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Black reformatted latex_tabs.py, tm_supply_chain.py, tm_usage.py,
and related doc/security files during the review-patch session.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017zY8BoH65KBX6cz7Pm8aeF
Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: doc/explanation/compliance_track.rst
+22-23Lines changed: 22 additions & 23 deletions
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@@ -159,12 +159,12 @@ The table below summarises dfetch's implementation of each prEN 40000-1-4 Securi
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- :ref:`C-001 <c-001>`, :ref:`C-002 <c-002>`
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- Integrity hash verification (:ref:`C-005 <c-005>`) is opt-in; manifest entries without an ``integrity`` field are fetched without hash verification by default
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- ⚠ Partial
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- SO.SecureStartupConfig
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- —
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- —
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- — N/A
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- SO.FactoryReset
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- —
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- —
@@ -174,17 +174,17 @@ The table below summarises dfetch's implementation of each prEN 40000-1-4 Securi
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ The table below summarises dfetch's implementation of each prEN 40000-1-4 Securi
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- :ref:`C-006 <c-006>`, :ref:`C-036 <c-036>`
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- dfetch has no native authentication or authorisation layer; access control is fully delegated to the underlying VCS server and host OS. C-006 prevents interactive credential prompts, and C-036 strips credentials from persisted metadata — both are confidentiality controls, not access-control mechanisms in the authentication/authorisation sense
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- ⚠ Partial
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- SO.AccessControlReport
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- :ref:`C-045 <c-045>`
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- No persistent log of unauthorised access attempts
@@ -204,22 +204,22 @@ The table below summarises dfetch's implementation of each prEN 40000-1-4 Securi
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- :ref:`C-036 <c-036>`
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- —
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- ✓ Implemented
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* -
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- SO.DataProcessedConfidentiality
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- :ref:`C-005 <c-005>`, :ref:`C-034 <c-034>`
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- —
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- ✓ Implemented
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* -
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- SO.DataTransmittedConfidentiality
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- :ref:`C-045 <c-045>`
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- C-045 warns on plaintext-scheme URLs but does not refuse to proceed; TLS/SSH confidentiality is provided by the underlying VCS client, not enforced by dfetch itself
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- ⚠ Partial
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- SO.ComAuth
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- :ref:`C-045 <c-045>`
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- Server authentication (TLS certificate verification, SSH host-key checking) is delegated to the OS trust store and VCS client; dfetch does not independently authenticate remote endpoints and cannot enforce authenticated channels when C-045's warning is overridden by the user
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- ⚠ Partial
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- SO.SecureProvisioning
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- :ref:`C-005 <c-005>`
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- —
@@ -229,17 +229,17 @@ The table below summarises dfetch's implementation of each prEN 40000-1-4 Securi
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- :ref:`C-005 <c-005>`
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- Integrity hash opt-in only; not enforced by default for git/svn
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- ⚠ Partial
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- SO.DataProcessedIntegrity
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- :ref:`C-005 <c-005>`, :ref:`C-034 <c-034>`
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- —
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- ✓ Implemented
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* -
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- SO.DataTransmittedIntegrity
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- :ref:`C-005 <c-005>`
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- C-005 provides end-to-end hash verification for archive sources only (opt-in); git and svn sources rely solely on VCS object integrity (SHA-1/SHA-256 object model) and TLS/SSH channel integrity — no dfetch-level hash verification
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- ⚠ Partial
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- SO.IntegrityReport
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- :ref:`C-045 <c-045>`
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- No persistent integrity-violation log
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- —
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- —
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- — N/A
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- SO.IncidentResilience
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- :ref:`C-002 <c-002>`, :ref:`C-007 <c-007>`
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- No timeout on VCS operations (potential resource exhaustion)
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- :ref:`C-001 <c-001>`, :ref:`C-007 <c-007>`
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- Archive HTTP operations time out at 15 s (reachability) and 60 s (download) via ``archive.py``; git and svn subprocess calls have no timeout and can stall indefinitely
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- ⚠ Partial
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- SO.PreventAttackPropagation
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- :ref:`C-001 <c-001>`, :ref:`C-008 <c-008>`
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- —
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- ✓ Implemented
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- SO.MonitorExternalImpact
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- —
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- —
@@ -289,17 +289,17 @@ The table below summarises dfetch's implementation of each prEN 40000-1-4 Securi
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- —
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- No persistent structured security event log (LGM-1/2/3/4 gap). dfetch prints operational output to stderr but does not retain it, does not record which credentials were used, which files were modified, or when remote access occurred. C-036 ensures credentials are excluded from operational output but is not a logging control
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- ⚠ Partial
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- SO.MonitorSecurityRelevantActivities
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- :ref:`C-045 <c-045>`
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- —
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- ⚠ Partial
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- SO.OptionDisableDataLogging
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- —
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- —
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- — N/A
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- SO.OptionDisableDataMonitoring
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- —
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- —
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- —
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- ✓ Implemented
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- SO.DataTransmittedConfidentiality
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- —
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- — N/A
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- SO.DataTransmittedIntegrity
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- —
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- — N/A
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- SO.ComAuth
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- —
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- —
@@ -438,4 +438,3 @@ Both files are regenerated with:
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