claude-code-review.yml

name: Claude Code Review

on:
  workflow_dispatch:
    inputs:
      pr_number:
        description: 'Pull Request Number'
        required: true
        type: string

jobs:
  claude-review:
    if: contains(fromJSON('["potatoqualitee","niphlod","andreasjordan"]'), github.actor)

    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    env:
      CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB: 1
    permissions:
      contents: read
      pull-requests: read
      issues: read
      id-token: write # Required for the action to fetch a GitHub OIDC token

    steps:
      - name: Checkout repository
        uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
        with:
          fetch-depth: 1

      - name: Validate PR number
        shell: bash
        env:
          PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.inputs.pr_number }}
        run: |
          if [[ ! "$PR_NUMBER" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]]; then
            echo "PR number must be numeric"
            exit 1
          fi

      - name: Set up bubblewrap for subprocess isolation
        shell: bash
        run: |
          # CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB=1 forces the Claude Code CLI to run every
          # subprocess under bubblewrap with secrets (OAuth token, GITHUB_TOKEN, cloud
          # creds) scrubbed from its environment. The CLI refuses to start if bubblewrap
          # is missing, so install it on the runner before invoking the action.
          # socat is the second half of the pair: it relays sandboxed network traffic
          # through the sandbox proxy. Without it every Bash command that touches the
          # network (gh, git push) dies on sandbox init. Neither package ships in the
          # ubuntu-latest image. Ref: https://code.claude.com/docs/en/sandboxing
          sudo apt-get update
          sudo apt-get install -y bubblewrap socat
          # Ubuntu 24.04 (ubuntu-latest) blocks unprivileged user namespaces via AppArmor,
          # which bubblewrap needs. Rather than globally disabling the kernel restriction
          # (kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns), load a dedicated AppArmor profile
          # granting only /usr/bin/bwrap the userns capability - the same profile shape
          # Ubuntu ships for Flatpak and Chrome - so host hardening stays intact.
          # Ref: https://code.claude.com/docs/en/sandboxing
          if [ "$(sysctl -n kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns 2>/dev/null || echo 0)" = "1" ]; then
            sudo tee /etc/apparmor.d/bwrap > /dev/null <<'PROFILE'
          abi <abi/4.0>,
          include <tunables/global>

          profile bwrap /usr/bin/bwrap flags=(unconfined) {
            userns,
            include if exists <local/bwrap>
          }
          PROFILE
            sudo apparmor_parser -r /etc/apparmor.d/bwrap
          fi
          # Fail fast here if bwrap still cannot create a user namespace, instead of
          # letting the Claude Code install fail later with a less obvious error.
          bwrap --ro-bind / / --unshare-user true
          echo "bubblewrap ready: $(bwrap --version)"
          # The sandbox keeps commands from editing config dotfiles by bind-mounting
          # over each one, and bwrap has to CREATE the mount point when the file does
          # not exist. One set of those paths resolves under /home, which is root-owned
          # on the runner, so the create fails and the sandbox aborts before bash ever
          # starts. Every Bash tool call in the session then dies with
          #   bwrap: Can't create file at /home/.mcp.json: Permission denied
          # which reads like a permissions denial on the command but is really sandbox
          # bootstrap failing. Pre-create the paths so bwrap binds over something that
          # already exists. Ref: https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/17258
          for name in .gitconfig .gitmodules .bashrc .bash_profile .zshrc .zprofile .profile .ripgreprc; do
            [ -e "/home/$name" ] || sudo install -m 644 /dev/null "/home/$name"
          done
          # Valid-but-empty JSON rather than a zero-byte file, in case anything on the
          # runner parses this one as an MCP config instead of just mounting over it.
          [ -e /home/.mcp.json ] || printf '{"mcpServers":{}}\n' | sudo tee /home/.mcp.json > /dev/null
          for name in .vscode .idea .claude/commands .claude/agents; do
            [ -d "/home/$name" ] || sudo install -d -m 755 "/home/$name"
          done
          echo "sandbox mount points ready in /home"

      - name: Run Claude Code Review
        id: claude-review
        uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@56cf60fde42f7b19c3abfd5c9c48b69a1288461f # v1
        with:
          claude_code_oauth_token: ${{ secrets.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN }}
          prompt: |
            REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
            PR NUMBER: ${{ github.event.inputs.pr_number }}

            Please review this pull request and provide feedback on:
            - Code quality and best practices
            - Potential bugs or issues
            - Performance considerations
            - Security concerns
            - Test coverage

            Use the repository's CLAUDE.md for guidance on style and conventions. Be constructive and helpful in your feedback.

            Use `gh pr comment` with your Bash tool to leave your review as a comment on the PR.

          # See https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code-action/blob/main/docs/usage.md
          # or https://docs.claude.com/en/docs/claude-code/cli-reference for available options
          claude_args: >-
            --max-turns 100
            --allowedTools "Bash(gh pr comment:*),Bash(gh pr diff:*),Bash(gh pr view:*)"