diff --git a/pkg/scanner/rules.go b/pkg/scanner/rules.go
index c951a09..54ee790 100644
--- a/pkg/scanner/rules.go
+++ b/pkg/scanner/rules.go
@@ -92,17 +92,24 @@ var readOnlyCommands = []string{
 // ${{ github.event.issue.number }}` on a `/command`) run fork code in the base
 // context just like pull_request_target.
 func CheckPwnRequest(wf *Workflow) []Finding {
-	if !wf.On.PullRequestTarget && !wf.On.IssueComment {
+	if !wf.On.PullRequestTarget && !wf.On.IssueComment && !wf.On.WorkflowRun {
 		return nil
 	}
 
-	triggerLabel := "pull_request_target"
-	switch {
-	case wf.On.PullRequestTarget && wf.On.IssueComment:
-		triggerLabel = "pull_request_target/issue_comment"
-	case wf.On.IssueComment:
-		triggerLabel = "issue_comment"
+	// All three are privileged triggers that run in the base-repo context with
+	// secrets; workflow_run additionally can check out the triggering PR's head
+	// (github.event.workflow_run.head_sha).
+	var trigs []string
+	if wf.On.PullRequestTarget {
+		trigs = append(trigs, "pull_request_target")
+	}
+	if wf.On.IssueComment {
+		trigs = append(trigs, "issue_comment")
 	}
+	if wf.On.WorkflowRun {
+		trigs = append(trigs, "workflow_run")
+	}
+	triggerLabel := strings.Join(trigs, "/")
 
 	var findings []Finding
 	for _, job := range wf.Jobs {
@@ -825,10 +832,12 @@ func CheckForkPRCodeExec(wf *Workflow) []Finding {
 			continue
 		}
 
-		severity := SeverityMedium
-		if postCheckoutAccessesSecrets(postCheckoutSteps) {
-			severity = SeverityHigh
-		}
+		// On `pull_request` (not `_target`), fork PRs run with a read-only token
+		// and NO repository secrets — secret references resolve to empty. So this
+		// is arbitrary code execution on an ephemeral runner with nothing to
+		// steal: low severity. (Self-hosted-runner host risk is FG-009; cache
+		// poisoning is FG-010; secret-bearing pwns are FG-001 on _target.)
+		severity := SeverityLow
 
 		confidence := ConfidenceConfirmed
 		if !execResult.Confirmed {
@@ -844,7 +853,7 @@ func CheckForkPRCodeExec(wf *Workflow) []Finding {
 			File:       wf.Path,
 			Line:       checkoutLine,
 			Message:    msg,
-			Details:    "Trigger: pull_request (read-only token from forks, but arbitrary code execution on runner)",
+			Details:    "Trigger: pull_request — fork PRs get a read-only token and no secrets, so this is code execution on an ephemeral runner with nothing to exfiltrate (cache-poisoning aside).",
 		})
 	}
 	return findings
@@ -1747,6 +1756,9 @@ func refPointsToPRHead(ref string) bool {
 		// issue_comment context: a checkout ref built from the PR number, e.g.
 		// `refs/pull/${{ github.event.issue.number }}/head`.
 		"github.event.issue.number",
+		// workflow_run context: the triggering (fork) PR's head.
+		"github.event.workflow_run.head_sha",
+		"github.event.workflow_run.head_branch",
 	}
 	for _, d := range dangerous {
 		if strings.Contains(ref, d) {
diff --git a/pkg/scanner/rules_fixtures_test.go b/pkg/scanner/rules_fixtures_test.go
index 9530fdb..dd15f91 100644
--- a/pkg/scanner/rules_fixtures_test.go
+++ b/pkg/scanner/rules_fixtures_test.go
@@ -144,6 +144,23 @@ func TestCheckScriptInjection_Safe(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// FG-001 must cover workflow_run: a workflow that checks out the triggering PR's
+// head (github.event.workflow_run.head_sha) and runs it is a pwn request.
+func TestCheckPwnRequest_WorkflowRun(t *testing.T) {
+	wf := loadFixture(t, "pwn-request-workflow-run.yaml")
+	findings := CheckPwnRequest(wf)
+	if len(findings) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 1 FG-001 finding for workflow_run checkout+exec, got %d: %v", len(findings), findings)
+	}
+	f := findings[0]
+	if f.Severity != SeverityCritical {
+		t.Errorf("expected critical for ungated workflow_run head checkout+exec, got %s", f.Severity)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(f.Message, "workflow_run") {
+		t.Errorf("expected workflow_run in message, got: %s", f.Message)
+	}
+}
+
 // FG-001 must now cover issue_comment ChatOps: an ungated `/command` job that
 // `gh pr checkout`s the PR and runs it is a pwn request, same as pull_request_target.
 func TestCheckPwnRequest_IssueComment(t *testing.T) {
@@ -409,8 +426,9 @@ func TestCheckForkPRCodeExec(t *testing.T) {
 	if f.RuleID != "FG-006" {
 		t.Errorf("expected rule FG-006, got %s", f.RuleID)
 	}
-	if f.Severity != SeverityMedium {
-		t.Errorf("expected medium severity (no secrets), got %s", f.Severity)
+	// pull_request fork exec: low (read-only token, no fork secrets, ephemeral runner).
+	if f.Severity != SeverityLow {
+		t.Errorf("expected low severity for pull_request fork exec, got %s", f.Severity)
 	}
 }
 
@@ -422,8 +440,10 @@ func TestCheckForkPRCodeExec_WithSecrets(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("expected 1 finding, got %d", len(findings))
 	}
 	f := findings[0]
-	if f.Severity != SeverityHigh {
-		t.Errorf("expected high severity (secrets on build step), got %s", f.Severity)
+	// Even with secret refs, on pull_request those resolve to empty for fork PRs,
+	// so this stays low — the tuning that stops FG-006 over-flagging as high.
+	if f.Severity != SeverityLow {
+		t.Errorf("expected low severity (secrets empty for fork PRs on pull_request), got %s", f.Severity)
 	}
 }
 
diff --git a/test/fixtures/pwn-request-workflow-run.yaml b/test/fixtures/pwn-request-workflow-run.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e8d707d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/fixtures/pwn-request-workflow-run.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+name: Process Build
+on:
+  workflow_run:
+    workflows: ["Build"]
+    types: [completed]
+jobs:
+  process:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          ref: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_sha }}
+      - run: npm install