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At join time the VTA credential vault is the durable home for the holder's VIC:
- if an invitation is loaded (file / paste), persist it via cred_vault_receive;
- if none is loaded, try loading one the VTA already holds for the holder
(cred_vault_query{purpose: invite} → cred_vault_get) and present it.
Both are best-effort — the join proceeds on the in-memory VIC regardless, so a
VTA without the credential-vault surface (or vault capability) degrades cleanly.
Uses the always-on admin VTA session already threaded into run_join_sequence
and the cred_vault_* methods shipped in vta-sdk 0.17.
Signed-off-by: Glenn Gore <glenn.g@affinidi.com>
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Summary
Wires OpenVTC to the VTA credential vault so the holder's invitation credential (VIC) has a durable home in the VTA rather than living only in memory / a file.
At join time (
run_join_sequence):--invitation <file>or paste), persist it —admin_vta.cred_vault_receive(vic);cred_vault_query({purpose: "invite"})→cred_vault_get(id)→ present it.Both are best-effort: the join proceeds on the in-memory VIC regardless, so a VTA without the credential-vault surface (or without the vault capability on the session) degrades cleanly.
Uses the always-on admin VTA session already threaded into the join flow and the
cred_vault_*methods shipped in vta-sdk 0.17 (verifiable-trust-infrastructure #524).Remaining (this completes #2; #1b build-side still open)
The subject-linkage build side (#1b) — signing
TAG‖vic_id‖presenterwith the subject persona's key to join under a fresh DID — is still open. It's a privacy-niche path (the join-as-subject default, #1a, already auto-presents the invited persona) and needs cross-persona key access + a "present a fresh identity" choice. The VTC verify side + the OpenVTCsign-bytes/SubjectLinkagegroundwork are already merged.Tests
openvtcbuilds clean against tdk 0.8 / vta-sdk 0.17; fmt clean.🤖 Generated with Claude Code