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SolidSyslogMbedTlsAesGcmPolicy replaces the HMAC policy on the store. Records at
rest gain confidentiality on top of tamper-evidence: the body is encrypted, the
record header is authenticated as associated data, and nonce and tag go in the
trailer.
Flash 14,652 B (+148)
Static RAM 5,060 B (+8)
Heap 17,784 B (+8)
Log stack 712 B (0)
Service stack 3,800 B (0)
A hundred and fifty bytes, because AES-GCM is already linked — a device that
negotiates a GCM ciphersuite for TLS is carrying the same primitive the store now
uses. No stack movement: the policy encrypts in place, into the buffer the store
already owns.
The store key is unchanged. Its name says what it protects, not which algorithm
protects it, so escalating the policy does not need another key provisioned.
GCM needs a fresh nonce per record and mbedTLS has no context-free RNG, so the
policy takes the device's DRBG as well as the key. That is the only wiring
difference from the HMAC policy.
The pipeline element now reports what the store actually did, derived like the
transport value rather than asserted, and both fall back to the weakest honest
answer if the credentials behind them are missing.
The heap difference is measurement noise; the per-run test PKI moves it by up to
32 bytes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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