Ordered by effort-to-impact. Steps 1-2 are the ones that matter; the rest compound. Everything here needs your account, so the text is ready to paste rather than done.
Rules research behind these choices is in DISTRIBUTION.md.
Needs org admin on cdmx-in. The repo currently has a null description, no topics and no
homepage, so it surfaces in no GitHub search.
Description (350 char limit, this is 273):
Claude Code skill that runs real security scanners (Semgrep, gitleaks, TruffleHog, Trivy, osv-scanner, ZAP) then verifies every finding against source. SAST, secrets across full git history, SCA, IaC, Supabase/Firebase RLS. One report tagged to OWASP Top 10 2025.
Website: https://cdmx.in
Topics:
claude-code claude-skill claude-plugin security sast dast sca
secret-scanning appsec devsecops owasp semgrep gitleaks trivy
vulnerability-scanner ai-agents
One command, if run by someone with admin:
gh repo edit cdmx-in/security-review \
--homepage "https://cdmx.in" \
--description "Claude Code skill that runs real security scanners (Semgrep, gitleaks, TruffleHog, Trivy, osv-scanner, ZAP) then verifies every finding against source. SAST, secrets across full git history, SCA, IaC, Supabase/Firebase RLS. One report tagged to OWASP Top 10 2025." \
--add-topic claude-code --add-topic claude-skill --add-topic claude-plugin \
--add-topic security --add-topic sast --add-topic dast --add-topic sca \
--add-topic secret-scanning --add-topic appsec --add-topic devsecops \
--add-topic owasp --add-topic semgrep --add-topic gitleaks --add-topic trivy \
--add-topic vulnerability-scanner --add-topic ai-agentsOr in the UI: repo page → the gear icon beside About → paste description, website and topics → Save changes.
The only channel with verified install numbers attached, and reachable by default from every Claude Code install. A community plugin currently sits at #2 with over a million installs.
Submit at https://clau.de/plugin-directory-submission, or https://platform.claude.com/plugins/submit for an individual author.
Already done: manifests exist, claude plugin validate . passes, and the install has
been tested end to end (/plugin marketplace add cdmx-in/security-review →
/plugin install security-audit@cdmx-security).
Note the repo must be public, and approved plugins get pinned to a commit SHA with the catalog syncing nightly.
377k subscribers, no karma gate, but Rule 5 requires a real write-up rather than a link drop. Flair: Built with Claude Code.
Title: I built a security audit skill that runs real scanners, and found that most of them exit 0 when they scan nothing
Claude Code ships
/security-review, which reads your diff and reasons about it. It works, but it never executes a scanner, so it cannot walk your git history for a key you committed eight months ago, and it does not know a transitive dependency has a published CVE.So I built a skill that orchestrates the real tools — Semgrep, gitleaks, TruffleHog, Trivy, osv-scanner, ZAP — and uses Claude for the part it is actually good at: verifying each candidate finding against source before it reaches the report.
What I learned building it, which is the more useful half:
Every one of those scanners has a documented mode where it scans nothing and exits 0. Semgrep on a parse error. Bandit silently dropping your excludes when filenames are passed, which is exactly what pre-commit does. TruffleHog under the default shallow clone, where there is no history to scan. gitleaks with a custom config missing
[extend] useDefault = true, which deletes every built-in rule. A clean report is the result people act on, so this is the failure that actually ships vulnerabilities.The fix is five lines: plant a known-vulnerable canary file and confirm the scanner flags it before you believe its silence.
The other thing that changed the design: measured on identical tasks, LLM review filters 36% of false positives when asked directly and 95% with tools and structure. It is much better at refuting a finding than originating one. So scanners find, Claude verifies — the reverse of how most AI security review is pitched.
How Claude Code was used: research agents in parallel to verify current tool syntax (which caught that ZAP's
owasp/zap2docker-*images are retired and gitleaksdetectis deprecated), then an adversarial reviewer agent that found a real defect in my own tool — scanner JSON contains cleartext secrets, and I was writing it into the repo being audited.MIT, install is two lines: github.com/cdmx-in/security-review
Honest limitation, in the README and in every report it generates: this misses more than it finds. The best-documented measurement of LLM security review on a known vulnerability found it 8 times in 100 runs and said "no bug here" in 66. A clean report means the checks that ran found nothing, not that the app is secure.
No hashtags — across ~25 sampled posts from every relevant account, zero used one. Distribution there is @-mentions and quote-tweets.
Best target is @claude_code (47.6k), which has a demonstrated pattern of amplifying community skills with install instructions.
Built a security audit skill for Claude Code that runs the real scanners — Semgrep, gitleaks, TruffleHog, Trivy, osv-scanner, ZAP — and verifies every finding against source before reporting.
The thing I did not expect: nearly all of those tools have a mode where they scan nothing and exit 0. Semgrep on a parse error. Bandit dropping excludes under pre-commit. TruffleHog under a shallow clone. A clean report is what people ship on.
So it plants a canary and proves the scanner works before trusting its silence.
MIT: github.com/cdmx-in/security-review
cc @claude_code
1.06M subscribers. Rule 7 explicitly welcomes self-promotion, but a feed post needs 50+ total karma; below that you are redirected to the showcase megathread, where mods note sub-50 posts rarely get traction.
Requirements: must be free to try and say so, minimal promotional language, no referral links. Flair: Built with Claude.
Reuse the r/ClaudeCode text, adding "Free and MIT licensed" near the top.
WRITEUP.md in this repo is ready to publish. It is the only artifact that unlocks
r/netsec, and it doubles as dev.to and Medium content.
- dev.to — tags
claudecode(notclaude-code, which 404s),security,ai,showdev - Medium — AI Advances (99k followers, 11% acceptance, 24-hour decisions) or Level Up Coding (352k)
- r/netsec — link the published writeup, never the repo. Rule 8 bans tool and README links outright; Rule 4 wants a 6+ month history of quality contribution before anything commercial; Rule 9 bans LLM-generated posts. If you have no history there, use the monthly tool thread instead and do not force it.
Gate: 14 days of ongoing commits, or 100 stars. Web issue form only — PRs risk a temporary interaction ban. There is a Security category.
Form: https://github.com/hesreallyhim/awesome-claude-code/issues/new?template=recommend-resource.yml
- Display Name: Security Audit
- Category: Skills
- Link: https://github.com/cdmx-in/security-review
- Author: cdmx-in
- Description:
Runs SAST, secret, dependency and IaC scanners over a repository and verifies each finding against source before reporting.
One line, factual, no emoji, no sales language, does not address the reader — their style rules are strict about this.
Calibration: the three largest community Claude Code projects are all absent from this list. Treat it as a lagging indicator, not a strategy.
Low priority. Median across ~40 "Claude Code skill" submissions is 3-4 points; Superpowers scored 1, 4, 4 and 3 across four attempts. The outlier that hit 337 had a demo video.
If you go: record a demo first, title Show HN: A security audit skill that verifies its own scanners work, post Sunday around 12:00 UTC, and be available to reply for the
first two hours.
- Hashnode — 9 followers on the Claude tag. Canonical cross-post for SEO only.
- smithery.ai — MCP servers only, despite appearing on most "where to publish" lists.
- davila7/claude-code-templates as a marketplace — it has no valid root manifest, so
/plugin marketplace addfails. Still a valid PR target for an aitmpl.com listing. - Chasing stars — one repo in this space shows 30k stars against 17.5k monthly npm downloads, and an ICSE 2026 paper puts ~6M suspected fake stars on GitHub concentrated in AI/LLM projects.