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+# 2026-07
+
+## PyPI Safety & Security Engineer (Mike Fiedler)
+
+### Malware Response
+
+July brought 202 malware reports across 173 unique packages.
+153 were confirmed and the releases removed,
+13 were false positives, and 36 remain open,
+for 93.2% accuracy on closed reports.
+Another 60-plus reports from prior periods are still queued.
+Corroboration held steady at 53 reports (26.2%) carrying two or more independent observers,
+and auto-quarantine restricted 108 of the 173 reported packages before anyone looked at them,
+so most user-facing exposure was contained ahead of manual review.
+
+Response times slipped.
+Of 264 email conversations,
+26% closed within 4 hours and another 29% within a day,
+but the 21% that ran past 4 days pulled the office-hours average to 2 days 5 hours.
+Two of five working weeks went to EuroPython and travel,
+and reports arriving during a conference week wait for someone to reach a keyboard.
+
+Mike closed out the ["Hades" wave of the Shai-Hulud campaign](https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/shai-hulud-hades-wave-hits-six-pypi-bioinformatics-packages)
+that dominated June with three more advisory batches
+([one](https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/pull/333),
+[two](https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/pull/336),
+[final](https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/pull/344)).
+Each entry covers phantom releases published from stolen credentials.
+On import, those releases ran a bundled JavaScript payload
+that harvested credentials and tried to spread itself further.
+Mike also [pinned all GitHub Actions references](https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/pull/332)
+in that repository.
+
+### Security Fixes and Hardening
+
+Mike reviewed and shipped a fix for
+[session re-authentication accepting another account's credentials](https://github.com/pypi/warehouse/pull/20126).
+The re-auth form carried a hidden username field;
+editing it before submission let a stale session be re-authenticated
+with a different user's password.
+The fix drops the field and validates against the session's own user ID,
+with a [follow-up filed](https://github.com/pypi/warehouse/issues/20321)
+to keep the two validation paths from drifting apart.
+
+A late-month vulnerability report yielded three false positives and one real finding,
+[percent-encoded dots accepted during URL verification](https://github.com/pypi/warehouse/pull/20333),
+fixed the same day.
+Mike also reviewed a proposed change to
+[reject PyPI tokens found in uploaded files](https://github.com/pypi/warehouse/pull/19994),
+and reviewed a public disclosure about incidents surfaced during cybersecurity evaluations,
+collecting evidence on a related PyPI project.
+
+Using [GitHub's new controls over what can trigger a workflow](https://github.blog/changelog/2026-06-18-control-who-and-what-triggers-github-actions-workflows/),
+Mike blocked `pull_request_target` across the `pypi` organization.
+Nothing used it, so the policy guards against someone adding one later.
+Other organizations publishing to PyPI should consider the same setting.
+
+Email handling is less silent about its own failures now.
+Warehouse [re-sends the unrecognized-login notice on repeated attempts](https://github.com/pypi/warehouse/pull/20323)
+instead of going quiet after a soft bounce,
+[emits a reason whenever a send is skipped](https://github.com/pypi/warehouse/pull/20320),
+and has [steadier MX validation coverage](https://github.com/pypi/warehouse/pull/20306).
+
+### Trusted Publishing
+
+[CircleCI as a Trusted Publisher](https://github.com/pypi/warehouse/pull/19349)
+is in a second round of review, it's taking a while since there's a lot going on.
+Mike helped debug [token expiration behavior on GitHub Actions](https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-python/issues/1729#issuecomment-5070474146)
+and published a [standalone workflow that dumps the OIDC token payload](https://github.com/miketheman/trusted-publishing-debugger/pull/1),
+so maintainers can inspect the claims their CI provider emits.
+A EuroPython session on Trusted Publishing prompted him
+to open conversations with external publishing providers
+about the security posture of the claims they issue.
+Some of that may turn into changes on their side to further secure Trusted Publishing.
+
+### Observability
+
+Mike moved warehouse logging onto [structlog](https://www.structlog.org/),
+[unifying rendering through a single ProcessorFormatter](https://github.com/pypi/warehouse/pull/20341)
+and then [migrating module loggers](https://github.com/pypi/warehouse/pull/20343).
+Within a day the new logs made clear that a third-party crawler
+was generating a large volume of 404s,
+and the vendor confirmed they will work on a fix once Mike sent the evidence.
+
+In linehaul he [retired the legacy v1 and v2 payload formats](https://github.com/pypi/linehaul-cloud-function/pull/306)
+and [stabilized the hypothesis tests in CI](https://github.com/pypi/linehaul-cloud-function/pull/307),
+which unblocks the extra fields needed to measure downloaded bytes.
+
+### Admin and Platform
+
+* Rebuilt the [journals admin pages on Tabulator](https://github.com/pypi/warehouse/pull/20258),
+  closing a long-open request for a view admins can work in
+* Added [project lifecycle status to admin project lists](https://github.com/pypi/warehouse/pull/20345)
+  and [segmented archived projects on the manage page](https://github.com/pypi/warehouse/pull/20242)
+* Added a [trigram index on usernames](https://github.com/pypi/warehouse/pull/20250)
+  and [deferred heavyweight gcloud imports](https://github.com/pypi/warehouse/pull/20261)
+* Added a [`warehouse db seed` command](https://github.com/pypi/warehouse/pull/20342)
+  so provenance work has realistic development data,
+  and took on review of [`Release.provenance_status`](https://github.com/pypi/warehouse/pull/20326)
+  alongside Kris, Dustin, and Nicole
+* Continued retiring the `pretend` test-double library
+  ([20238](https://github.com/pypi/warehouse/pull/20238),
+  [20241](https://github.com/pypi/warehouse/pull/20241),
+  [20262](https://github.com/pypi/warehouse/pull/20262))
+* Opened [pyramid_components](https://github.com/pypi/warehouse/pull/20263) for review,
+  a typed props contract plus co-located template for HTML components,
+  tried out in admin views first
+* Shipped Dependabot batches carrying security updates
+
+### Community Engagement and Conferences
+
+Mike spent a full week at EuroPython in Kraków.
+At the [Packaging Summit](https://ep2026.europython.eu/session/packaging-summit)
+he walked through [upcoming changes to the PyPI user interface](https://hackmd.io/DZj3uo6eT_qyddBP0PZlDw?view#5-Mike-Fiedler-Upcoming-changes-to-PyPI-user-Interface),
+and he sat in on the Language Summit to see where those decisions land on packaging.
+He delivered [Anatomy of a Phishing Campaign](https://ep2026.europython.eu/session/anatomy-of-a-phishing-campaign)
+and joined a panel on [Security and Ethics in the Age of Generative AI](https://ep2026.europython.eu/session/security-and-ethics-in-the-age-of-generative-ai).
+Sprints covered staged-release lifecycle status with [wheelnext](https://wheelnext.dev/),
+operational questions for [pytransparency.dev](https://pytransparency.dev/),
+and a draft of API v3.
+
+Closer to home, Mike gave the NYU Secure Systems Lab a primer on PyPI
+and heard out their Secure Software Operations Center idea.
+He recorded a Talk Python episode on security,
+and attended Alpha-Omega and OpenSSF Securing Software Repositories sessions.
+He also tested a new Alpha-Omega threat modeling skill against a small Python project
+and sent feedback to its author.
+
+### Ecosystem Contributions
+
+Outside PyPI, Mike merged five changes to `pyramid_openapi3`, including
+[OpenAPI 3.2 support](https://github.com/Pylons/pyramid_openapi3/pull/324),
+[serving the spec as JSON](https://github.com/Pylons/pyramid_openapi3/pull/323),
+and a [fix so server prefixes respect path segment boundaries](https://github.com/Pylons/pyramid_openapi3/pull/322).
+He also opened a
+[proposal to consolidate that project's test authoring approach](https://github.com/Pylons/pyramid_openapi3/issues/319).
+
+In `readme_renderer` he [enabled GFM alerts and shortcodes](https://github.com/pypa/readme_renderer/pull/374),
+[stopped RST's top-level heading from being dropped](https://github.com/pypa/readme_renderer/pull/377),
+and [handled expected test warnings](https://github.com/pypa/readme_renderer/pull/373).
+He made the [osv.dev search input reachable from the keyboard](https://github.com/google/osv.dev/pull/5569),
+and kept `stdlib-list` and `inspector` current.
+
+## Security Developer-in-Residence (Seth Larson)
+
+### EuroPython 2026
+
+Seth attended EuroPython 2026 to speak in multiple sessions
+and to attend summits and sprints. Seth attended and was the
+blogger for the Python Language Summit and attended the
+Python Packaging Summit.
+
+Seth delivered a talk titled “[Learning from the “not‑so‑secret” Python security cabal](https://sethmlarson.dev/europython-2026-security-talk)”
+which discussed how LLMs were affecting open source security teams, what
+individual contributors can do to start their journey to joining
+and contributing to an OSS security team, and how projects can start thinking
+about this period of experimentation we're all in.
+
+This talk is a continuation of a talk I gave a year ago: “Security Work isn’t
+Special” as the keynote for OpenSSF Community Day NA where I lamented on how security
+work didn't match other Open Source contribution models like documentation, community,
+or code contributions.
+
+Seth was also a member of the AI, Cybersecurity, and Ethics panel along with
+Mike Fiedler and three other experts. This panel recording is
+[now published to YouTube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4cfgbo912rg).
+
+### Python.org Security Fixes
+
+Following the report on mitigating an API authentication bypass
+for python.org, we received the expected uptick in scrutiny from
+other security researchers. Seth responded to the reported issues
+and applied the fixes:
+
+* [Sanitize the HTML descriptions](https://github.com/python/pythondotorg/pull/3075)
+  imported from trusted iCalendar/ICS
+  files prior to displaying them on event detail pages. This prevents
+  a malicious takeover of a remote event calendar from being able
+  to inject malicious HTML into an event detail page.
+* [Restrict editing of nominations outside a nomination window](https://github.com/python/pythondotorg/pull/3074).
+* [Community posts that are private should not be returned in the API](https://github.com/python/pythondotorg/pull/3073).
+* [Blog excerpt text still requires escaping](https://github.com/python/pythondotorg/pull/3072), even after `striptags` filter is applied.
+* [Sanitize `MarkupField` content](https://github.com/python/pythondotorg/pull/3067) to a restricted list of tags and attributes using nh3.
+  This affected many user-editable full-text fields including event descriptions and nominations.
+* Upgraded dependencies ([Django, idna](https://github.com/python/pythondotorg/pull/3071)
+  [Pillow](https://github.com/python/pythondotorg/pull/3068)) that were affected by vulnerabilities.
+
+A longer-term project is [adding a strict ``Content-Security-Policy``
+HTTP header](https://github.com/python/pythondotorg/pull/3042)
+to ``python.org``, but this will take a bit of time
+to avoid breaking the website while others are using the service.
+For now a ``Report-Only`` HTTP header is in place and the plan
+is to monitor the violations using Sentry before making the
+switch to enforce violations if no impact is detected.
+
+## Restricted "Open-Releases" on PyPI
+
+The Python Package Index (PyPI) now rejects new files being uploaded to releases
+that are older than 14 days. This restriction was put in place to prevent old and
+long-stable releases from being poisoned in case publishing tokens or workflows of
+PyPI projects were compromised. As far as we are aware this has not yet been abused,
+but there is no technical reason beyond that attackers weren't aware it was possible.
+
+This work was done after [restarting a conversation](https://discuss.python.org/t/restricting-open-ended-releases-on-pypi/43566/34) (following the LiteLLM/Telnyx
+compromises) that started [back in January 2024](https://discuss.python.org/t/restricting-open-ended-releases-on-pypi/43566). With help from data gathered
+by Mike Fiedler and Hugo van Kemenade and through discussing the issue
+at the PyCon US 2026 Packaging Summit we were able to come to a rough consensus
+and move forward with the restriction.
+
+Seth [made the changes to PyPI]() and then [published a blog post](https://blog.pypi.org/posts/2026-07-22-releases-now-reject-new-files-after-14-days/)
+to the PyPI blog detailing this change and the journey to get there. Seth also [fixed
+a small bug](https://github.com/pypi/warehouse/pull/20260) in the implementation which
+broke an existing benign workflow using `twine upload --skip-existing`.
+
+### Hiring another Security Developer
+
+The Python Software Foundation is hiring another Security Developer
+to work on the Python Security Response Team and PyPI malware handling.
+Seth is the hiring manager for this role and has been preparing the role
+description, screening, and interview pipeline.
+
+### Other items
+
+* Applying to the Common Good Cyber Fund grant with Loren Crary.
+* Working on the Python Security Response Team report queue.
+* Nominated Tania Allard to the PSRT.
+* Published the advisory for pip (CVE-2026-13346) and Python's HTML parser (CVE-2026-15308).
+* Interviewed by IEEE Spectrum about slopsquatting and LLMs effects on
+  open source security.
+* Recorded an episode of Talk Python about "Everything Security at PyCon US 2026"
+  with Juanita Gomez and Mike Fiedler.
+* Published a blog post with a [wrap-up for United Nations Open Source Week 2026](https://sethmlarson.dev/un-open-source-week-2026).
+