From bfaae36ad295126a77ed5c0e40a97c0a1987b599 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "aikido-autofix[bot]"
 <119856028+aikido-autofix[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2026 03:05:46 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] fix(security): autofix Overly Broad Permissions in GitHub
 Actions Workflows is risky

---
 .github/workflows/release.yml | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/.github/workflows/release.yml b/.github/workflows/release.yml
index 27aa0a9..ab4498f 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/release.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/release.yml
@@ -5,15 +5,16 @@ on:
     tags:
       - 'v*'
 
-permissions:
-  id-token: write  # Required for OIDC trusted publishing
-  contents: write  # Required for creating GitHub releases
+permissions: {}
 
 jobs:
   publish:
     # npm provenance publishing only supports GitHub-hosted Actions runners.
     # Keep this job on ubuntu-latest unless npm adds self-hosted provenance support.
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+      id-token: write  # Required for OIDC trusted publishing
     # Workflow-context values are bound to env here and referenced as
     # shell variables ($TAG/$REPO/$COMMIT_SHA) in run: blocks instead of
     # `${{ }}` interpolation, so an attacker-controlled tag name cannot be