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Security: AlterMundi/daimon-matrix

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Reporting

Do not publish vulnerabilities involving active identities, private memory, credentials, or deployed infrastructure in a public issue. Contact the AlterMundi maintainers privately with reproduction details and affected versions.

V0 boundaries

  • Root /me keys are never committed, shared among collective members, or installed in ordinary bodies.
  • One being may authorize multiple simultaneously active embodiment credentials. A second valid embodiment is not split-brain evidence.
  • Identity credentials never replace Cluster resource fences: incompatible writes to the same concrete resource require one current fenced holder and stale generations fail closed.
  • Runtime keys and credentials remain outside the public repository.
  • GitHub coordination uses dedicated ephemeral session keys. It must never reuse a Daimon root, operational, transport, SSH, signing, or encryption key; a coordination session is work attribution, not /me or presence evidence.
  • Public signing keys are never treated as encryption secrets.
  • Tribe and source relationships do not imply access beyond signed grants.
  • Models may propose memory changes but cannot write canonical state directly.
  • Legacy Tribe Bridge ciphertext must be treated as potentially non-confidential.
  • Fixtures and CI must use synthetic identities, memories, keys, and messages.

The V0 threat model and cryptographic test vectors must be complete before any live CompAII canary.

There aren't any published security advisories