fix(rp-login): send the authenticate type the RP actually binds

packages/core/src/rp-login/didcomm.ts

@@ -18,8 +18,17 @@ import { packAuthcrypt, packAuthcryptJson, wrapForward, type Identity } from "..
 import type { RemoteDidcommEndpoint } from "../vta/didcomm.js";
 import type { DidcommMessageBridge } from "../vta/transport.js";
 
-const MSG_AUTHENTICATE = "https://affinidi.com/webvh/1.0/authenticate";
-const MSG_AUTH_RESPONSE = "https://affinidi.com/webvh/1.0/authenticate-response";
+// The canonical Trust-Task auth URIs, matching `did-hosting-common`'s
+// `MSG_AUTHENTICATE` / `MSG_AUTH_RESPONSE` verbatim. This package sent the
+// retired `affinidi.com/webvh/1.0/*` pair, which the control plane's DIDComm
+// router no longer binds — so the request did not route, and a reply under the
+// canonical type would have been rejected here as the wrong type anyway. Login
+// over DIDComm could not succeed against a current RP at all.
+//
+// Matched with `===` against the spelling the RP declares today; no
+// both-spellings fold, per this repo's rule on compatibility arms.
+const MSG_AUTHENTICATE = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/auth/authenticate/0.1";
+const MSG_AUTH_RESPONSE = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/auth/authenticate/0.1#response";
 
 const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000;
 
@@ -64,8 +73,19 @@ export async function loginViaDidcomm(opts: DidcommLoginOptions): Promise<Didcom
     type: MSG_AUTHENTICATE,
     from: holder.did,
     to: [service.did],
-    // Body is ignored by the server — the authcrypt sender identity is the
-    // authentication. Sent empty.
+    // Empty, because the RP's DIDComm handler authenticates on the **authcrypt
+    // sender** and reads nothing from the body (`run_authenticate(&state,
+    // sender)`).
+    //
+    // Worth naming as a conformance gap rather than leaving to be discovered:
+    // the canonical `auth/authenticate/0.1` schema declares `challenge` and
+    // `sessionId` REQUIRED, and the RP obtains a challenge from a REST-only
+    // `POST /api/auth/challenge`. So this message carries a canonical type over
+    // a body that does not satisfy it — a shape the RP chose when it bound its
+    // sender-authenticated handler to that URI, and which this package now
+    // matches rather than diverges from. Closing it properly means the
+    // challenge-based flow over a `TrustTaskSender`, the same shape
+    // `vta/auth-tasks.ts` already uses against the VTA.
     body: {},
   };
 

packages/core/tests/rp-login.didcomm.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+// The RP login's wire contract, pinned.
+//
+// This had drifted: the package sent `affinidi.com/webvh/1.0/authenticate` to a
+// control plane whose DIDComm router binds
+// `trusttasks.org/spec/auth/authenticate/0.1`, so the request did not route and
+// login could not succeed at all. Nothing caught it because nothing tested this
+// module — the type URIs were two string constants no assertion ever read.
+//
+// The values below are the RP's own, from `did-hosting-common`'s
+// `didcomm_types.rs`:
+//
+//     pub const MSG_AUTHENTICATE:  &str = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/auth/authenticate/0.1";
+//     pub const MSG_AUTH_RESPONSE: &str = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/auth/authenticate/0.1#response";
+
+import { test } from "node:test";
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+
+import { loginViaDidcomm } from "../dist/rp-login/index.js";
+import { unpack } from "@openvtc/vti-didcomm-js/unpack";
+import { Identity } from "../dist/didcomm/index.js";
+import { x25519 } from "@noble/curves/ed25519.js";
+
+const AUTHENTICATE = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/auth/authenticate/0.1";
+const AUTH_RESPONSE = `${AUTHENTICATE}#response`;
+const RP_DID = "did:web:rp.example";
+
+function party(did) {
+  const sk = x25519.utils.randomSecretKey();
+  const pk = x25519.getPublicKey(sk);
+  return {
+    did,
+    kid: `${did}#key-1`,
+    secretJwk: {
+      kty: "OKP",
+      crv: "X25519",
+      d: Buffer.from(sk).toString("base64url"),
+      x: Buffer.from(pk).toString("base64url"),
+    },
+    publicJwk: { kty: "OKP", crv: "X25519", x: Buffer.from(pk).toString("base64url") },
+  };
+}
+
+const holderParty = party("did:peer:2holder");
+const rpParty = party(RP_DID);
+
+/** A bridge that unpacks nothing — it reports what was asked of it and replies
+ *  with whatever the test supplies. The crypto is covered elsewhere; what is
+ *  under test here is the contract. */
+function bridge(reply) {
+  const calls = [];
+  return {
+    calls,
+    async sendAndAwaitReply(packed, requestId) {
+      calls.push({ packed, requestId });
+      return typeof reply === "function" ? reply(requestId) : { ...reply, thid: requestId };
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+function opts(b) {
+  return {
+    bridge: b,
+    holder: Identity.fromSecretJwk({
+      did: holderParty.did,
+      kid: holderParty.kid,
+      jwk: holderParty.secretJwk,
+    }),
+    service: {
+      did: RP_DID,
+      keyAgreementKid: rpParty.kid,
+      keyAgreementPublicJwk: rpParty.publicJwk,
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+test("a canonical authenticate-response yields the RP's session tokens", async () => {
+  const b = bridge({
+    from: RP_DID,
+    type: AUTH_RESPONSE,
+    body: {
+      session_id: "s1",
+      access_token: "at",
+      refresh_token: "rt",
+      access_expires_at: 111,
+      refresh_expires_at: 222,
+    },
+  });
+
+  const out = await loginViaDidcomm(opts(b));
+  assert.equal(out.sessionId, "s1");
+  assert.equal(out.accessToken, "at");
+  assert.equal(out.refreshToken, "rt");
+  assert.equal(out.accessExpiresAt, 111);
+  assert.equal(out.refreshExpiresAt, 222);
+});
+
+test("the retired response type is refused — no both-spellings fold", async () => {
+  const b = bridge({
+    from: RP_DID,
+    type: "https://affinidi.com/webvh/1.0/authenticate-response",
+    body: { session_id: "s", access_token: "a", refresh_token: "r" },
+  });
+  await assert.rejects(
+    () => loginViaDidcomm(opts(b)),
+    /authenticate-response/,
+    "the legacy type must not be accepted alongside the canonical one",
+  );
+});
+
+test("a reply from someone other than the RP is refused", async () => {
+  const b = bridge({
+    from: "did:web:imposter.example",
+    type: AUTH_RESPONSE,
+    body: { session_id: "s", access_token: "a", refresh_token: "r" },
+  });
+  await assert.rejects(() => loginViaDidcomm(opts(b)), /!= RP/);
+});
+
+test("a response missing a token is refused rather than half-returned", async () => {
+  const b = bridge({ from: RP_DID, type: AUTH_RESPONSE, body: { session_id: "s" } });
+  await assert.rejects(() => loginViaDidcomm(opts(b)), /malformed/);
+});
+
+test("the request goes out under the canonical authenticate type", async () => {
+  // The assertion that would have caught the drift. Everything above tests the
+  // reply; the request type is what the RP's router binds, and sending the
+  // retired one meant the message never reached a handler at all.
+  const b = bridge({
+    from: RP_DID,
+    type: AUTH_RESPONSE,
+    body: { session_id: "s", access_token: "a", refresh_token: "r" },
+  });
+  await loginViaDidcomm(opts(b));
+
+  // Unpack as the RP would: the authcrypt recipient, with the holder as the
+  // verified sender.
+  const opened = await unpack(
+    b.calls[0].packed,
+    { kid: rpParty.kid, privateJwk: rpParty.secretJwk },
+    { publicJwk: holderParty.publicJwk },
+  );
+  assert.equal(opened.message.type, AUTHENTICATE);
+  assert.equal(opened.message.from, holderParty.did);
+  assert.deepEqual(opened.message.to, [RP_DID]);
+  // Empty by contract: the RP's DIDComm handler authenticates on the authcrypt
+  // sender and reads nothing here. See the note in didcomm.ts about the
+  // conformance gap this leaves against the canonical schema.
+  assert.deepEqual(opened.message.body, {});
+});