diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index d8c66af..3dcf377 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+### Added
+- **SQLite immutable audit triggers** (`src/audit/sqlite.rs`): two `BEFORE UPDATE / BEFORE DELETE` triggers are now installed during schema initialisation, enforcing audit record immutability at the database engine level — zero runtime performance cost. Any attempt to modify or delete a committed audit row is aborted by SQLite regardless of which process or connection issues it. The `no_audit_delete` trigger is skipped when rotation (`max_entries` / `max_age_days`) is configured, since rotation intentionally prunes old rows. Closes #99.
+
 ### Fixed
 - **Federation timeout now returns partial results** (`src/gateway.rs`): when `tools/list` is federated across multiple upstreams and the deadline fires, results from upstreams that already responded are now returned instead of discarding everything with an error. The response includes `"_arbitus_partial": true` when not all upstreams replied in time — clients can proceed with the partial tool catalog rather than seeing an empty list. Closes #97.
 - **Stack overflow on deeply nested JSON payloads** (`src/middleware/payload_filter.rs`, `src/gateway.rs`): `scan_value` (payload filter) was fully recursive and would overflow the stack on deeply nested JSON arguments. Replaced with an explicit-stack iterative traversal capped at `MAX_DEPTH = 64`. `redact_value` (gateway) was also recursive; refactored to depth-parameterised recursion that returns the value unchanged beyond `REDACT_MAX_DEPTH = 64` instead of panicking. Added two new unit tests covering the boundary. Closes #95.
diff --git a/src/audit/sqlite.rs b/src/audit/sqlite.rs
index 52642b7..d31e3ed 100644
--- a/src/audit/sqlite.rs
+++ b/src/audit/sqlite.rs
@@ -192,6 +192,26 @@ impl SqliteAudit {
             .execute_batch("ALTER TABLE audit_log ADD COLUMN prev_hash TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '';");
         let _ = conn
             .execute_batch("ALTER TABLE audit_log ADD COLUMN entry_hash TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '';");
+        // Immutability triggers — database-level enforcement; zero runtime cost.
+        // The UPDATE trigger is always installed: no row should ever be modified.
+        // The DELETE trigger is only installed when rotation is disabled; rotation
+        // uses DELETE to prune old entries by design, so the two are mutually exclusive.
+        conn.execute_batch(
+            "CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS no_audit_update
+             BEFORE UPDATE ON audit_log
+             BEGIN
+                 SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'audit records are immutable');
+             END;",
+        )?;
+        if max_entries.is_none() && max_age_days.is_none() {
+            conn.execute_batch(
+                "CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS no_audit_delete
+                 BEFORE DELETE ON audit_log
+                 BEGIN
+                     SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'audit records are immutable');
+                 END;",
+            )?;
+        }
         let conn = Arc::new(Mutex::new(conn));
         let (tx, mut rx) = mpsc::channel::<Arc<AuditEntry>>(CHANNEL_CAPACITY);
 
@@ -655,8 +675,15 @@ mod tests {
         audit.record(entry(Outcome::Allowed));
         audit.flush().await;
 
-        // Tamper: overwrite the entry_hash in the database
+        // Simulate a privileged attacker who bypasses triggers to tamper with the DB.
+        // Drop triggers first (requires schema-write access), then mutate the row.
+        // The hash chain must still detect the tampering.
         let conn = Connection::open(path).unwrap();
+        conn.execute_batch(
+            "DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS no_audit_update;
+             DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS no_audit_delete;",
+        )
+        .unwrap();
         conn.execute(
             "UPDATE audit_log SET entry_hash = 'deadbeef' WHERE id = 1",
             [],
@@ -679,8 +706,13 @@ mod tests {
         audit.record(entry(Outcome::Allowed));
         audit.flush().await;
 
-        // Break the chain: change row 2's prev_hash without updating entry_hash
+        // Simulate a privileged attacker bypassing triggers before mutating.
         let conn = Connection::open(path).unwrap();
+        conn.execute_batch(
+            "DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS no_audit_update;
+             DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS no_audit_delete;",
+        )
+        .unwrap();
         conn.execute(
             "UPDATE audit_log SET prev_hash = 'badhash' WHERE id = 2",
             [],
@@ -694,6 +726,50 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
+    // ── Immutability triggers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn trigger_prevents_update_on_audit_log() {
+        let f = NamedTempFile::new().unwrap();
+        let path = f.path().to_str().unwrap();
+        let audit = SqliteAudit::new(path, test_metrics()).unwrap();
+        audit.record(entry(Outcome::Allowed));
+        audit.flush().await;
+
+        let conn = Connection::open(path).unwrap();
+        let result = conn.execute("UPDATE audit_log SET outcome = 'blocked' WHERE id = 1", []);
+        assert!(
+            result.is_err(),
+            "UPDATE must be rejected by the immutability trigger"
+        );
+        let err = result.unwrap_err().to_string();
+        assert!(
+            err.contains("immutable"),
+            "error must mention immutability, got: {err}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn trigger_prevents_delete_on_audit_log() {
+        let f = NamedTempFile::new().unwrap();
+        let path = f.path().to_str().unwrap();
+        let audit = SqliteAudit::new(path, test_metrics()).unwrap();
+        audit.record(entry(Outcome::Allowed));
+        audit.flush().await;
+
+        let conn = Connection::open(path).unwrap();
+        let result = conn.execute("DELETE FROM audit_log WHERE id = 1", []);
+        assert!(
+            result.is_err(),
+            "DELETE must be rejected by the immutability trigger"
+        );
+        let err = result.unwrap_err().to_string();
+        assert!(
+            err.contains("immutable"),
+            "error must mention immutability, got: {err}"
+        );
+    }
+
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn verify_chain_empty_log_returns_ok() {
         let f = NamedTempFile::new().unwrap();