diff --git a/pkg/scanner/rules.go b/pkg/scanner/rules.go
index 9b0d995..c951a09 100644
--- a/pkg/scanner/rules.go
+++ b/pkg/scanner/rules.go
@@ -1656,6 +1656,13 @@ func isTrustedRef(ref string) bool {
 	if strings.Contains(lower, "pull_request.base.") {
 		return true
 	}
+	// github.workflow_sha = the commit of the workflow file (the base/trusted ref
+	// on pull_request_target), and github.sha = the base commit on
+	// pull_request_target. Both check out trusted code, unlike ...head.sha (fork).
+	// "github.sha" does not appear as a substring of "...head.sha", so this is safe.
+	if strings.Contains(lower, "workflow_sha") || strings.Contains(lower, "github.sha") {
+		return true
+	}
 	return false
 }
 
@@ -2610,6 +2617,30 @@ func CheckCurlPipeBash(wf *Workflow) []Finding {
 	return findings
 }
 
+// localActionUnderTrustedCheckout reports whether a `uses: ./<dir>/...` local
+// action resolves to a directory that a checkout of a trusted ref populated
+// (e.g. `actions/checkout` at `github.workflow_sha` into `path: <dir>`), so the
+// action definition comes from trusted code, not the fork.
+func localActionUnderTrustedCheckout(job Job, uses string) bool {
+	p := strings.TrimPrefix(uses, "./")
+	seg := p
+	if i := strings.Index(p, "/"); i != -1 {
+		seg = p[:i]
+	}
+	if seg == "" || seg == "." {
+		return false
+	}
+	for _, step := range job.Steps {
+		if !isCheckoutAction(step.Uses) {
+			continue
+		}
+		if normalizePathspec(step.With["path"]) == seg && isTrustedRef(step.With["ref"]) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
 // CheckLocalActionUntrustedCheckout detects local action usage after fork checkout (FG-016).
 func CheckLocalActionUntrustedCheckout(wf *Workflow) []Finding {
 	if !wf.On.PullRequestTarget && !wf.On.IssueComment && !wf.On.WorkflowRun {
@@ -2660,6 +2691,12 @@ func CheckLocalActionUntrustedCheckout(wf *Workflow) []Finding {
 
 		for _, step := range job.Steps[checkoutIdx+1:] {
 			if strings.HasPrefix(step.Uses, "./") {
+				// The local action lives under a subdir populated by a checkout of
+				// a trusted ref (e.g. actions checked out at github.workflow_sha
+				// into path/), so its definition is not attacker-controlled.
+				if localActionUnderTrustedCheckout(job, step.Uses) {
+					continue
+				}
 				findings = append(findings, Finding{
 					RuleID:   "FG-016",
 					Severity: severity,
diff --git a/pkg/scanner/rules_fixtures_test.go b/pkg/scanner/rules_fixtures_test.go
index a060b8d..9530fdb 100644
--- a/pkg/scanner/rules_fixtures_test.go
+++ b/pkg/scanner/rules_fixtures_test.go
@@ -1201,6 +1201,17 @@ func TestCheckLocalActionUntrustedCheckout_TrustedRefIsolated(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// A local action loaded from a subdir populated by a checkout of the trusted
+// github.workflow_sha (not the fork) is not attacker-controlled. Regression for
+// leanprover-community/mathlib4's PR_summary.yml.
+func TestCheckLocalActionUntrustedCheckout_WorkflowShaDir(t *testing.T) {
+	wf := loadFixture(t, "local-action-workflow-sha.yaml")
+	findings := CheckLocalActionUntrustedCheckout(wf)
+	if len(findings) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 0 findings for local action under trusted workflow_sha checkout, got %d: %v", len(findings), findings)
+	}
+}
+
 // A run block that fetches the PR head to a named ref but never checks it out
 // leaves fork code off the working tree; a local action loaded afterward comes
 // from the base clone, not the fork. No FG-016 finding.
diff --git a/pkg/scanner/rules_test.go b/pkg/scanner/rules_test.go
index f8d537a..114606d 100644
--- a/pkg/scanner/rules_test.go
+++ b/pkg/scanner/rules_test.go
@@ -949,6 +949,29 @@ func TestCheckLifecycleInstallBeforeCredentialedOperation_SelfUpdatePlusDeps(t *
 	}
 }
 
+func TestIsTrustedRef(t *testing.T) {
+	trusted := []string{
+		"main", "master", "${{ github.base_ref }}",
+		"${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}",
+		"${{ github.workflow_sha }}", "${{ github.sha }}",
+	}
+	for _, r := range trusted {
+		if !isTrustedRef(r) {
+			t.Errorf("expected %q to be trusted", r)
+		}
+	}
+	untrusted := []string{
+		"${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}",
+		"${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}",
+		"${{ github.head_ref }}",
+	}
+	for _, r := range untrusted {
+		if isTrustedRef(r) {
+			t.Errorf("expected %q to NOT be trusted (fork head)", r)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 // --- AllRules completeness ---
 
 func TestAllRules_IncludesNewRules(t *testing.T) {
diff --git a/test/fixtures/local-action-workflow-sha.yaml b/test/fixtures/local-action-workflow-sha.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c909dfd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/fixtures/local-action-workflow-sha.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+name: PR Summary
+on: pull_request_target
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+  pull-requests: write
+jobs:
+  summary:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
+          path: pr-branch
+          persist-credentials: false
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          ref: ${{ github.workflow_sha }}
+          sparse-checkout: .github/actions
+          path: workflow-actions
+      - uses: ./workflow-actions/.github/actions/get-ci