ClipnPaste is a local desktop app for Linux (X11). It does not require network access at runtime and does not phone home.
| In scope | Out of scope |
|---|---|
| Malicious or buggy frontend invoke trying to write outside Screenshots | Full multi-user / multi-seat isolation on a shared machine |
| Accidental path traversal via save filename/path | Defending against other processes running as the same user |
| Overly large clipboard/image payloads exhausting memory | Kernel / X11 / compositor compromise |
| Loose Unix socket permissions for local IPC | Network attackers (app is offline) |
Same-user malware can already read the clipboard and drive the session; ClipnPaste does not claim to stop that.
| Path | Mode (intent) | Contents |
|---|---|---|
~/.local/share/clipnpaste/ |
0700 |
App data directory |
…/history.db |
0600 |
Clipboard history (text + images as data URLs) |
…/settings.json |
user umask | UI preferences |
…/ipc.sock |
0600 |
Local control socket for hotkeys / clipnpaste-cli |
…/focus_target |
under data dir | Last paste target window id |
$XDG_PICTURES_DIR/Screenshots/ |
user dir | Snip PNG files |
Treat history and screenshots as sensitive (passwords, secrets, personal images).
clipnpaste-cli and desktop shortcuts talk to a Unix domain socket under the data directory. Commands are allowlisted: clipboard, emoji, snip, settings. There is no authentication beyond filesystem permissions (owner-only socket).
Edited snips and save_png only write under the Screenshots directory. Client-supplied paths are validated (basename sanitization; no .. / absolute escape). Decoded PNG size is capped (MAX_IMAGE_BYTES, 10 MiB).
Tauri CSP allows script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' (typical for this stack). Windows are local UI only; no remote origins are loaded for core features.
If you find a vulnerability, open a private security advisory or contact the maintainer via the GitHub repository. Please avoid filing public issues that include exploit details until a fix is available.