🛡️ Sentinel: Fix XXE vulnerability in SVG parser - #21
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- Initializes `XMLDocument` with `.nodeLoadExternalEntitiesNever` in `SVGParser.swift`. - Prevents XML External Entity (XXE) attacks when parsing untrusted SVG files. - Hardens the codebase against local file inclusion and SSRF vulnerabilities via malicious SVGs.
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- Initializes `XMLDocument` with `.nodeLoadExternalEntitiesNever` in `SVGParser.swift`. - Prevents XML External Entity (XXE) attacks when parsing untrusted SVG files. - Hardens the codebase against local file inclusion and SSRF vulnerabilities via malicious SVGs. - Verified `XMLDocument` usage across the codebase; `FileWriter.swift` only writes XML and is safe.
- Initializes `XMLDocument` with `.nodeLoadExternalEntitiesNever` in `SVGParser.swift`. - Prevents XML External Entity (XXE) attacks when parsing untrusted SVG files. - Hardens the codebase against local file inclusion and SSRF vulnerabilities via malicious SVGs. - Verified `XMLDocument` usage across the codebase; `FileWriter.swift` only writes XML and is safe.
alexey1312
changed the title
- Initializes `XMLDocument` with `.nodeLoadExternalEntitiesNever` in `SVGParser.swift`. - Prevents XML External Entity (XXE) attacks when parsing untrusted SVG files. - Hardens the codebase against local file inclusion and SSRF vulnerabilities via malicious SVGs. - Verified `XMLDocument` usage across the codebase; `FileWriter.swift` only writes XML and is safe. - Verified `parse(contentsOf:)` delegates to the patched method.
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🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix XXE vulnerability in SVG parser
🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
💡 Vulnerability: The SVG parser initialized
XMLDocumentwith empty options, potentially allowing XML External Entity (XXE) attacks if the underlying XML parser processes external entities by default.🎯 Impact: Attackers could potentially read local files or perform SSRF attacks by supplying malicious SVG content.
🔧 Fix: Explicitly disable external entity loading by passing
.nodeLoadExternalEntitiesNeverto theXMLDocumentinitializer.✅ Verification: Verified code change ensures
optionsare set correctly. (Runtime verification skipped due to CI environment limitations).PR created automatically by Jules for task 4237659465778421869 started by @alexey1312