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Security: BruceL017/enterprise-agent

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported Versions

Security fixes are accepted for the current release candidate line:

Version Supported
v0.1.0-rc.1 Yes

Reporting A Vulnerability

Do not open a public issue with exploit details or secrets. Report privately to the repository maintainers using GitHub Security Advisories or the private contact channel configured by the project owner.

Include:

  • affected version or commit
  • reproduction steps
  • impact
  • whether any credentials, customer data, or production systems were exposed

Public Repository Rules

  • Never commit .env, real API keys, tokens, cookies, SSH keys, private keys, database dumps, backup files, logs, or screenshots containing credentials.
  • Keep .env.example placeholder-only.
  • Rotate any credential that was pasted into task descriptions, logs, issues, pull requests, or local files.
  • Run a secret scan before every public push.

Recommended local scan:

rg -n -i "API_KEY|SECRET|TOKEN|PASSWORD|PRIVATE_KEY|OPENAI|ANTHROPIC|CLAUDE|GEMINI|DEEPSEEK|KIMI|SILICONFLOW|SUPABASE|LARK|TELEGRAM|GITHUB_TOKEN|GITLAB|JWT|ENCRYPTION|bearer|sk-[A-Za-z0-9]|xoxb-|ghp_|glpat-|-----BEGIN" \
  -g '!node_modules/**' -g '!dist/**' -g '!__pycache__/**' -g '!.venv/**' .

If a real secret was committed to Git history, do not push the repository publicly. Rotate the credential and either rewrite history or initialize a clean repository from sanitized files.

Production Security Baseline

  • Set ADMIN_API_TOKEN, OPERATOR_API_TOKEN, VIEWER_API_TOKEN, and AGENT_API_TOKEN to strong random values.
  • Set AUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRES_AT for trial token expiry.
  • Set APP_SECRET_KEY to a stable high-entropy value before storing provider configs.
  • Put the API and Web Console behind TLS and a trusted reverse proxy.
  • Replace bearer-token RBAC with OIDC/SSO before broad multi-user rollout.
  • Store production secrets in Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, GCP Secret Manager, Azure Key Vault, or an equivalent managed secret store.
  • Keep production/high-risk tools approval-gated.
  • Keep real external write adapters disabled until sandbox rollback acceptance is complete.

Built-In Safety Boundaries

  • Mock provider and mock external adapters are the default.
  • Provider secrets are masked in API/CLI/Web responses and encrypted when stored through provider config APIs.
  • Tool calls go through Tool Registry, Policy Engine, event logging, approval, and rollback planning.
  • MCP servers default to untrusted and require an explicit manifest, trusted, and allowed_tools.
  • Secret-like values are redacted from logs, events, tool calls, rollback plans, approval payloads, and API responses.

There aren't any published security advisories