Do not open a public issue for a vulnerability. Report Databricks platform issues to security@databricks.com. For a project-specific issue, use this repository's private Security → Advisories → Report a vulnerability flow.
Include the affected version or commit, reproduction steps and expected impact.
The App reads Databricks configuration and telemetry and writes assessment records to a Lakebase database owned by the installing customer.
- It never asks for, receives or stores a personal access token. The Databricks Apps proxy supplies a short-lived on-behalf-of token for the current request.
- Interactive reads run with the signed-in user's permissions. Scheduled reads run as the explicitly configured service principal, whose identity is recorded on the run.
- Mutating endpoints fail closed unless the caller is a direct member of the configured assessor group.
- Cloud credentials, when required, are short lived and vended at scan time; they are not persisted.
- SQL values are parameterised. Identifiers that cannot be parameterised are validated before interpolation.
- The App requests enumerated API scopes and never requests the blanket
all-apisscope. - Optional AI receives only the current assessment context and cannot alter findings or scores.
Stored records carry SHA-256 digests of their canonical JSON. These detect accidental or uncoordinated changes; they are not signatures and do not establish who produced a record. Exports similarly expose a digest that establishes byte integrity, not origin authenticity.
Security fixes are applied to main. Customer installations are pinned until an operator deliberately
upgrades through the documented DAB lifecycle.