GovEngine is an in-process governance kernel. It is not a scanner, exploit framework, sandbox, execution runtime, or remote authorization authority.
GovEngine source currently tracks the published 1.0.0rc2 release candidate.
Security fixes should target main until the stable release line exists. The
public rc2 artifacts passed independent external review with zero open P0/P1
and were published through the tag-confirmed OIDC workflow. Final 1.0.0
promotion requires the candidate observation window to complete without an
open P0/P1 and the remaining downstream qualification to stay green.
Please report security-sensitive issues privately to the project owner when possible. Do not publish credentials, private targets, raw runtime logs, or exploit details in public issues.
GovEngine must not:
- treat LLM prose as executable authority;
- construct live shell commands from untrusted text;
- violate the documented SCLite/GovEngine/RExecOp/profile dependency direction;
- publish raw stdout/stderr, command logs, credentials, cookies, private paths, or private target identifiers;
- claim authorization to test a target;
- claim live vulnerability evidence from dry-run artifacts.
The detailed trusted computing base, attacker model and residual risks are in
docs/THREAT_MODEL.md. Tested guarantees, digest
bindings and explicit non-claims are in
docs/SECURITY_GUARANTEES.md.
GovEngine runs in the host process. It does not claim resistance to a malicious or fully compromised in-process host that skips the kernel or ignores its decision.
New safety-sensitive code should be deterministic by default, testable without live targets, and explicit about:
- scope and policy decisions;
- approved vs prepared execution shape;
- dry-run/local/mock/live truth;
- receipt/evidence non-claims;
- bounded, recursively filtered metadata at key-resolution and trust-store adapter boundaries;
- owner-review boundaries.