fix(dr): the full restore-verify opens the snapshot under the real store keyring (BACKLOG #1718) - #1126
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…s PHI Full restore verification built a bare StoreSettings to open the extracted snapshot, so an encrypted snapshot opened under the identity cipher: no key, no keyring, no provider. PRAGMA quick_check passed anyway, and the verify reported PASS having proved nothing about whether a single PHI cell was readable. Adding the decrypt pass without the settings fix turns that into the opposite and worse failure -- a perfectly good encrypted archive reported FAIL, which would teach a deploying operator that their backup is bad when it is fine, and a disaster-recovery check that cries wolf gets switched off. Four changes: 1. Thread the live StoreSettings into _verify_archive_blocking and on into _full_open_check, substituting only the path (and the backend, which the archive member is by construction). model_copy, not a rebuilt object, so a field added to StoreSettings later rides along instead of being dropped. 2. Add _decrypt_check: decrypt AND authenticate the snapshot's cipher-covered cells under the store's own cipher, with the same cell-bound AAD the store writes. A bit-flipped AEAD cell passes quick_check and every row count, so this is the half that makes the check worth running. VerifyResult now carries decrypted_cells -- a count, never a plaintext. 3. Bind the store before the try in _full_open_check, so an open that raises surfaces its own cause rather than a cleanup error over the top of it. 4. ADR 0049: correct the full_restore_verify prose, which claimed the open ran through the cipher, and add AC-13. Scope of the decrypt pass, stated rather than implied: it covers the store's own id-keyed _CIPHER_COLUMNS declaration. The cipher-covered tables whose AAD binds to a composite or natural key are enumerated only as code inside the store's bespoke passes, so widening this means giving the store one declaration to publish -- a separate change.
…open closes its handle (BACKLOG #1718) Builds on the commit beneath it, which threaded the live store settings into the full verify and added the decrypt pass. Three things it left open. 1. The status. A snapshot holding sealed cells that the settings resolve no key for was FAIL, which sends an operator looking for a bad archive when the archive is fine and the key configuration is not. It is now KEY_MISMATCH, raised from both places the condition surfaces: the decrypt pass, and the StoreKeylessError the store's own eager state/reference warm-ups raise first. A failed AEAD tag stays FAIL -- CipherError cannot separate bit rot from a key that was never supplied, and bit rot is the reading that must not be softened. 2. The leaked handle. MessageStore.open left its aiosqlite connection open when a warm-up raised, so the verify's temp-directory cleanup was refused and its PermissionError replaced the real cause. Measured here: without the guard the new test reports WinError 32 on the extracted snapshot instead of the missing key. 3. The case the item was filed for. No test held a state or reference row -- the rows the store decrypts eagerly at open, and so the ones that turned every scheduled backup of a keyed store into a failing verify. ADR 0049 AC-13 is amended for the status split and AC-14 added for the close; the CONFIGURATION.md row for full_restore_verify now says what the leg proves. The crypto-inventory gate (ASVS 11.1.3) also had to be told that dr_backup.py now imports the store-cipher seam. That import arrives with the commit below, so this branch reds that required leg without the row.
…ow it half does (BACKLOG #1718) The full restore-verify opens the extracted snapshot's cipher-covered cells through the STORE cipher (build_store_cipher, ADR 0049 AC-13). That is the same cipher that wrote them, so under cipher_provider = vault_transit the read runs in Transit. PHI.md's PL-1 rule said vault_transit never applies to a backup, full stop, and that sentence is now a false premise -- the kind §11 forbids a control from resting on. The archive's own seal is unchanged: backup_codec, keyed by resolve_active_key, so vault_transit still never applies to sealing or unsealing a .mfbak. The distinction is the archive versus the cells inside it, and the doc now states it. The guard that caught this asserted "build_store_cipher not in dr_backup.py", which pinned "one cipher in this module" rather than the claim itself. It now pins the distinction: if the module builds the store cipher, §3 has to say which cipher governs which read. Its other assertions are untouched. This is a required CI leg, red on both the ubuntu and windows-2022 test rows of PR 1126 before this commit.
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LANDER: PR 1126 and PR 1138 ARE THE SAME FEATURE, built twice under two item numbers. Neither should merge until one is withdrawn. Posting this on both. THE EVIDENCE, measured rather than inferred from the titles. The Overlap on the rest: 113 of the 126 added lines in PR 1138's PR 1126 is the superset. It additionally changes WHY THIS NEEDED SAYING NOW rather than at merge time. Two PRs implementing one feature against different bases do not necessarily conflict textually. Whichever lands second can merge clean and double-apply, and the merge queue will not report anything. This is the failure mode that does not announce itself, which is why I am recording it while both are still unmergeable rather than discovering it on the second merge. WHAT I AM NOT DOING YET. I am not closing PR 1138, because PR 1126 has not proved it can land and I will not discard the fallback before the preferred one is green. PR 1126 currently reads BLOCKED: ON PR 1126's OTHER RED, so it is not mistaken for a reason to prefer PR 1138: That leg intermittently times out starting NEITHER DIFF HAS BEEN READ AT HUNK GRANULARITY YET. This comment establishes the relationship only. A read verdict follows separately, and neither will be enqueued before one. |
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Cross-PR finding from the Builder on #1147, verified here before posting. Not a blocker for review, but it should not land unnoticed. The two cleanup paths added here are unshielded, and they catch
Measured: The non-cancellation path — a Two options, and I am not asserting which is right:
#1147 and this PR merge clean and use no competing locking idiom; this is the one interaction worth a decision rather than a silent resolution. |
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Triage of the two red rows, and a structural note that is worth more than either.
No test logic ran — The structural note: a NOT-required leg is blocking a REQUIRED context here. The only two failed jobs in that run are That matters beyond this PR. Anyone classifying rows against the required set, as they should, will read All other required contexts on this PR are green, including all three I have re-run the failed jobs on the same head. The attempt-1 evidence is quoted above so the re-run does not erase the failure that was actually acted on. |
…ACKLOG #1718) store.py resolves to main's content. This PR's step 4 closed the connection on a failed MessageStore.open so a keyless open surfaces KEY_MISMATCH, not a Windows PermissionError from temp-dir cleanup. BACKLOG #1670 (1fbcf78) landed independently doing the same thing, and its try/except around the whole region after aiosqlite.connect subsumes this branch's two narrower guards: it closes the constructed store, which owns the read pool, and the writer either way. Verified, not asserted. This PR's own regression test test_full_verify_on_a_failed_open_reports_the_open_error_not_a_cleanup_error passes against main's code. Control: deleting main's cleanup block reds it with WinError 32 masking the expected KEY_MISMATCH, the exact symptom step 4 was written against. The PR keeps its DR-side value: _full_open_check under the real store keyring, _decrypt_check, KEY_MISMATCH, ADR 0049 and the docs.
Conflict resolved: store.py takes main's content, this PR's store.py hunk is droppedHead moved How, and why
Main's BACKLOG #1670 already covers this PR's step 4. Step 4 added a connection-close on a failed Main's version is a strict superset, not merely an equivalent:
Verified, not assertedThis PR's own regression test is the experiment, run against main's implementation: A passing test that examines nothing is indistinguishable from a real pass, so I ran a positive control: deleting main's That is the exact symptom step 4 was written against. The control was reverted; store.py is identical to Nothing landed was reverted
The last four ran together: 138 passed, 4 skipped. Also green: What this PR still deliversDropping the store.py hunk costs the PR nothing it uniquely offered. Its DR-side work has no counterpart on main: Remaining diff vs main is 8 files: One note for whoever lands thisThe Not enqueued, auto-merge not armed. |
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LANDER review. Read against head 428f0a5, base 0f9206a (current main). Merge. THE DEFECT IS THE GATE-THAT-EXAMINED-NOTHING FAMILY IN THE HIGHEST-STAKES PLACE THERE IS. A full restore-verify opened the snapshot and reported PASS without ever proving a single PHI cell was readable. The docstring puts it better than I would:
A disaster-recovery check that goes green on an unrecoverable archive is the worst false green in the product, because the one moment its answer matters is the moment nobody can go back and re-check it. THE CONTROL IS IN THE TEST AND IT IS THE RIGHT ONE: paired with its mirror on the unencrypted archive: That pairing is what makes the count meaningful rather than decorative. Zero is accepted ONLY where it is provably correct, and demanded to be non-zero everywhere else. THE SUBTLEST CORRECT THING IS THE IDENTITY-CIPHER TRAP. THE KEY_MISMATCH / FAIL DISCRIMINATION IS ARGUED IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. A
Binding I VERIFIED THE TWO LOAD-BEARING CLAIMS RATHER THAN ACCEPTING THEM.
ON THE MERGE RESOLUTION, WHICH I ALSO CHECKED. The Manager reports AND THE BUILDER PROVED IT INSTEAD OF READING IT, which is the part worth repeating: it DELETED main's cleanup block and re-ran this PR's own regression test, which went red with THIS IS THE THIRD TIME TONIGHT TWO LEDGER NUMBERS TURNED OUT TO NAME ONE DEFECT (#1718's step 4 and #1670). That is worth a ledger item of its own rather than three separate rediscoveries. Verdict: merge. |
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LANDER: both reds are known flakes, neither is yours, and I am NOT re-running yet — re-running now would be wasted. My merge verdict above stands. RED 1 -- the store thread race, and it has now reached a THIRD platform. That arrived on This is why I am not re-running this leg now. Your PR's own CI builds against The evidence that #1174 works is a paired control CI produced on its own: two queue branches in the same batch, one second apart, differing by exactly that diff — RED 2 -- the pwsh launch ceiling, BACKLOG #1304. Different tests again ( I want to flag my own error on that second one, because it is the more useful half. I recently escalated #1168 to the owner over four failures of this exact leg, having never measured the leg's failure RATE. Four-in-a-row at a one-in-three rate is unremarkable. A count is not evidence until you know the rate it should be compared against, and I had run only the sibling control — which answers "is it broken everywhere?", not "is four surprising?". WHAT HAPPENS NEXT, so nothing is owed from you: #1174 lands, I re-run this PR's failed legs, and enqueue when they are green. 28 SUCCESS already, and the only two reds are the two flakes above. |
Closes BACKLOG #1718.
_full_open_checkinmessagefoundry/pipeline/dr_backup.pyopened therestore-verify snapshot with a bare
StoreSettings, which carries no key, so on a keyed store thesnapshot opened under the identity cipher. It passed a corrupted store and failed a good one holding a
stateorreferencerow.THIS PR CARRIES TWO AUTHORS' WORK, AND THE OLDER HALF HAD NEVER BEEN REVIEWED
The lower commit is
9c1efdaaf1a5bf477c1479d659fbd171037edac6, rebased onto currentmainasdc2f5f8e2. It was written and pushed on 2026-09-14 by an agent session that has since died, on abranch that had no pull request and cited no backlog number in its subject, so it was invisible
to both a PR listing and a citation grep. It was one commit ahead of
mainand fourteen behind.git patch-id --stableon the original and on the rebased commit isf654977d684ad5b60b0d44eb8f66de0593d70382for both, so the rebase preserved it byte-for-byte; there were no conflicts.
I am the first reviewer it has ever had. I read it at hunk granularity and judged it sound: it threads
the live
StoreSettingsinto_verify_archive_blockingand on into_full_open_check(
model_copysubstituting onlypathandbackend), adds_decrypt_checkreading the snapshot'scipher-covered cells back through
build_store_cipherunder the samecell_aadbinding, addsVerifyResult.decrypted_cells, and amends ADR 0049. Whoever lands this should know they are gettingthat work as well as mine.
Its commit message overclaims one thing, which I left standing rather than rewrite another author's
text: change 3 says it binds the store before the
tryin_full_open_checkso an open that raisessurfaces its own cause. The store was already bound before the
tryin the shipped code — the leak isinside
MessageStore.open, one frame down, which is item step 4 and is my commit.WHAT I ADDED ON TOP (
d34676f55)Step 4 of the item: a failed open closes its handle.
MessageStore.openleft its aiosqliteconnection open when a warm-up raised, so the verify's temp-directory cleanup was refused on Windows
and its
PermissionErrorreplaced the real cause. Two guards now close what they own and re-raise;the close is itself wrapped so a failing cleanup cannot mask the open's error either.
Step 2's status split. A snapshot holding sealed cells that the settings resolve no key for was
FAIL; it is nowKEY_MISMATCH, raised from both places the condition surfaces — the decrypt pass,and the
StoreKeylessErrorthe store's eagerstate/referencewarm-ups raise first. A failed AEADtag stays
FAIL:CipherErrorcannot separate bit rot from a key that was never supplied (its owndocstring says so), and bit rot is the reading that must not be softened. ADR 0049 AC-13 amended,
AC-14 added for the close, and the
docs/CONFIGURATION.mdrow forfull_restore_verifycorrected —that row is the false promise the item quotes.
Step 3's missing case. No test held a
stateorreferencerow. Those are the rowsMessageStore.opendecrypts eagerly, and so the ones that turned every scheduled backup of a keyedstore into a failing verify. Two new tests:
test_full_verify_passes_on_a_snapshot_holding_state_and_reference_rowsandtest_full_verify_on_a_failed_open_reports_the_open_error_not_a_cleanup_error.The crypto-inventory gate (ASVS 11.1.3).
dr_backup.pygains amessagefoundry.store.cryptoimport in the lower commit, and that trips the gate. Without the INVENTORY row this branch reds a
required leg. This is evidence the lower commit never ran through
pre-commitor CI.AND A SECOND RED THE INHERITED COMMIT LEFT BEHIND, CAUGHT BY CI (
460d21948)tests/test_phi_at_rest_inventory.py::test_pl1_encryption_rule_carves_out_the_backup_codecreddenedboth the
ubuntu-latestandwindows-2022test legs on the first push. It asserted"build_store_cipher" not in dr_backup.py, pinning a sentence indocs/PHI.md§3 PL-1:"Because the key is resolved by
resolve_active_keyand notbuild_store_cipher,cipher_provider = vault_transitnever applies to a backup."That sentence is now half wrong, and the half that is wrong matters. The archive's own seal is
unchanged —
backup_codec, keyed byresolve_active_key— sovault_transitstill never applies tosealing or unsealing a
.mfbak. Butfull_restore_verifynow opens the snapshot's cipher-coveredCELLS through
build_store_cipher, and undervault_transitthat read runs in Transit. I correcteddocs/PHI.mdto state the distinction (the archive versus the cells inside it) and re-pointed theguard at the claim instead of at the import: if the module builds the store cipher, §3 has to say which
cipher governs which read. Its other assertions are untouched.
This is the second gate the inherited commit had never been run against, and it is the substantive one:
a security document asserting a control that does not hold is exactly what CLAUDE.md §11 / SDS-3.7
forbids.
POSITIVE CONTROL, measured on this box. With the
store.pyguard reverted and everything elseunchanged,
test_full_verify_on_a_failed_open_reports_the_open_error_not_a_cleanup_errorfails withPermissionError: [WinError 32] The process cannot access the file because it is being used by another process: '...\mefor-verify-1igwxz1e\extracted_store.db', reported asFAIL. That is the item'smeasured symptom reproduced, and it is what the guard fixes. 9 of 10 passed in that control run, so the
instrument is not failing everything.
FILE TYPES, not the subject
Six
.pyfiles, two of them engine modules and one a CI gate script. Do not read this as a docs PR.messagefoundry/store/store.pytouchesMessageStore.open, which every SQLite-backed test in therepository runs through. The change is two
try/except BaseExceptionguards that close and re-raise;the success path is unchanged. That breadth is the main review risk here and is why the whole-suite legs
matter more than usual.
CHECKS RUN
ruff format --check .ruff check .mypy messagefoundry(strict)pytest tests/test_restore_verify.pypytest tests/test_backup_restore_atleastonce.py test_backup_runner.py test_backup_crypto.py test_store_aad_binding.pypre-commit(full hook set, at commit)pytest tests/test_phi_at_rest_inventory.pypytest tests/test_asvs_gcm_invocation_bound.py-n 4,test_connscale_smoke.pydeselectedWHAT MUST BE READ AFTER I AM GONE
reported one failure I caused myself — I edited
store.pywhile it was running, which staleslinecacheunderinspect.getsourceand madetest_asvs_gcm_invocation_bound.py::test_every_batched_encrypt_burst_charges_the_bound_on_every_backendraise
tokenize.TokenError: unterminated string literal. That file passes 32/32 on a stable tree; thefailure is an artifact of mid-run editing, not a defect. I restarted the run on the stable tree and it
did not finish before my process exited. It is not a result and I am not reporting it as one.
Because
MessageStore.openis on every SQLite test's path, the Linux and Windowspytestlegs arethe real gate on this PR, not the DR suite I ran. The first push's CI already ran the whole suite:
13121 passed with the single
test_phi_at_rest_inventoryfailure that460d21948fixes.windows-service-smokeand any other hosted-runner-only leg — a Builder never sees these.repo harness tests (windows-2025)is RED and it is not mine.tests/test_worktree_gate_control_plane.py::test_a_carried_env_at_an_UNRELATED_repo_allows_from_a_GOVERNED_cwdreports
PWSH LAUNCH TIMED OUT after 45s (BACKLOG #1304)— the known slow-Windows-runner pwsh-launchtimeout the test itself cites. 3210 passed beside it, the
ubuntu-latestharness row passed, andworktree_gate.ps1is not in this diff. This leg is NOT in the required set (read below). Do notinherit it into the next PR.
tests/test_required_contexts.pypassed onall three
testrows. Read branch protection for the live set rather than either that file or thisparagraph; measured at 2026-09-15 it is 15 contexts:
CI gate,a PR that implements BACKLOG #N must update BACKLOG.md,bandit (Python SAST),cla,crypto-inventory (ASVS 11.1.3 discovery gate),dependency-and-secret-scan,forbidden-content,gitleaks,npm-audit,pip-audit,repo-scan,semgrep, and the threetest (ubuntu-latest | windows-2022 | windows-2025, py3.14)rows.NON-REQUIRED legs that cover these file types, so green-required is not sufficient here: the
ideleg does not touch this, but the coverage/lint-extras and any docs-link legs do cover the two.mdfiles, and the ASVS anchor-report workflow reads
scripts/security/. The required set is the merge bar,not the correctness bar.
QUESTIONS I COULD NOT RESOLVE
KEY_MISMATCHat all? The item's "what closing looks like" step 2 saysreport
KEY_MISMATCHwhen the keyring cannot, and I implemented that. The inherited commit's AC-13deliberately said
FAILinstead. Both are defensible and I chose the item's wording. If the ownerprefers the narrower reading — that
KEY_MISMATCHnames only the ARCHIVE header fingerprint compareand nothing else — the change is one status string and one AC sentence.
_decrypt_checkreadsMessageStore._CIPHER_COLUMNS, a private class attribute, frompipeline/. That is the inherited commit's choice, documented in its docstring, and it is the onlyway to avoid copying the store's coverage list into the DR module. It is still a
pipeline/modulereading a
store/private. The clean fix is for the store to publish that declaration; I did not doit, because it widens the change into a store API addition.
mfenc:cell in the covered columns. On a multi-GB storethat is a full scan plus a decrypt per row inside a scheduled backup.
full_restore_verifyisopt-in and documented as heavier, so this may be intended, but nobody has measured it at scale.
FOOTPRINT DEVIATIONS
My brief's footprint was
dr_backup.py,store.py,test_restore_verify.py,test_backup_restore_atleastonce.py,docs/CONFIGURATION.mdanddocs/adr/0049-*.md. Two files falloutside it:
scripts/security/crypto_inventory_check.py— forced by the crypto-inventory gate, mine.docs/PHI.mdandtests/test_phi_at_rest_inventory.py— forced by the required test leg above, mine.messagefoundry/__main__.py— arrives with the inherited commit (therestore-verifyCLI printsdecrypted_cells), not mine.Neither is in any sibling builder's stated footprint.
tests/test_backup_restore_atleastonce.pyneededno edit:
store_settingsis keyword-with-default, so its positional-by-keyword calls still compile.CI STATE WHEN I EXITED
All 14 non-aggregate required contexts green on
460d21948, including all threetestOS rows(ubuntu 7m39s, windows-2022 8m25s, windows-2025 10m52s), both SQL Server rows,
postgres store, andall three web-console rows.
CI gatewas still pending as the aggregator. The one red anywhere on thePR is the non-required
repo harness tests (windows-2025)flake described above.BACKLOG #1718 is CLAIMED by this worktree (
scripts/coord/claim.ps1 -Take 1718). Release it after themerge:
pwsh -NoProfile -File scripts\coord\claim.ps1 -Release 1718.Not enqueued and auto-merge not armed — both belong to the Lander.