).
(create-session! request response))))))))))

(def authz
{:name ::authz
Expand Down
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