diff --git a/labs/lab2/threagile-model-auth.yaml b/labs/lab2/threagile-model-auth.yaml
new file mode 100644
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+threagile_version: 1.0.0
+
+title: Juice Shop — Authentication Flow Threat Model
+date: 2025-09-18
+
+author:
+  name: Student Name
+  homepage: https://example.edu
+
+management_summary_comment: >
+  Focused threat model of the Juice Shop authentication flow:
+  login, JWT issuance, session use on protected endpoints, and admin
+  privilege escalation. This model deliberately omits non-auth assets
+  (product catalog, orders) to surface auth-specific risks that a
+  full-architecture model masks.
+
+business_criticality: critical
+
+business_overview:
+  description: >
+    Authentication is the primary security control in Juice Shop.
+    Weaknesses here (weak JWT signing, missing brute-force protection,
+    broken admin authorization) directly enable account takeover and
+    privilege escalation.
+
+technical_overview:
+  description: >
+    A browser submits credentials to the Auth API, which validates them
+    against the User Credential Store and requests a signed JWT from the
+    Token Signer. The browser then presents that JWT on every subsequent
+    request. The Admin Endpoint additionally verifies that the JWT carries
+    an admin role claim before serving privileged operations.
+
+questions: {}
+abuse_cases:
+  Brute-Force Login: >
+    Attacker submits thousands of credential pairs against the login endpoint
+    to guess a valid password.
+  JWT Algorithm Confusion: >
+    Attacker forges a JWT by exploiting a weak or mis-configured signing
+    algorithm (e.g. alg:none or RS256→HS256 confusion).
+  Privilege Escalation via Tampered JWT: >
+    Attacker modifies the role claim in a JWT to gain admin access.
+  Session Fixation: >
+    Attacker plants a known session token before login and hijacks the
+    authenticated session afterwards.
+
+security_requirements:
+  Strong JWT signing: Use RS256 or ES256; never accept alg:none.
+  Rate limiting on login: Lock account or add CAPTCHA after N failed attempts.
+  Admin role server-side check: Verify role claim on every admin request server-side.
+  Short-lived tokens: JWT expiry ≤ 15 minutes; use refresh-token rotation.
+  Secrets in vault: JWT signing keys must not appear in source code or logs.
+
+tags_available:
+  - browser
+  - auth
+  - jwt
+  - admin
+  - credentials
+  - session
+  - token
+  - internal
+  - external
+
+# =========================
+# DATA ASSETS
+# =========================
+data_assets:
+
+  Credentials:
+    id: credentials
+    description: "Username and password submitted at login."
+    usage: business
+    tags: ["auth", "credentials"]
+    origin: user-supplied
+    owner: Lab Owner
+    quantity: many
+    confidentiality: strictly-confidential
+    integrity: critical
+    availability: important
+    justification_cia_rating: >
+      Plaintext credentials in transit must be strictly protected;
+      compromise allows immediate account takeover.
+
+  JWT Token:
+    id: jwt-token
+    description: "Signed JWT issued after successful login, carries user identity and role claims."
+    usage: business
+    tags: ["auth", "jwt", "token"]
+    origin: application
+    owner: Lab Owner
+    quantity: many
+    confidentiality: confidential
+    integrity: critical
+    availability: important
+    justification_cia_rating: >
+      A forged or tampered JWT bypasses all authorization checks.
+      Integrity is therefore critical.
+
+  JWT Signing Key:
+    id: jwt-signing-key
+    description: "Secret or private key used to sign and verify JWTs."
+    usage: devops
+    tags: ["auth", "jwt"]
+    origin: application
+    owner: Lab Owner
+    quantity: very-few
+    confidentiality: strictly-confidential
+    integrity: critical
+    availability: important
+    justification_cia_rating: >
+      Exposure of the signing key allows an attacker to forge arbitrary
+      tokens with any identity or role.
+
+  User Session State:
+    id: user-session-state
+    description: "Server-side or client-side session state tracking authenticated users."
+    usage: business
+    tags: ["session", "auth"]
+    origin: application
+    owner: Lab Owner
+    quantity: many
+    confidentiality: confidential
+    integrity: important
+    availability: important
+    justification_cia_rating: >
+      Session fixation or hijack gives an attacker full user-level access.
+
+  Admin Operation Request:
+    id: admin-operation-request
+    description: "Privileged requests to admin endpoints (user management, config changes)."
+    usage: business
+    tags: ["admin", "auth"]
+    origin: user-supplied
+    owner: Lab Owner
+    quantity: few
+    confidentiality: confidential
+    integrity: critical
+    availability: important
+    justification_cia_rating: >
+      Admin operations can modify all application data; integrity is critical
+      to prevent privilege escalation abuse.
+
+# =========================
+# TECHNICAL ASSETS
+# =========================
+technical_assets:
+
+  Browser:
+    id: browser
+    description: "End-user web browser initiating login and authenticated requests."
+    type: external-entity
+    usage: business
+    used_as_client_by_human: true
+    out_of_scope: false
+    justification_out_of_scope:
+    size: system
+    technology: browser
+    tags: ["browser", "external"]
+    internet: true
+    machine: virtual
+    encryption: none
+    owner: External User
+    confidentiality: public
+    integrity: operational
+    availability: operational
+    justification_cia_rating: "Client controlled by end user; potentially an attacker."
+    multi_tenant: false
+    redundant: false
+    custom_developed_parts: false
+    data_assets_processed:
+      - credentials
+      - jwt-token
+      - user-session-state
+      - admin-operation-request
+    data_assets_stored:
+      - jwt-token
+      - user-session-state
+    data_formats_accepted:
+      - json
+    communication_links:
+      Login Request:
+        target: auth-api
+        description: "Browser POSTs credentials to /rest/user/login over HTTPS."
+        protocol: https
+        authentication: credentials
+        authorization: none
+        tags: []
+        vpn: false
+        ip_filtered: false
+        readonly: false
+        usage: business
+        data_assets_sent:
+          - credentials
+        data_assets_received:
+          - jwt-token
+      Authenticated API Request:
+        target: auth-api
+        description: "Browser sends JWT in Authorization header for protected endpoints."
+        protocol: https
+        authentication: token
+        authorization: enduser-identity-propagation
+        tags: []
+        vpn: false
+        ip_filtered: false
+        readonly: false
+        usage: business
+        data_assets_sent:
+          - jwt-token
+          - user-session-state
+        data_assets_received: []
+      Admin Request:
+        target: admin-endpoint
+        description: "Browser sends JWT with admin role claim to admin endpoints."
+        protocol: https
+        authentication: token
+        authorization: enduser-identity-propagation
+        tags: ["admin"]
+        vpn: false
+        ip_filtered: false
+        readonly: false
+        usage: business
+        data_assets_sent:
+          - jwt-token
+          - admin-operation-request
+        data_assets_received: []
+
+  Auth API:
+    id: auth-api
+    description: "Juice Shop authentication endpoint (/rest/user/login, /rest/user/register). Validates credentials and orchestrates JWT issuance."
+    type: process
+    usage: business
+    used_as_client_by_human: false
+    out_of_scope: false
+    justification_out_of_scope:
+    size: application
+    technology: web-service-rest
+    tags: ["auth", "internal"]
+    internet: false
+    machine: container
+    encryption: none
+    owner: Lab Owner
+    confidentiality: internal
+    integrity: critical
+    availability: important
+    justification_cia_rating: >
+      Central authentication logic; compromise here breaks all access control.
+    multi_tenant: false
+    redundant: false
+    custom_developed_parts: true
+    data_assets_processed:
+      - credentials
+      - jwt-token
+      - user-session-state
+    data_assets_stored: []
+    data_formats_accepted:
+      - json
+    communication_links:
+      Validate Credentials:
+        target: user-credential-store
+        description: "Auth API queries the credential store to verify submitted username/password hash."
+        protocol: jdbc
+        authentication: credentials
+        authorization: technical-user
+        tags: []
+        vpn: false
+        ip_filtered: false
+        readonly: true
+        usage: business
+        data_assets_sent:
+          - credentials
+        data_assets_received:
+          - credentials
+      Request JWT:
+        target: token-signer
+        description: "Auth API asks the Token Signer to issue a signed JWT after successful credential validation."
+        protocol: https
+        authentication: token
+        authorization: technical-user
+        tags: []
+        vpn: false
+        ip_filtered: false
+        readonly: false
+        usage: business
+        data_assets_sent:
+          - user-session-state
+        data_assets_received:
+          - jwt-token
+
+  Token Signer:
+    id: token-signer
+    description: "Component responsible for signing and verifying JWTs using the signing key."
+    type: process
+    usage: business
+    used_as_client_by_human: false
+    out_of_scope: false
+    justification_out_of_scope:
+    size: component
+    technology: web-service-rest
+    tags: ["jwt", "auth", "internal"]
+    internet: false
+    machine: container
+    encryption: none
+    owner: Lab Owner
+    confidentiality: internal
+    integrity: critical
+    availability: important
+    justification_cia_rating: >
+      Holds the JWT signing key; compromise allows forging of arbitrary tokens.
+    multi_tenant: false
+    redundant: false
+    custom_developed_parts: true
+    data_assets_processed:
+      - jwt-token
+      - jwt-signing-key
+    data_assets_stored:
+      - jwt-signing-key
+    data_formats_accepted:
+      - json
+    communication_links: {}
+
+  User Credential Store:
+    id: user-credential-store
+    description: "SQLite database storing hashed passwords and user profile data."
+    type: datastore
+    usage: business
+    used_as_client_by_human: false
+    out_of_scope: false
+    justification_out_of_scope:
+    size: component
+    technology: database
+    tags: ["auth", "internal"]
+    internet: false
+    machine: container
+    encryption: none
+    owner: Lab Owner
+    confidentiality: strictly-confidential
+    integrity: critical
+    availability: important
+    justification_cia_rating: >
+      Contains password hashes; direct access enables offline cracking
+      and full account compromise.
+    multi_tenant: false
+    redundant: false
+    custom_developed_parts: false
+    data_assets_processed:
+      - credentials
+    data_assets_stored:
+      - credentials
+    data_formats_accepted:
+      - file
+    communication_links: {}
+
+  Admin Endpoint:
+    id: admin-endpoint
+    description: "Privileged admin routes (e.g. /administration, /#/administration). Requires JWT with admin role claim."
+    type: process
+    usage: business
+    used_as_client_by_human: false
+    out_of_scope: false
+    justification_out_of_scope:
+    size: component
+    technology: web-service-rest
+    tags: ["admin", "auth", "internal"]
+    internet: false
+    machine: container
+    encryption: none
+    owner: Lab Owner
+    confidentiality: internal
+    integrity: critical
+    availability: important
+    justification_cia_rating: >
+      Admin operations affect all users and application data;
+      broken authorization here is a critical elevation-of-privilege risk.
+    multi_tenant: false
+    redundant: false
+    custom_developed_parts: true
+    data_assets_processed:
+      - jwt-token
+      - admin-operation-request
+    data_assets_stored: []
+    data_formats_accepted:
+      - json
+    communication_links:
+      Verify JWT:
+        target: token-signer
+        description: "Admin endpoint calls Token Signer to verify JWT signature and role claim before serving request."
+        protocol: https
+        authentication: token
+        authorization: technical-user
+        tags: []
+        vpn: false
+        ip_filtered: false
+        readonly: true
+        usage: business
+        data_assets_sent:
+          - jwt-token
+        data_assets_received:
+          - jwt-token
+
+# =========================
+# TRUST BOUNDARIES
+# =========================
+trust_boundaries:
+
+  Internet:
+    id: internet-auth
+    description: "Untrusted public network (browsers and attackers)."
+    type: network-dedicated-hoster
+    tags: []
+    technical_assets_inside:
+      - browser
+    trust_boundaries_nested:
+      - container-auth
+
+  Container Network (Auth):
+    id: container-auth
+    description: "Docker container network hosting auth components."
+    type: network-dedicated-hoster
+    tags: []
+    technical_assets_inside:
+      - auth-api
+      - token-signer
+      - user-credential-store
+      - admin-endpoint
+    trust_boundaries_nested: []
+
+# =========================
+# SHARED RUNTIMES
+# =========================
+shared_runtimes:
+  Auth Container Runtime:
+    id: auth-runtime
+    description: "Docker engine running all auth-flow containers."
+    tags: []
+    technical_assets_running:
+      - auth-api
+      - token-signer
+      - user-credential-store
+      - admin-endpoint
+
+individual_risk_categories: {}
+risk_tracking: {}
diff --git a/labs/lab2/threagile-model-secure.yaml b/labs/lab2/threagile-model-secure.yaml
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/labs/lab2/threagile-model-secure.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,429 @@
+threagile_version: 1.0.0
+
+title: OWASP Juice Shop — Local Lab Threat Model  
+date: 2025-09-18
+
+author:
+  name: Student Name
+  homepage: https://example.edu
+
+management_summary_comment: >
+  Threat model for a local OWASP Juice Shop setup. Users access the app  
+  either directly via HTTP on port 3000 or through an optional reverse proxy that  
+  terminates TLS and adds security headers. The app runs in a container  
+  and writes data to a host-mounted volume (for database, uploads, logs).  
+  Optional outbound notifications (e.g., a challenge-solution WebHook) can be configured for integrations.
+
+business_criticality: important  # archive, operational, important, critical, mission-critical
+
+business_overview:
+  description: >
+    Training environment for DevSecOps. This model covers a deliberately vulnerable  
+    web application (OWASP Juice Shop) running locally in a Docker container. The focus is on a minimal architecture, STRIDE threat analysis, and actionable mitigations for the identified risks.
+
+  images:
+    # - dfd.png: Data Flow Diagram (if exported from the tool)
+
+technical_overview:
+  description: >
+    A user’s web browser connects to the Juice Shop application (Node.js/Express server) either directly on **localhost:3000** (HTTP) or via a **reverse proxy** on ports 80/443 (with HTTPS). The Juice Shop server may issue outbound requests to external services (e.g., a configured **WebHook** for solved challenge notifications). All application data (the SQLite database, file uploads, logs) is stored on the host’s filesystem via a mounted volume. Key trust boundaries include the **Internet** (user & external services) → **Host** (local machine/VM) → **Container Network** (isolated app container).
+  images: []
+
+questions:
+  Do you expose port 3000 beyond localhost?: ""
+  Do you use a reverse proxy with TLS and security headers?: ""
+  Are any outbound integrations (webhooks) configured?: ""
+  Is any sensitive data stored in logs or files?: ""
+
+abuse_cases:
+  Credential Stuffing / Brute Force: >
+    Attackers attempt repeated login attempts to guess credentials or exhaust system resources.
+  Stored XSS via Product Reviews: >
+    Malicious scripts are inserted into product reviews, getting stored and executed in other users’ browsers.
+  SSRF via Outbound Requests: >
+    Server-side requests (e.g. profile image URL fetch or WebHook callback) are abused to access internal network resources.
+
+security_requirements:
+  TLS in transit: Enforce HTTPS for user traffic via a TLS-terminating reverse proxy with strong ciphers and certificate management.
+  AuthZ on sensitive routes: Implement strict server-side authorization checks (role/permission) on admin or sensitive functionalities.
+  Rate limiting & lockouts: Apply rate limiting and account lockout policies to mitigate brute-force and automated attacks on authentication and expensive operations.
+  Secure headers: Add security headers (HSTS, CSP, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, etc.) at the proxy or app to mitigate client-side attacks.
+  Secrets management: Protect secret keys and credentials (JWT signing keys, OAuth client secrets) – keep them out of code repos and avoid logging them.
+
+tags_available:
+  # Relevant technologies and environment tags
+  - docker
+  - nodejs
+  # Data and asset tags
+  - pii
+  - auth
+  - tokens
+  - logs
+  - public
+  - actor
+  - user
+  - optional
+  - proxy
+  - app
+  - storage
+  - volume
+  - saas
+  - webhook
+  # Communication tags
+  - primary
+  - direct
+  - egress
+
+# =========================
+# DATA ASSETS
+# =========================
+data_assets:
+
+  User Accounts:
+    id: user-accounts
+    description: "User profile data, credential hashes, emails."
+    usage: business
+    tags: ["pii", "auth"]
+    origin: user-supplied
+    owner: Lab Owner
+    quantity: many
+    confidentiality: confidential
+    integrity: critical
+    availability: important
+    justification_cia_rating: >
+      Contains personal identifiers and authentication data. High confidentiality is required to protect user privacy, and integrity is critical to prevent account takeovers.
+
+  Orders:
+    id: orders
+    description: "Order history, addresses, and payment metadata (no raw card numbers)."
+    usage: business
+    tags: ["pii"]
+    origin: application
+    owner: Lab Owner
+    quantity: many
+    confidentiality: confidential
+    integrity: important
+    availability: important
+    justification_cia_rating: >
+      Contains users’ personal data and business transaction records. Integrity and confidentiality are important to prevent fraud or privacy breaches.
+
+  Product Catalog:
+    id: product-catalog
+    description: "Product information (names, descriptions, prices) available to all users."
+    usage: business
+    tags: ["public"]
+    origin: application
+    owner: Lab Owner
+    quantity: many
+    confidentiality: public
+    integrity: important
+    availability: important
+    justification_cia_rating: >
+      Product data is intended to be public, but its integrity is important (to avoid defacement or price manipulation that could mislead users).
+
+  Tokens & Sessions:
+    id: tokens-sessions
+    description: "Session identifiers, JWTs for authenticated sessions, CSRF tokens."
+    usage: business
+    tags: ["auth", "tokens"]
+    origin: application
+    owner: Lab Owner
+    quantity: many
+    confidentiality: confidential
+    integrity: important
+    availability: important
+    justification_cia_rating: >
+      If session tokens are compromised, attackers can hijack user sessions. They must be kept confidential and intact; availability is less critical (tokens can be reissued).
+
+  Logs:
+    id: logs
+    description: "Application and access logs (may inadvertently contain PII or secrets)."
+    usage: devops
+    tags: ["logs"]
+    origin: application
+    owner: Lab Owner
+    quantity: many
+    confidentiality: internal
+    integrity: important
+    availability: important
+    justification_cia_rating: >
+      Logs are for internal use (troubleshooting, monitoring). They should not be exposed publicly, and sensitive data should be sanitized to protect confidentiality.
+
+# =========================
+# TECHNICAL ASSETS
+# =========================
+technical_assets:
+
+  User Browser:
+    id: user-browser
+    description: "End-user web browser (client)."
+    type: external-entity
+    usage: business
+    used_as_client_by_human: true
+    out_of_scope: false
+    justification_out_of_scope:
+    size: system
+    technology: browser
+    tags: ["actor", "user"]
+    internet: true
+    machine: virtual
+    encryption: none
+    owner: External User
+    confidentiality: public
+    integrity: operational
+    availability: operational
+    justification_cia_rating: "Client controlled by end user (potentially an attacker)."
+    multi_tenant: false
+    redundant: false
+    custom_developed_parts: false
+    data_assets_processed: []
+    data_assets_stored: []
+    data_formats_accepted:
+      - json
+    communication_links:
+      To Reverse Proxy (preferred):
+        target: reverse-proxy
+        description: "User browser to reverse proxy (HTTPS on 443)."
+        protocol: https
+        authentication: session-id
+        authorization: enduser-identity-propagation
+        tags: ["primary"]
+        vpn: false
+        ip_filtered: false
+        readonly: false
+        usage: business
+        data_assets_sent:
+          - tokens-sessions
+        data_assets_received:
+          - product-catalog
+      Direct to App (no proxy):
+        target: juice-shop
+        description: "Direct browser access to app (HTTP on 3000)."
+        protocol: https
+        authentication: session-id
+        authorization: enduser-identity-propagation
+        tags: ["direct"]
+        vpn: false
+        ip_filtered: false
+        readonly: false
+        usage: business
+        data_assets_sent:
+          - tokens-sessions
+        data_assets_received:
+          - product-catalog
+
+  Reverse Proxy:
+    id: reverse-proxy
+    description: "Optional reverse proxy (e.g., Nginx) for TLS termination and adding security headers."
+    type: process
+    usage: business
+    used_as_client_by_human: false
+    out_of_scope: false
+    justification_out_of_scope:
+    size: application
+    technology: reverse-proxy
+    tags: ["optional", "proxy"]
+    internet: false
+    machine: virtual
+    encryption: transparent
+    owner: Lab Owner
+    confidentiality: internal
+    integrity: important
+    availability: important
+    justification_cia_rating: "Not exposed to internet directly; improves security of inbound traffic."
+    multi_tenant: false
+    redundant: false
+    custom_developed_parts: false
+    data_assets_processed:
+      - product-catalog
+      - tokens-sessions
+    data_assets_stored: []
+    data_formats_accepted:
+      - json
+    communication_links:
+      To App:
+        target: juice-shop
+        description: "Proxy forwarding to app (HTTP on 3000 internally)."
+        protocol: https
+        authentication: none
+        authorization: none
+        tags: []
+        vpn: false
+        ip_filtered: false
+        readonly: false
+        usage: business
+        data_assets_sent:
+          - tokens-sessions
+        data_assets_received:
+          - product-catalog
+
+  Juice Shop Application:
+    id: juice-shop
+    description: "OWASP Juice Shop server (Node.js/Express, v19.0.0)."
+    type: process
+    usage: business
+    used_as_client_by_human: false
+    out_of_scope: false
+    justification_out_of_scope:
+    size: application
+    technology: web-server
+    tags: ["app", "nodejs"]
+    internet: false
+    machine: container
+    encryption: none
+    owner: Lab Owner
+    confidentiality: internal
+    integrity: important
+    availability: important
+    justification_cia_rating: "In-scope web application (contains all business logic and vulnerabilities by design)."
+    multi_tenant: false
+    redundant: false
+    custom_developed_parts: true
+    data_assets_processed:
+      - user-accounts
+      - orders
+      - product-catalog
+      - tokens-sessions
+    data_assets_stored:
+      - logs
+    data_formats_accepted:
+      - json
+    communication_links:
+      To Challenge WebHook:
+        target: webhook-endpoint
+        description: "Optional outbound callback (HTTP POST) to external WebHook when a challenge is solved."
+        protocol: https
+        authentication: none
+        authorization: none
+        tags: ["egress"]
+        vpn: false
+        ip_filtered: true
+        readonly: false
+        usage: business
+        data_assets_sent:
+          - orders
+
+  Persistent Storage:
+    id: persistent-storage
+    description: "Host-mounted volume for database, file uploads, and logs."
+    type: datastore
+    usage: devops
+    used_as_client_by_human: false
+    out_of_scope: false
+    justification_out_of_scope:
+    size: component
+    technology: file-server
+    tags: ["storage", "volume"]
+    internet: false
+    machine: virtual
+    encryption: data-with-symmetric-shared-key
+    owner: Lab Owner
+    confidentiality: internal
+    integrity: important
+    availability: important
+    justification_cia_rating: "Local disk storage for the container – not directly exposed, but if compromised it contains sensitive data (database and logs)."
+    multi_tenant: false
+    redundant: false
+    custom_developed_parts: false
+    data_assets_processed: []
+    data_assets_stored:
+      - logs
+      - user-accounts
+      - orders
+      - product-catalog
+    data_formats_accepted:
+      - file
+    communication_links: {}
+
+  Webhook Endpoint:
+    id: webhook-endpoint
+    description: "External WebHook service (3rd-party, if configured for integrations)."
+    type: external-entity
+    usage: business
+    used_as_client_by_human: false
+    out_of_scope: true
+    justification_out_of_scope: "Third-party service to receive notifications (not under our control)."
+    size: system
+    technology: web-service-rest
+    tags: ["saas", "webhook"]
+    internet: true
+    machine: virtual
+    encryption: none
+    owner: Third-Party
+    confidentiality: internal
+    integrity: operational
+    availability: operational
+    justification_cia_rating: "External service that receives data (like order or challenge info). Treated as a trusted integration point but could be abused if misconfigured."
+    multi_tenant: true
+    redundant: true
+    custom_developed_parts: false
+    data_assets_processed:
+      - orders
+    data_assets_stored: []
+    data_formats_accepted:
+      - json
+    communication_links: {}
+
+# =========================
+# TRUST BOUNDARIES
+# =========================
+trust_boundaries:
+
+  Internet:
+    id: internet
+    description: "Untrusted public network (Internet)."
+    type: network-dedicated-hoster
+    tags: []
+    technical_assets_inside:
+      - user-browser
+      - webhook-endpoint
+    trust_boundaries_nested:
+      - host
+
+  Host:
+    id: host
+    description: "Local host machine / VM running the Docker environment."
+    type: network-dedicated-hoster
+    tags: []
+    technical_assets_inside:
+      - reverse-proxy
+      - persistent-storage
+    trust_boundaries_nested:
+      - container-network
+
+  Container Network:
+    id: container-network
+    description: "Docker container network (isolated internal network for containers)."
+    type: network-dedicated-hoster
+    tags: []
+    technical_assets_inside:
+      - juice-shop
+    trust_boundaries_nested: []
+
+# =========================
+# SHARED RUNTIMES
+# =========================
+shared_runtimes:
+
+  Docker Host:
+    id: docker-host
+    description: "Docker Engine and default bridge network on the host."
+    tags: ["docker"]
+    technical_assets_running:
+      - juice-shop
+      # If the reverse proxy is containerized, include it:
+      # - reverse-proxy
+
+# =========================
+# INDIVIDUAL RISK CATEGORIES (optional)
+# =========================
+individual_risk_categories: {}
+
+# =========================
+# RISK TRACKING (optional)
+# =========================
+risk_tracking: {}
+
+# (Optional diagram layout tweaks can be added here)
+#diagram_tweak_edge_layout: spline
+#diagram_tweak_layout_left_to_right: true
diff --git a/submissions/lab2.md b/submissions/lab2.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..44b8346e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/submissions/lab2.md
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+# Lab 2 — Threat Modeling: STRIDE on Juice Shop with Threagile
+
+## Task 1: Baseline Threat Model
+
+### Risk count by severity
+| Severity | Count |
+|----------|------:|
+| Critical |     0 |
+| High     |     0 |
+| Elevated |     4 |
+| Medium   |    14 |
+| Low      |     5 |
+| **Total**|  **23** |
+
+### Top 5 risks (from `risks.json`)
+1. **missing-authentication** — Missing Authentication covering link To App from Reverse Proxy to Juice Shop Application; severity Elevated; affecting juice-shop
+2. **cross-site-scripting** — Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) risk at Juice Shop Application; severity Elevated; affecting juice-shop
+3. **unencrypted-communication** — Unencrypted Communication on Direct to App (no proxy) between User Browser and Juice Shop Application transferring authentication data; severity Elevated; affecting user-browser
+4. **unencrypted-communication** — Unencrypted Communication on To App between Reverse Proxy and Juice Shop Application; severity Elevated; affecting reverse-proxy
+5. **unnecessary-technical-asset** — Unnecessary Technical Asset named Persistent Storage; severity Low; affecting persistent-storage
+
+### STRIDE mapping
+- Risk 1 (missing-authentication): **S** (Spoofing) — without authentication on the internal proxy→app link, any process on the host network can forge requests to the app as if it were the legitimate proxy.
+- Risk 2 (cross-site-scripting): **T** (Tampering) — malicious scripts injected via product reviews or other inputs tamper with the DOM in victim browsers, enabling session hijack or data exfiltration.
+- Risk 3 (unencrypted-communication, Direct to App): **I** (Information Disclosure) — plaintext HTTP on port 3000 exposes session tokens and credentials to any network-level observer or ARP-spoofing attacker.
+- Risk 4 (unencrypted-communication, To App): **I** (Information Disclosure) — even after TLS termination at the proxy, the internal HTTP hop from proxy to app leaks tokens in plaintext within the host network.
+- Risk 5 (unnecessary-technical-asset): **D** (Denial of Service) — an unused but mounted persistent storage volume increases the attack surface; if the volume is filled or corrupted it can deny service to the application.
+
+### Trust boundary observation
+In `data-flow-diagram.png`, the arrow **User Browser → Juice Shop Application** (Direct to App, HTTP on port 3000) crosses the Internet→Host trust boundary without TLS. This arrow is particularly attractive to an attacker because it carries session tokens and credentials in plaintext, meaning a passive network tap or an ARP-spoofing attack is sufficient to harvest valid sessions with zero interaction with the application logic itself.
+
+
+## Task 2: Secure Variant & Diff
+
+### Risk count comparison
+| Severity | Baseline | Secure |  Δ |
+|----------|---------:|-------:|---:|
+| Critical |        0 |      0 |  0 |
+| High     |        0 |      0 |  0 |
+| Elevated |        4 |      2 | -2 |
+| Medium   |       14 |     13 | -1 |
+| Low      |        5 |      5 |  0 |
+| **Total**|   **23** | **20** | **-3** |
+
+### Which rules are GONE in the secure variant?
+1. `unencrypted-communication` (elevated) — fixed by `protocol: https` on the **Direct to App** link (User Browser → Juice Shop)
+2. `unencrypted-communication` (elevated) — fixed by `protocol: https` on the **To App** link (Reverse Proxy → Juice Shop)
+3. `unencrypted-asset` (medium, one instance) — fixed by `encryption: data-with-symmetric-shared-key` on Persistent Storage
+
+### Which rules are STILL THERE in the secure variant?
+1. **missing-authentication** (elevated) — the internal link from Reverse Proxy to Juice Shop still carries no authentication token. Setting `protocol: https` encrypts the channel but does not prove the caller's identity; eliminating this risk would require mTLS or a shared secret header between proxy and app.
+2. **server-side-request-forgery** (medium) — the Juice Shop application can still initiate outbound HTTP requests based on user-supplied input (e.g. profile image URL fetch or WebHook callback). Setting `ip_filtered: true` on the WebHook link signals intent but Threagile still fires the rule because the app logic itself is not constrained; a server-side allowlist of permitted outbound destinations is required to close it.
+
+### Honesty check
+Yes, the total dropped by 3 (≈13%), not over 50%. The changes fixed only the most obvious transport-layer issues — flipping a protocol field or adding an encryption flag costs minutes of work. The remaining 20 risks require architectural changes (mTLS between components, a secrets vault, WAF, 2FA, hardened base images) or application-level fixes (input sanitisation for XSS/CSRF, SSRF allowlists). This illustrates a classic cost-benefit asymmetry: perimeter hardening is cheap and fast but eliminates only a small fraction of the total risk surface; the expensive application-level work is where most risk actually lives.
+
+
+## Bonus Task: Auth Flow Threat Model
+
+### Risk count
+| Severity | Count |
+|----------|------:|
+| Critical |     0 |
+| High     |     1 |
+| Elevated |     6 |
+| Medium   |    19 |
+| Low      |     6 |
+| **Total**|**32** |
+
+### Three auth-specific risks NOT in the baseline model's top 5
+
+1. **sql-nosql-injection** — STRIDE: **T** (Tampering) — The Auth API passes user-supplied login input directly into SQL queries against the User Credential Store. Mitigation: enforce parameterized queries / prepared statements for all credential lookups; validate and sanitize all user input server-side before it reaches the database layer.
+
+2. **unguarded-access-from-internet** (affecting auth-api) — STRIDE: **S** (Spoofing) — The Auth API is reachable directly from the Internet trust boundary without a WAF or rate-limiting layer in front of it, making brute-force and credential-stuffing attacks trivial. Mitigation: place a WAF or reverse proxy with rate limiting and account-lockout policy in front of the login endpoint; consider CAPTCHA after N failed attempts.
+
+3. **missing-vault** (affecting user-credential-store) — STRIDE: **I** (Information Disclosure) — The JWT signing key and database credentials are stored directly in the container environment rather than in a dedicated secrets vault, meaning any container escape or environment variable leak exposes them. Mitigation: store all secrets (JWT signing key, DB credentials) in a secrets manager (e.g. HashiCorp Vault or Docker secrets) and inject them at runtime; never hardcode or log them.
+
+### Reflection
+Building the focused auth model surfaced `sql-nosql-injection` (High) and `unguarded-access-from-internet` on the login endpoint — both absent from the baseline model's top 5 — because the baseline treats the Juice Shop as a single monolithic process and never models the internal credential-validation data flow separately. Feature-level threat models force you to name every data asset that crosses a component boundary (credentials → Auth API → DB), which is precisely where injection and spoofing risks live. Architecture-level models are good at transport and boundary risks; feature-level models are necessary to catch logic and injection risks that only appear when you zoom in.
+