diff --git a/CHANGES.txt b/CHANGES.txt
index c7f32ea4..6138ce5e 100644
--- a/CHANGES.txt
+++ b/CHANGES.txt
@@ -4,6 +4,16 @@ Unreleased
 Bugfix
 ~~~~~~
 
+- When a request uses the absolute-form of request-target (e.g.
+  ``GET http://example.com/page HTTP/1.1``), waitress now uses that
+  request-target's own authority as the ``Host``, ignoring any received
+  ``Host`` header, per RFC 9112 section 3.2.2. Previously, a client-supplied
+  ``Host`` header that disagreed with the request-target's authority was
+  used as-is, which could let a request's ``Host``-based routing, access
+  control, or cache-key handling be driven by a value the request line
+  itself contradicted. See
+  https://github.com/Pylons/waitress/issues/467
+
 - Renamed the HTTP header "Trailers" to "Trailer" to fix a typo and comply with
   the correct header name as specified in RFC 7230.
 
diff --git a/src/waitress/parser.py b/src/waitress/parser.py
index 1af4594d..79d18088 100644
--- a/src/waitress/parser.py
+++ b/src/waitress/parser.py
@@ -273,6 +273,20 @@ def parse_header(self, header_plus):
             self.query,
             self.fragment,
         ) = split_uri(uri)
+
+        if self.proxy_netloc:
+            # RFC 9112 sec 3.2.2: "When a proxy receives a request with an
+            # absolute-form of request-target, the proxy MUST ignore the
+            # received Host header field (if any) and instead replace it
+            # with the host information of the request-target." The same
+            # requirement applies to an origin server receiving such a
+            # request. Without this, a client could send a request whose
+            # Host header differs from the request-target's own authority,
+            # and any code relying on the (untouched) Host header -- for
+            # routing, access control, or cache keys -- would be acting on
+            # a value the request-line itself contradicts. See GH #467.
+            headers["HOST"] = self.proxy_netloc
+
         self.url_scheme = self.adj.url_scheme
         connection = headers.get("CONNECTION", "")
 
diff --git a/tests/test_parser.py b/tests/test_parser.py
index 5f341ae9..ae568fc1 100644
--- a/tests/test_parser.py
+++ b/tests/test_parser.py
@@ -716,7 +716,13 @@ def testProxyGET(self):
         self.assertTrue(parser.completed)
         self.assertEqual(parser.version, "8.4")
         self.assertFalse(parser.empty)
-        self.assertEqual(parser.headers, {"CONTENT_LENGTH": "6"})
+        # HOST is derived from the absolute-form request-target's own
+        # authority (RFC 9112 sec 3.2.2), even though no explicit Host
+        # header was sent here. See GH #467.
+        self.assertEqual(
+            parser.headers,
+            {"CONTENT_LENGTH": "6", "HOST": "example.com:8080"},
+        )
         self.assertEqual(parser.path, "/foobar")
         self.assertEqual(parser.command, "GET")
         self.assertEqual(parser.proxy_scheme, "https")
@@ -725,6 +731,28 @@ def testProxyGET(self):
         self.assertEqual(parser.query, "")
         self.assertEqual(parser.get_body_stream().getvalue(), b"Hello.")
 
+    def testProxyGETIgnoresMismatchedHostHeader(self):
+        """
+        Regression test for
+        https://github.com/Pylons/waitress/issues/467
+
+        Per RFC 9112 sec 3.2.2, an absolute-form request-target's own
+        authority must be used as the Host, and any Host header
+        actually received on the wire must be ignored -- even (and
+        especially) when it disagrees with the request-target, as a
+        malicious or misconfigured client might send.
+        """
+        data = (
+            b"GET http://example.com/page HTTP/1.1\r\n"
+            b"Host: attacker-controlled.example\r\n"
+            b"\r\n"
+        )
+        parser = self.parser
+        self.feed(data)
+        self.assertTrue(parser.completed)
+        self.assertEqual(parser.headers["HOST"], "example.com")
+        self.assertEqual(parser.path, "/page")
+
     def testDuplicateHeaders(self):
         # Ensure that headers with the same key get concatenated as per
         # RFC2616.