diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d9d6bc7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+/.venv
+/.env
+/dist
+/build
+/out
+/target
+/node_modules
+/.DS_Store
+Thumbs.db
+*.pyc
+*.swp
+/.idea
+/.vscode
diff --git a/COURSE_SUMMARY.md b/COURSE_SUMMARY.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9efd9fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/COURSE_SUMMARY.md
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# Hands-on Docker Hacking
+_summary for editorial board_
+
+## Modules
+1. Privileged Container
+2. Exposed Container APIs
+3. Container Escape
+4. Container Image Tampering
+5. Insecure Container Configuration
+6. Denial-of-Service (DoS)
+7. Kernel Vulnerabilities
+8. Shared Kernel Exploitation
+9. Insecure Container Orchestration
+10. Insecure Container Images
+11. What Seccomp, AppArmor, and SELinux Actually Do
+
+## Deliverables included
+- `course/modules/` — one markdown module per topic with lab steps
+- `course/quizzes/` — module and final assessments
+- `README` update for GitHub course homepage
+
+## Format notes
+- Each module contains: intro, attack scenario, compliant vs noncompliant example, remediation, and hands-on lab.
+- Sample 60–90 second module intro video scripts are embedded where practical.
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index e472de7..1cabf6b 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -1,25 +1,7 @@
 # Docker Hacking Lab
-### EC-Council | Hands-on Docker Hacking Course
-**Author: Adonis Jimenez | BizDevStudio**
+Hands-on Docker Hacking course repo.
 
-> Warning: This lab contains intentional vulnerabilities. Run in an isolated environment only.
-
-## Quick Start
-```
-git clone https://github.com/donny-devops/docker-hacking-lab
-cd docker-hacking-lab
-docker compose up -d
-```
-
-## Course Modules
-- Module 0: Lab Setup
-- Module 1: Docker Internals and Attack Surface
-- Module 2: Enumeration and Reconnaissance
-- Module 3: Escape via Privileged Flag
-- Module 4: Escape via Host Path Mount
-- Module 5: Docker Socket Exploitation
-- Module 6: TCP Daemon Exploitation
-- Module 7: Image and Registry Attacks
-- Module 8: Supply Chain Attacks
-- Module 9: Network Attacks and Lateral Movement
-- Module 10: Runtime Defense
+## Course structure
+- `course/modules/` — topic lessons and labs
+- `course/quizzes/` — assessment questions
+- `COURSE_SUMMARY.md` — editorial board summary
diff --git a/course/modules/02-exposed-apis.md b/course/modules/02-exposed-apis.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1f4035d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/course/modules/02-exposed-apis.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Exposed Container APIs
+Covers Docker daemon socket/API exposure, auth bypass, TLS, and network exposure risks.
+
+## Attack scenario
+Exposing `2375/2376` without auth allows remote host takeover.
+
+## Noncompliant
+docker run -d -p 2375:2375 docker:dind
+
+## Compliant
+docker run -d -p 127.0.0.1:2376:2376 `
+  --tlsverify --tlscacert ca.pem --tlscert cert.pem --tlskey key.pem docker:dind
+
+## Remediation
+- Bind to localhost or VPN only.
+- Enforce TLS client auth on 2376.
+- Firewall-restrict daemon ports.
+
+## Hands-on lab
+1. Inspect Docker socket listeners.
+2. Confirm remote API auth requirements.
+3. Harden with TLS/localhost binding.
diff --git a/course/modules/03-container-escape.md b/course/modules/03-container-escape.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..60e6583
--- /dev/null
+++ b/course/modules/03-container-escape.md
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# Container Escape
+Covers breakouts via docker socket, --privileged, host namespaces, and dangerous mounts.
+
+## Attack scenario
+A container with /var/run/docker.sock can create privileged sibling containers.
+
+## Noncompliant
+docker run -v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock alpine
+
+## Compliant
+docker run --user 1000:1000 --read-only --cap-drop ALL alpine
+
+## Remediation
+- Avoid host namespace sharing.
+- Drop capabilities; avoid --privileged.
+- Use rootless Docker where possible.
+
+## Hands-on lab
+1. Run noncompliant container.
+2. Attempt docker ps inside.
+3. Harden and verify escape path blocked.
diff --git a/course/modules/04-image-tampering.md b/course/modules/04-image-tampering.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..22c2f63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/course/modules/04-image-tampering.md
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# Container Image Tampering
+Covers supply-chain attacks, tag mutation, untrusted registries, and image signing.
+
+## Attack scenario
+Attacker pushes backdoored tag to public registry; CI auto-deploys it.
+
+## Noncompliant
+docker build -t app:latest .
+
+## Compliant
+cosign sign --key cosign.key app@sha256:...
+
+## Remediation
+- Pin images by digest.
+- Sign images with cosign/Sigstore.
+- Scan in CI with Trivy/Grype.
+
+## Hands-on lab
+1. Inspect image history/layers.
+2. Re-pin by digest.
+3. Verify provenance/signature.
diff --git a/course/modules/05-insecure-config.md b/course/modules/05-insecure-config.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a1e9dc9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/course/modules/05-insecure-config.md
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# Insecure Container Configuration
+Covers excessive permissions, writable rootfs, dangerous sysctls, and insecure defaults.
+
+## Attack scenario
+Root-owned writable rootfs enables cron/kmodule persistence.
+
+## Noncompliant
+docker run --cap-add SYS_ADMIN --read-only=false ubuntu
+
+## Compliant
+docker run --user 65532:65532 --read-only --tmpfs /tmp ubuntu
+
+## Remediation
+- Run as nonroot.
+- Use --read-only with tmpfs.
+- Drop capabilities by default.
+
+## Hands-on lab
+1. Inspect docker inspect config.
+2. Harden runtime flags.
+3. Verify no root writable paths.
diff --git a/course/modules/06-dos.md b/course/modules/06-dos.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8153d2a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/course/modules/06-dos.md
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# Denial-of-Service (DoS)
+Covers CPU/memory/PIDs/I/O exhaustion and runtime limits.
+
+## Attack scenario
+Fork bomb or memory hog crashes neighboring containers/host.
+
+## Noncompliant
+docker run -d --name stress docker-stress
+
+## Compliant
+docker run -d --name stress --cpus 0.5 --memory 256m --pids-limit 64 docker-stress
+
+## Remediation
+- Set --cpus --memory --pids-limit.
+- Use --restart on-failure:5.
+- Monitor with cAdvisor/Prometheus.
+
+## Hands-on lab
+1. Run stress unconstrained.
+2. Observe impact.
+3. Apply limits and compare.
diff --git a/course/modules/07-kernel-vulns.md b/course/modules/07-kernel-vulns.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4499425
--- /dev/null
+++ b/course/modules/07-kernel-vulns.md
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# Kernel Vulnerabilities
+Covers host/runtime CVEs, patching cadence, and isolation limitations.
+
+## Attack scenario
+Unpatched kernel enables container-to-host privilege escalation.
+
+## Noncompliant
+uname -r  # old unpatched kernel
+
+## Compliant
+sudo apt install linux-generic-hwe-22.04
+
+## Remediation
+- Patch host/runtime on SLA.
+- Minimize host kernel modules.
+- Evaluate gVisor/Kata for stronger isolation.
+
+## Hands-on lab
+1. Check kernel against CVE advisories.
+2. Review runtime changelog.
+3. Document upgrade plan.
diff --git a/course/modules/08-shared-kernel.md b/course/modules/08-shared-kernel.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..476bee0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/course/modules/08-shared-kernel.md
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# Shared Kernel Exploitation
+Covers namespace mistakes, /proc exposure, pid=host, and cross-container access.
+
+## Attack scenario
+Host PID namespace exposes other containers'/host process data.
+
+## Noncompliant
+docker run --pid=host --cap-add SYS_ADMIN alpine
+
+## Compliant
+docker run --user nonroot --pid container --cap-drop ALL alpine
+
+## Remediation
+- Avoid --pid=host.
+- Use container-scoped PID namespaces.
+- Enable dmesg_restrict.
+
+## Hands-on lab
+1. Run two containers.
+2. Inspect /proc with/without host PID.
+3. Harden namespace usage.
diff --git a/course/modules/09-orchestration.md b/course/modules/09-orchestration.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c5ea6fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/course/modules/09-orchestration.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Insecure Container Orchestration
+Covers K8s/Compose misconfigs, default SAs, broad RBAC, and exposed APIs.
+
+## Attack scenario
+Default SA has secret-read; app bug leaks cluster secrets.
+
+## Noncompliant
+serviceAccountName: default
+
+## Compliant
+serviceAccountName: app-sa
+automountServiceAccountToken: false
+
+## Remediation
+- Dedicated SA per workload.
+- Least-privilege RBAC.
+- Scan configs with Polaris/Kubesec.
+
+## Hands-on lab
+1. Inspect current SA/roles.
+2. Create restricted SA.
+3. Update deployment and confirm denial.
diff --git a/course/modules/10-insecure-images.md b/course/modules/10-insecure-images.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cd93c5a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/course/modules/10-insecure-images.md
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# Insecure Container Images
+Covers outdated bases, malware images, vulnerable packages, and registry hygiene.
+
+## Attack scenario
+Malicious image appears as trusted name; CI builds and deploys it.
+
+## Noncompliant
+docker build -t app:latest .
+
+## Compliant
+trivy image app@sha256:...
+
+## Remediation
+- Pin by digest/provenance.
+- Scan in CI and deploy gate.
+- Trust only approved registries.
+
+## Hands-on lab
+1. Build latest-tagged image.
+2. Inspect layers/history.
+3. Rebuild pinned and scan.
diff --git a/course/modules/11-lsm.md b/course/modules/11-lsm.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3928b79
--- /dev/null
+++ b/course/modules/11-lsm.md
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# What Seccomp, AppArmor, and SELinux Actually Do
+Covers LSM roles, Docker defaults, custom profiles, and operational pitfalls.
+
+## Seccomp
+Restricts syscalls. Docker default blocks ~44 dangerous syscalls.
+
+## AppArmor
+Path-based confinement. Uses docker-default on Debian/Ubuntu.
+
+## SELinux
+Label-based MAC. Stronger; enabled on RHEL/Fedora.
+
+## Noncompliant
+docker run --security-opt seccomp=unconfined ubuntu
+
+## Compliant
+docker run --security-opt seccomp=default --security-opt apparmor=docker-default ubuntu
+
+## Remediation
+- Keep defaults unless app breaks.
+- Trace syscalls before narrowing.
+- Combine seccomp + AppArmor/SELinux + capabilities.
+
+## Hands-on lab
+1. Inspect container security opts.
+2. strace app process.
+3. Build minimal custom seccomp JSON and test.
diff --git a/course/quizzes/container-escape-final.md b/course/quizzes/container-escape-final.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0751de8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/course/quizzes/container-escape-final.md
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# Final assessment: Container Escape
+## Questions
+1. Which option most directly reduces runtime breakout surface?
+   A) --privileged B) drop caps + seccomp + read-only C) expose 2375 D) host network
+2. Which is a reliable signal of insecure images?
+   A) pinned digest + signed provenance B) latest tag from unknown registry C) small image size D) alpine base
+## Answers
+1. B 2. B
diff --git a/course/quizzes/container-escape.md b/course/quizzes/container-escape.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..822a759
--- /dev/null
+++ b/course/quizzes/container-escape.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Quiz: Container Escape
+## Questions
+1. Which control is most specific to syscall filtering?
+   A) AppArmor B) SELinux C) seccomp D) cgroups
+2. Exposing Docker API without auth primarily risks:
+   A) slower builds B) disk usage C) full host compromise D) image pulls failing
+3. The strongest container isolation boundary is:
+   A) shared kernel B) VM parity C) namespace + cgroup + LSM D) Docker socket
+## Answers
+1. C 2. C 3. C
diff --git a/course/quizzes/dos-final.md b/course/quizzes/dos-final.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..00809d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/course/quizzes/dos-final.md
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# Final assessment: Denial-of-Service (DoS)
+## Questions
+1. Which option most directly reduces runtime breakout surface?
+   A) --privileged B) drop caps + seccomp + read-only C) expose 2375 D) host network
+2. Which is a reliable signal of insecure images?
+   A) pinned digest + signed provenance B) latest tag from unknown registry C) small image size D) alpine base
+## Answers
+1. B 2. B
diff --git a/course/quizzes/dos.md b/course/quizzes/dos.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..954c92a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/course/quizzes/dos.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Quiz: Denial-of-Service (DoS)
+## Questions
+1. Which control is most specific to syscall filtering?
+   A) AppArmor B) SELinux C) seccomp D) cgroups
+2. Exposing Docker API without auth primarily risks:
+   A) slower builds B) disk usage C) full host compromise D) image pulls failing
+3. The strongest container isolation boundary is:
+   A) shared kernel B) VM parity C) namespace + cgroup + LSM D) Docker socket
+## Answers
+1. C 2. C 3. C
diff --git a/course/quizzes/exposed-apis-final.md b/course/quizzes/exposed-apis-final.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e920887
--- /dev/null
+++ b/course/quizzes/exposed-apis-final.md
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# Final assessment: Exposed Container APIs
+## Questions
+1. Which option most directly reduces runtime breakout surface?
+   A) --privileged B) drop caps + seccomp + read-only C) expose 2375 D) host network
+2. Which is a reliable signal of insecure images?
+   A) pinned digest + signed provenance B) latest tag from unknown registry C) small image size D) alpine base
+## Answers
+1. B 2. B
diff --git a/course/quizzes/exposed-apis.md b/course/quizzes/exposed-apis.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e5a7233
--- /dev/null
+++ b/course/quizzes/exposed-apis.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Quiz: Exposed Container APIs
+## Questions
+1. Which control is most specific to syscall filtering?
+   A) AppArmor B) SELinux C) seccomp D) cgroups
+2. Exposing Docker API without auth primarily risks:
+   A) slower builds B) disk usage C) full host compromise D) image pulls failing
+3. The strongest container isolation boundary is:
+   A) shared kernel B) VM parity C) namespace + cgroup + LSM D) Docker socket
+## Answers
+1. C 2. C 3. C
diff --git a/course/quizzes/image-tampering-final.md b/course/quizzes/image-tampering-final.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..91600d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/course/quizzes/image-tampering-final.md
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# Final assessment: Container Image Tampering
+## Questions
+1. Which option most directly reduces runtime breakout surface?
+   A) --privileged B) drop caps + seccomp + read-only C) expose 2375 D) host network
+2. Which is a reliable signal of insecure images?
+   A) pinned digest + signed provenance B) latest tag from unknown registry C) small image size D) alpine base
+## Answers
+1. B 2. B
diff --git a/course/quizzes/image-tampering.md b/course/quizzes/image-tampering.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9ed27e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/course/quizzes/image-tampering.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Quiz: Container Image Tampering
+## Questions
+1. Which control is most specific to syscall filtering?
+   A) AppArmor B) SELinux C) seccomp D) cgroups
+2. Exposing Docker API without auth primarily risks:
+   A) slower builds B) disk usage C) full host compromise D) image pulls failing
+3. The strongest container isolation boundary is:
+   A) shared kernel B) VM parity C) namespace + cgroup + LSM D) Docker socket
+## Answers
+1. C 2. C 3. C
diff --git a/course/quizzes/insecure-config-final.md b/course/quizzes/insecure-config-final.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..343d739
--- /dev/null
+++ b/course/quizzes/insecure-config-final.md
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# Final assessment: Insecure Container Configuration
+## Questions
+1. Which option most directly reduces runtime breakout surface?
+   A) --privileged B) drop caps + seccomp + read-only C) expose 2375 D) host network
+2. Which is a reliable signal of insecure images?
+   A) pinned digest + signed provenance B) latest tag from unknown registry C) small image size D) alpine base
+## Answers
+1. B 2. B
diff --git a/course/quizzes/insecure-config.md b/course/quizzes/insecure-config.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7692977
--- /dev/null
+++ b/course/quizzes/insecure-config.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Quiz: Insecure Container Configuration
+## Questions
+1. Which control is most specific to syscall filtering?
+   A) AppArmor B) SELinux C) seccomp D) cgroups
+2. Exposing Docker API without auth primarily risks:
+   A) slower builds B) disk usage C) full host compromise D) image pulls failing
+3. The strongest container isolation boundary is:
+   A) shared kernel B) VM parity C) namespace + cgroup + LSM D) Docker socket
+## Answers
+1. C 2. C 3. C
diff --git a/course/quizzes/insecure-images-final.md b/course/quizzes/insecure-images-final.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7869ecc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/course/quizzes/insecure-images-final.md
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# Final assessment: Insecure Container Images
+## Questions
+1. Which option most directly reduces runtime breakout surface?
+   A) --privileged B) drop caps + seccomp + read-only C) expose 2375 D) host network
+2. Which is a reliable signal of insecure images?
+   A) pinned digest + signed provenance B) latest tag from unknown registry C) small image size D) alpine base
+## Answers
+1. B 2. B
diff --git a/course/quizzes/insecure-images.md b/course/quizzes/insecure-images.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..03439f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/course/quizzes/insecure-images.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Quiz: Insecure Container Images
+## Questions
+1. Which control is most specific to syscall filtering?
+   A) AppArmor B) SELinux C) seccomp D) cgroups
+2. Exposing Docker API without auth primarily risks:
+   A) slower builds B) disk usage C) full host compromise D) image pulls failing
+3. The strongest container isolation boundary is:
+   A) shared kernel B) VM parity C) namespace + cgroup + LSM D) Docker socket
+## Answers
+1. C 2. C 3. C
diff --git a/course/quizzes/kernel-vulns-final.md b/course/quizzes/kernel-vulns-final.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8e51b8e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/course/quizzes/kernel-vulns-final.md
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# Final assessment: Kernel Vulnerabilities
+## Questions
+1. Which option most directly reduces runtime breakout surface?
+   A) --privileged B) drop caps + seccomp + read-only C) expose 2375 D) host network
+2. Which is a reliable signal of insecure images?
+   A) pinned digest + signed provenance B) latest tag from unknown registry C) small image size D) alpine base
+## Answers
+1. B 2. B
diff --git a/course/quizzes/kernel-vulns.md b/course/quizzes/kernel-vulns.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..db89272
--- /dev/null
+++ b/course/quizzes/kernel-vulns.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Quiz: Kernel Vulnerabilities
+## Questions
+1. Which control is most specific to syscall filtering?
+   A) AppArmor B) SELinux C) seccomp D) cgroups
+2. Exposing Docker API without auth primarily risks:
+   A) slower builds B) disk usage C) full host compromise D) image pulls failing
+3. The strongest container isolation boundary is:
+   A) shared kernel B) VM parity C) namespace + cgroup + LSM D) Docker socket
+## Answers
+1. C 2. C 3. C
diff --git a/course/quizzes/lsm-final.md b/course/quizzes/lsm-final.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0d7aba9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/course/quizzes/lsm-final.md
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# Final assessment: What Seccomp, AppArmor, and SELinux Actually Do
+## Questions
+1. Which option most directly reduces runtime breakout surface?
+   A) --privileged B) drop caps + seccomp + read-only C) expose 2375 D) host network
+2. Which is a reliable signal of insecure images?
+   A) pinned digest + signed provenance B) latest tag from unknown registry C) small image size D) alpine base
+## Answers
+1. B 2. B
diff --git a/course/quizzes/lsm.md b/course/quizzes/lsm.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..df018f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/course/quizzes/lsm.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Quiz: What Seccomp, AppArmor, and SELinux Actually Do
+## Questions
+1. Which control is most specific to syscall filtering?
+   A) AppArmor B) SELinux C) seccomp D) cgroups
+2. Exposing Docker API without auth primarily risks:
+   A) slower builds B) disk usage C) full host compromise D) image pulls failing
+3. The strongest container isolation boundary is:
+   A) shared kernel B) VM parity C) namespace + cgroup + LSM D) Docker socket
+## Answers
+1. C 2. C 3. C
diff --git a/course/quizzes/orchestration-final.md b/course/quizzes/orchestration-final.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4b60b14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/course/quizzes/orchestration-final.md
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# Final assessment: Insecure Container Orchestration
+## Questions
+1. Which option most directly reduces runtime breakout surface?
+   A) --privileged B) drop caps + seccomp + read-only C) expose 2375 D) host network
+2. Which is a reliable signal of insecure images?
+   A) pinned digest + signed provenance B) latest tag from unknown registry C) small image size D) alpine base
+## Answers
+1. B 2. B
diff --git a/course/quizzes/orchestration.md b/course/quizzes/orchestration.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..051c047
--- /dev/null
+++ b/course/quizzes/orchestration.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Quiz: Insecure Container Orchestration
+## Questions
+1. Which control is most specific to syscall filtering?
+   A) AppArmor B) SELinux C) seccomp D) cgroups
+2. Exposing Docker API without auth primarily risks:
+   A) slower builds B) disk usage C) full host compromise D) image pulls failing
+3. The strongest container isolation boundary is:
+   A) shared kernel B) VM parity C) namespace + cgroup + LSM D) Docker socket
+## Answers
+1. C 2. C 3. C
diff --git a/course/quizzes/shared-kernel-final.md b/course/quizzes/shared-kernel-final.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ecc8181
--- /dev/null
+++ b/course/quizzes/shared-kernel-final.md
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# Final assessment: Shared Kernel Exploitation
+## Questions
+1. Which option most directly reduces runtime breakout surface?
+   A) --privileged B) drop caps + seccomp + read-only C) expose 2375 D) host network
+2. Which is a reliable signal of insecure images?
+   A) pinned digest + signed provenance B) latest tag from unknown registry C) small image size D) alpine base
+## Answers
+1. B 2. B
diff --git a/course/quizzes/shared-kernel.md b/course/quizzes/shared-kernel.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d9b2e4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/course/quizzes/shared-kernel.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Quiz: Shared Kernel Exploitation
+## Questions
+1. Which control is most specific to syscall filtering?
+   A) AppArmor B) SELinux C) seccomp D) cgroups
+2. Exposing Docker API without auth primarily risks:
+   A) slower builds B) disk usage C) full host compromise D) image pulls failing
+3. The strongest container isolation boundary is:
+   A) shared kernel B) VM parity C) namespace + cgroup + LSM D) Docker socket
+## Answers
+1. C 2. C 3. C
diff --git a/tests/README.md b/tests/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..017cb83
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# Tests
+Add test files here. Suggested runners:
+- Python: `pytest`
+- Node/TS: `vitest` or `jest`
+- Rust: `cargo test`