fix(client): verify the server certificate and hostname when TLS is on - #90
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Closes #65. Fixes the client half of GHSA-pr76-c2f9-qx6r. Conn.ssl_opts/1 fell back to verify: :verify_none whenever no :cacert was given, so --tls alone bought encryption without authentication: anyone on the path presents their own certificate, the client accepts it, and reads and rewrites the traffic while both ends look healthy. Verification is now the default and skipping it is opt-in, because the old failure mode was silent from the caller's side. Without a CA the client verifies against the operating system's trust store, the set a browser or curl would use, so a broker behind a proxy with a publicly signed certificate works with no flag while a privately signed one fails closed. That failure is the common case for this project (the repo's own generate-dist-certs.sh issues a private CA), so a verification alert is translated into a message naming both ways forward, --cacert for a private CA and --insecure for a development server, instead of surfacing a raw TLS alert. A missing or unreadable OS trust store is refused as :no_system_trust_store rather than degraded to an unverified connection. Hostname verification comes with it, on the --cacert path too, not just the new one: verify_peer alone accepts a certificate legitimately issued for another host as long as it chains to a trusted CA, so checking the chain without checking the name is half a fix. SNI carries the requested name and pkix_verify_hostname_match_fun(:https) holds the certificate to it. --insecure is the single remaining way to skip verification. It is recorded in the rebuilt reproduce command for the same reason the certificate paths are: a command that omitted it would reproduce a stronger configuration than the run it claims to describe. Verification: eight new cases in test/malachi/loadtest/conn_tls_test.exs, four asserting the policy itself without a server (no CA uses cacerts and never verify_none, a CA uses cacertfile, both carry SNI and the hostname match_fun, insecure is the only verify_none) and four end to end against a live TLS listener (a self-signed server is refused with the two-way hint, a CA-signed server connects, a certificate for another host is refused with the chain otherwise valid, and insecure still connects). Non-vacuity proven by reintroducing verify_none locally: five of the eight fail, including both end-to-end refusals, which start connecting again. The CA-signed fixture is deliberate, since OTP rejects a self-signed peer as selfsigned_peer even when it is named as the CA, so only a real CA plus signed certificate can show that a private-CA deployment still works. Full suite 1262 tests and 0 failures including multinode; format, credo --strict, dialyzer, sobelow and docs --warnings-as-errors clean, all with unpiped exit codes.
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe Elixir load test now verifies TLS certificates and hostnames by default. It supports explicit ChangesTLS verification and insecure mode
Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~45 minutes Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to Default TLS runs can produce reproduction commands that fail or no longer use the system trust store, preventing users from reliably replaying verified load tests. Filter unset TLS paths before merge. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant Loadtest
participant Conn
participant TrustStore
participant TLSServer
Loadtest->>Conn: Connect with TLS options
Conn->>TrustStore: Load configured CA or system certificates
Conn->>TLSServer: Perform verified TLS handshake
TLSServer-->>Conn: Return handshake result
Conn-->>Loadtest: Return connection or explained verification error
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
✨ Finishing Touches📝 Generate docstrings
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📊 Measured on this branch
Chaos certification: PASSED at RF 3: 4 faults injected, 1,841 acknowledged writes verified Each generator ran on its own runner, server pinned to 3 cores and generator to 1, sweeping These numbers are measured, not committed: a shared runner varies enough between runs that This comment was automatically generated by the results workflow |
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Inline comments:
In `@lib/malachi/loadtest.ex`:
- Around line 813-817: Update tls_options/1 to filter out entries whose
Keyword.get(conn_opts, option) returns nil before appending them to the TLS
options list, while preserving configured :cacert, :cert, and :key paths and the
existing insecure options.
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docs/guides/running-the-elixir-loadtest.mdlib/malachi/loadtest.exlib/malachi/loadtest/conn.exlib/mix/tasks/malachi.loadtest.extest/malachi/loadtest/conn_tls_test.exstest/malachi/loadtest_test.exs
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📝 Description
Conn.ssl_opts/1 fell back to verify: :verify_none whenever no :cacert was given, so --tls alone bought encryption without authentication: anyone on the path presents their own certificate, the client accepts it, and reads and rewrites the traffic while both ends look healthy. Verification is now the default and skipping it is opt-in, because the old failure mode was silent from the caller's side.
Without a CA the client verifies against the operating system's trust store, the set a browser or curl would use, so a broker behind a proxy with a publicly signed certificate works with no flag while a privately signed one fails closed. That failure is the common case for this project (the repo's own generate-dist-certs.sh issues a private CA), so a verification alert is translated into a message naming both ways forward, --cacert for a private CA and --insecure for a development server, instead of surfacing a raw TLS alert. A missing or unreadable OS trust store is refused as :no_system_trust_store rather than degraded to an unverified connection.
Hostname verification comes with it, on the --cacert path too, not just the new one: verify_peer alone accepts a certificate legitimately issued for another host as long as it chains to a trusted CA, so checking the chain without checking the name is half a fix. SNI carries the requested name and pkix_verify_hostname_match_fun(:https) holds the certificate to it.
--insecure is the single remaining way to skip verification. It is recorded in the rebuilt reproduce command for the same reason the certificate paths are: a command that omitted it would reproduce a stronger configuration than the run it claims to describe.
Verification: eight new cases in test/malachi/loadtest/conn_tls_test.exs, four asserting the policy itself without a server (no CA uses cacerts and never verify_none, a CA uses cacertfile, both carry SNI and the hostname match_fun, insecure is the only verify_none) and four end to end against a live TLS listener (a self-signed server is refused with the two-way hint, a CA-signed server connects, a certificate for another host is refused with the chain otherwise valid, and insecure still connects). Non-vacuity proven by reintroducing verify_none locally: five of the eight fail, including both end-to-end refusals, which start connecting again. The CA-signed fixture is deliberate, since OTP rejects a self-signed peer as selfsigned_peer even when it is named as the CA, so only a real CA plus signed certificate can show that a private-CA deployment still works. Full suite 1262 tests and 0 failures including multinode; format, credo --strict, dialyzer, sobelow and docs --warnings-as-errors clean, all with unpiped exit codes.
🔖 Type of Change
✅ Checklist
🧪 How to Test
📸 Screenshots (if applicable)
🔗 Related Issues
Closes #65. Fixes the client half of GHSA-pr76-c2f9-qx6r.
Note about versioning:
patch,minorormajoron the PR[major],[minor]in the titlepatch(0.0.1)Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
--insecureto allow unverified TLS connections when needed for development.Documentation
--insecureoption.Bug Fixes