diff --git a/pkg/scanner/rules.go b/pkg/scanner/rules.go
index d521e60..9b0d995 100644
--- a/pkg/scanner/rules.go
+++ b/pkg/scanner/rules.go
@@ -17,20 +17,21 @@ type ExecutionAnalysis struct {
 
 // MitigationAnalysis captures defensive controls detected on a workflow/job.
 type MitigationAnalysis struct {
-	LabelGated          bool
-	EnvironmentGated    bool
-	MaintainerCheck     bool
-	ForkGuard           bool
-	ActorGuard          bool // Job if: restricts execution to specific bot actor(s)
-	ActorGuardHuman     bool // Job if: restricts to specific human actor(s) (weaker)
-	NeedsGate           bool // Job depends on upstream job with environment/fork gate
-	TokenBlanked        bool
-	PathIsolated        bool // Fork code checked out to subdirectory, no direct execution
-	TrustedRefIsolated  bool // Fork checkout to subdir, all executed code from trusted ref
-	PermissionGateJob   bool // Upstream job verifies collaborator permissions via API
-	BuildBeforeCheckout bool // Binary compiled from base branch BEFORE PR code checkout
-	NoCredentialExec    bool // Executing job has empty permissions (no token) AND references no secrets
-	Details             []string
+	LabelGated            bool
+	EnvironmentGated      bool
+	MaintainerCheck       bool
+	ForkGuard             bool
+	ActorGuard            bool // Job if: restricts execution to specific bot actor(s)
+	ActorGuardHuman       bool // Job if: restricts to specific human actor(s) (weaker)
+	NeedsGate             bool // Job depends on upstream job with environment/fork gate
+	TokenBlanked          bool
+	PathIsolated          bool // Fork code checked out to subdirectory, no direct execution
+	TrustedRefIsolated    bool // Fork checkout to subdir, all executed code from trusted ref
+	PermissionGateJob     bool // Upstream job verifies collaborator permissions via API
+	BuildBeforeCheckout   bool // Binary compiled from base branch BEFORE PR code checkout
+	NoCredentialExec      bool // Executing job has empty permissions (no token) AND references no secrets
+	AuthorAssociationGate bool // Job if: restricts execution by author_association (trusted commenters/contributors)
+	Details               []string
 }
 
 // Build tools that definitely execute code from the working directory.
@@ -85,13 +86,24 @@ var readOnlyCommands = []string{
 	"echo", "printf",
 }
 
-// CheckPwnRequest detects pull_request_target workflows that checkout PR head
-// code with post-checkout execution analysis (FG-001).
+// CheckPwnRequest detects pull_request_target and issue_comment workflows that
+// checkout PR head code with post-checkout execution analysis (FG-001). Both are
+// privileged triggers: issue_comment ChatOps bots (e.g. `gh pr checkout
+// ${{ github.event.issue.number }}` on a `/command`) run fork code in the base
+// context just like pull_request_target.
 func CheckPwnRequest(wf *Workflow) []Finding {
-	if !wf.On.PullRequestTarget {
+	if !wf.On.PullRequestTarget && !wf.On.IssueComment {
 		return nil
 	}
 
+	triggerLabel := "pull_request_target"
+	switch {
+	case wf.On.PullRequestTarget && wf.On.IssueComment:
+		triggerLabel = "pull_request_target/issue_comment"
+	case wf.On.IssueComment:
+		triggerLabel = "issue_comment"
+	}
+
 	var findings []Finding
 	for _, job := range wf.Jobs {
 		// Skip jobs scoped to pull_request only — they never run in
@@ -213,13 +225,20 @@ func CheckPwnRequest(wf *Workflow) []Finding {
 			mitigated = true
 		}
 
+		// Author-association gate: only trusted commenters/contributors can
+		// trigger — an arbitrary external commenter can't reach the checkout.
+		if mitigation.AuthorAssociationGate && !mitigated {
+			severity = downgradeBy(severity, 2)
+			mitigated = true
+		}
+
 		// Path isolation adjusts confidence, not severity
 		if mitigation.PathIsolated && confidence == ConfidenceConfirmed {
 			confidence = ConfidencePatternOnly
 			mitigated = true
 		}
 
-		msg := fmt.Sprintf("Pwn Request: pull_request_target with fork checkout [%s]", confidence)
+		msg := fmt.Sprintf("Pwn Request: %s with fork checkout [%s]", triggerLabel, confidence)
 		if execResult.Detail != "" {
 			msg += " — " + execResult.Detail
 		}
@@ -229,8 +248,8 @@ func CheckPwnRequest(wf *Workflow) []Finding {
 
 		permDesc := describePermissions(wf.Permissions, job.Permissions)
 		details := fmt.Sprintf(
-			"Trigger: pull_request_target, Checkout ref: %s, Permissions: %s, Execution: %s",
-			checkoutRef, permDesc, confidence,
+			"Trigger: %s, Checkout ref: %s, Permissions: %s, Execution: %s",
+			triggerLabel, checkoutRef, permDesc, confidence,
 		)
 
 		findings = append(findings, Finding{
@@ -927,6 +946,14 @@ func analyzeMitigations(wf *Workflow, job Job, checkoutIdx int, postCheckoutStep
 			m.ActorGuardHuman = true
 			m.Details = append(m.Details, fmt.Sprintf("job if: restricts to specific actor(s) (%s)", truncate(job.If, 80)))
 		}
+		// author_association gate — common on issue_comment ChatOps: only
+		// trusted commenters (MEMBER/OWNER/COLLABORATOR) or known contributors
+		// can trigger. Strong for issue_comment (author is checked at fire time,
+		// no re-run TOCTOU).
+		if hasAuthorAssociationGuard(job) {
+			m.AuthorAssociationGate = true
+			m.Details = append(m.Details, "job if: restricts execution by author_association")
+		}
 	}
 
 	// 3. Check environment protection
@@ -1710,6 +1737,9 @@ func refPointsToPRHead(ref string) bool {
 		"github.event.pull_request.head.sha",
 		"github.event.pull_request.head.ref",
 		"github.head_ref",
+		// issue_comment context: a checkout ref built from the PR number, e.g.
+		// `refs/pull/${{ github.event.issue.number }}/head`.
+		"github.event.issue.number",
 	}
 	for _, d := range dangerous {
 		if strings.Contains(ref, d) {
diff --git a/pkg/scanner/rules_fixtures_test.go b/pkg/scanner/rules_fixtures_test.go
index a3e0ab3..a060b8d 100644
--- a/pkg/scanner/rules_fixtures_test.go
+++ b/pkg/scanner/rules_fixtures_test.go
@@ -144,6 +144,40 @@ func TestCheckScriptInjection_Safe(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// FG-001 must now cover issue_comment ChatOps: an ungated `/command` job that
+// `gh pr checkout`s the PR and runs it is a pwn request, same as pull_request_target.
+func TestCheckPwnRequest_IssueComment(t *testing.T) {
+	wf := loadFixture(t, "pwn-request-issue-comment.yaml")
+	findings := CheckPwnRequest(wf)
+	if len(findings) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 1 FG-001 finding for issue_comment ChatOps, got %d: %v", len(findings), findings)
+	}
+	f := findings[0]
+	if f.Severity != SeverityCritical {
+		t.Errorf("expected critical for ungated issue_comment checkout+exec, got %s", f.Severity)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(f.Message, "issue_comment") {
+		t.Errorf("expected issue_comment in message, got: %s", f.Message)
+	}
+}
+
+// The same ChatOps gated by an author_association allowlist (only trusted
+// commenters can trigger) must be downgraded and marked mitigated.
+func TestCheckPwnRequest_IssueCommentAuthorGuarded(t *testing.T) {
+	wf := loadFixture(t, "pwn-request-issue-comment-guarded.yaml")
+	findings := CheckPwnRequest(wf)
+	if len(findings) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 1 FG-001 finding, got %d: %v", len(findings), findings)
+	}
+	f := findings[0]
+	if f.Severity == SeverityCritical || f.Severity == SeverityHigh {
+		t.Errorf("expected downgraded severity for author-association-gated ChatOps, got %s", f.Severity)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(f.Message, "mitigated") {
+		t.Errorf("expected mitigated note, got: %s", f.Message)
+	}
+}
+
 // FG-001 must downgrade to info when the executing job has empty permissions
 // (no GITHUB_TOKEN) and references no secrets — fork code runs but there is
 // nothing to exfiltrate. Regression for ionos-cloud/cluster-api-provider-proxmox.
diff --git a/test/fixtures/pwn-request-issue-comment-guarded.yaml b/test/fixtures/pwn-request-issue-comment-guarded.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0dc049a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/fixtures/pwn-request-issue-comment-guarded.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+name: PR Command Guarded
+on:
+  issue_comment:
+    types: [created]
+jobs:
+  run-command:
+    if: >
+      github.event.issue.pull_request &&
+      contains(github.event.comment.body, '/test') &&
+      (github.event.comment.author_association == 'OWNER' ||
+       github.event.comment.author_association == 'MEMBER' ||
+       github.event.comment.author_association == 'COLLABORATOR')
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - name: checkout pr
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+        run: gh pr checkout ${{ github.event.issue.number }}
+      - run: npm install
diff --git a/test/fixtures/pwn-request-issue-comment.yaml b/test/fixtures/pwn-request-issue-comment.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..536ec7c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/fixtures/pwn-request-issue-comment.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+name: PR Command
+on:
+  issue_comment:
+    types: [created]
+jobs:
+  run-command:
+    if: github.event.issue.pull_request && contains(github.event.comment.body, '/test')
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - name: checkout pr
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+        run: gh pr checkout ${{ github.event.issue.number }}
+      - run: npm install