For release-verification questions, corrections, or security reports, use
projectshadowqa@protonmail.com with the appropriate subject prefix from
CONTACT_AND_CORRECTIONS.md.
Do not rely on a filename alone. Verify both byte count and SHA-256 before extracting an archive.
The repository is in POSTPUBLICATION for Generic Myth v0.2.0 and R1.0.1.
Their final identities are concrete, frozen, separately authorized, and
published on GitHub and Hugging Face. The exact Myth-free R1.0.1 inner remains
the scoped admitted packaging identity; its admission does not independently
authorize publication.
Validate the current published repository state:
python3 -I -S -B tools/verify_repository_evidence.py --phase postpublicationThe current postpublication state records an implemented packaging correction
with effectiveness reverification pending for one criterion. Anonymous GitHub
and Hugging Face redownloads matched the exact current identities; both
downloaded Generic packages passed the bounded 23-path verifier; and R1.0.1
passed recursive zero-Myth verification. The August 18 six-site receipt is
preserved as historical observation evidence, but external adversarial review
showed that its lexical predicates were insufficient for relation-level
meaning. CAPA PS-R1-PRIVATE-MYTH-PUBLIC-BOUNDARY-001 is therefore
IMPLEMENTED_PENDING_EFFECTIVENESS until a replayable v2 six-site check passes.
Online mode redownloads and verifies the exact GitHub and Hugging Face assets, runs the historical and current package verifiers, checks live release metadata, and rechecks the six-site semantic boundary. It validates retained evidence but does not rewrite receipts or publish anything:
python3 -I -S -B tools/verify_repository_evidence.py --phase postpublication \
--online --download-dir /tmp/project-shadow-release-assetsThe Hugging Face route policy is deliberately separate from artifact identity.
It permits only HTTPS on the default port and the exact documented hosts
huggingface.co, us.aws.cdn.hf.co, and us.gcp.cdn.hf.co. The downloaded
byte count and SHA-256 must still match the authorized artifact. Broad suffix
matching and lookalike hosts are rejected.
The six-site machine check uses the non-hidden HTML-source
public-boundary-v2 contract. It requires
one current R1 role, one preserved-superseded predecessor role, contradiction
rejection, exact sidecar roles, and artifact identities bound to exact semantic
records. All visible data-shadow-* markers must fit the closed structured
schema; the prose layer rejects the enumerated direct contradiction fixtures,
not every possible natural-language paraphrase. The verifier also runs
adversarial negative controls and records the
expected, executed, passed, failed, skipped, and unexpected check counts.
When the online check runs with a clean, committed verifier, it writes a bounded response-evidence ZIP and a v2 JSON receipt beneath the download directory. The receipt binds every route to the exact retained response bytes, their SHA-256 values, the pending CAPA state actually observed, and the exact verifier blob at a reachable clean Git commit. The same semantic assertions are then replayed offline from those retained bytes without consulting a later mutable CAPA state.
Machine replay alone cannot establish browser-computed visibility when an
external or embedded stylesheet is involved or judge every unstructured prose
paraphrase. Before reclosure, a named human
reviewer must inspect all required routes as rendered, sign the exact
attestation defined by the verifier, and retain
governance/R1_0_1_PUBLIC_BOUNDARY_V2_HUMAN_REVIEW_2026-08-22.json. That record
must bind the exact v2 receipt and response-evidence ZIP, cover all six sites,
and confirm the ordinary visible meaning and relation/binding determinations.
The generated v2 receipt, evidence ZIP, and human-review record must all be
reviewed and added to governance/ before the CAPA can return to
CLOSED_EFFECTIVE. A later online run checks the new live closed-state
declarations separately; it does not rewrite the retained pending-state
receipt.
Git materialization is also explicit: .gitattributes pins Python verifier and
test sources to LF. That makes the working-tree byte identity deterministic
under standard checkout configurations, including core.autocrlf=true.
| File | Bytes | SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
Project_Shadow_R1_Public_Release_Candidate_2026-08-14.zip |
7,679,812 | 2f8fe1530b6a83294d15011df95853aaecf08fa4dba756f0c2e91dd089e1b1ec |
Project_Shadow_Full_Canon_Myth_Sidecar_v0.3.4_OPTIONAL_EXTERNAL_RESEARCH_2026-08-14.zip |
1,418,194 | 3c8c8c0d3d9582c76b685c1b685260cc8179478ab310037c858b46257aa314c7 |
Project_Shadow_Full_Canon_Myth_Sidecar_v0.3.5_OPTIONAL_PUBLIC_COMPANION_2026-08-17.zip |
1,428,812 | 2b55867fe7c502a0defd8d6f2e9b53fbd1caaf1b0f225a438bd45b04a3e7bae2 |
The August 14 R1 identity is preserved as immutable historical evidence. It is not the corrected current reference because its nested runtime-family package included Generic Myth v0.1.1 carrying non-public metadata. Do not edit or silently replace the historical asset.
| File | Bytes | SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
Project_Shadow_Generic_Myth_Sidecar_v0.2.0_OPTIONAL_PUBLIC_COMPANION_2026-08-17.zip |
93,676 | 6e7a362d4135f9d626dcfef463bfb1f7166226b3cf8a4c02a953ab39af1538bf |
Project_Shadow_R1.0.1_Runtime_Family_Myth_Decoupled_2026-08-17.zip |
5,463,189 | c8c32b12432c954b1a6f852c0c9f81bbbd40167e936be057d4c3de1a0aa3a623 |
Project_Shadow_R1.0.1_Public_Reference_2026-08-17.zip |
5,731,663 | 6f6f1e16d5e9a20e62403f14af7ce8629ce2d702528fb7f80aaf4a14deb7a1d1 |
The Generic identity is published under scoped GitHub/Hugging Face publication authorization. The inner identity has the maintainer's scoped packaging admission, which explicitly does not authorize publication. The outer identity has a separate exact-hash authorization covering GitHub, Hugging Face, the verified repository update, and six GPT Site updates. Neither authority permits production or operational deployment.
$r1 = ".\Project_Shadow_R1_Public_Release_Candidate_2026-08-14.zip"
$myth = ".\Project_Shadow_Full_Canon_Myth_Sidecar_v0.3.5_OPTIONAL_PUBLIC_COMPANION_2026-08-17.zip"
(Get-Item -LiteralPath $r1).Length
(Get-FileHash -LiteralPath $r1 -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLowerInvariant()
(Get-Item -LiteralPath $myth).Length
(Get-FileHash -LiteralPath $myth -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLowerInvariant()wc -c Project_Shadow_R1_Public_Release_Candidate_2026-08-14.zip
sha256sum Project_Shadow_R1_Public_Release_Candidate_2026-08-14.zip
wc -c Project_Shadow_Full_Canon_Myth_Sidecar_v0.3.5_OPTIONAL_PUBLIC_COMPANION_2026-08-17.zip
sha256sum Project_Shadow_Full_Canon_Myth_Sidecar_v0.3.5_OPTIONAL_PUBLIC_COMPANION_2026-08-17.zipOn macOS, shasum -a 256 may be used when sha256sum is unavailable.
The exact R1 ZIP is preserved and was not rewritten after publication. Its embedded verifier is therefore also a frozen historical release artifact and does not contain later verifier hardening committed to this public repository. After the byte/hash check above, use a current checkout of this repository to verify the outer ZIP before extraction:
python3 -I -S -B /path/to/Project-Shadow/tools/verify_public_release.py \
/path/to/Project_Shadow_R1_Public_Release_Candidate_2026-08-14.zipThat current repository copy performs the prospective member-count, cumulative-uncompressed-size, individual-compression-ratio, and cumulative-compression-ratio metadata checks before reading ZIP members. Then extract the archive and run its embedded verifier as described below. The embedded copy remains controlling evidence of what shipped; the repository copy adds post-publication verifier hardening without changing the released bytes.
The verifier has two deliberately different modes. The first validates the exact preserved cryptographic evidence and the independent receipt. The second also invokes Cosign now. A Level 1 pass must not be described as a fresh Cosign execution.
From the extracted R1 root:
python3 -I -S -B tools/verify_public_release.py .The R1 verifier checks the exact admitted component identities, package member allowlist, manifests, exclusion rules, signature bundle and independent verification receipt, external-sidecar reference, archive safety controls, and release scope. It does not make safety, efficacy, production, certification, or legal-compliance claims.
In this mode the verifier confirms that:
- the admission record, Sigstore bundle, and independent receipt have the exact expected byte counts and SHA-256 identities;
- the bundle targets the expected admission-record digest and contains a transparency-log entry and RFC 3161 timestamp; and
- the exact receipt records successful signature, transparency-log, and RFC 3161 verification.
It does not execute Cosign. This level is receipt-bound verification that can be performed offline after the files are obtained.
Level 2 performs every Level 1 check and freshly runs cosign verify-blob
against the preserved admission record and bundle. The verifier deliberately
requires all six options together and checks that the supplied Cosign binary
and Sigstore trusted-root JSON match the exact identities recorded in the
independent receipt.
Expected verification inputs:
| Input | Exact expected value |
|---|---|
| Cosign executable platform | Linux/amd64, matching the independently preserved receipt |
| Cosign executable SHA-256 | 4629c757b7618056f8ddd7e2625ae9fdd94c0372a65049520bc7d9df9efc7f71 |
| Sigstore TrustedRoot JSON SHA-256 | 6494e21ea73fa7ee769f85f57d5a3e6a08725eae1e38c755fc3517c9e6bc0b66 |
| Certificate identity | pausebeforeharmprotocol_PBHP@protonmail.com |
| Certificate OIDC issuer | https://github.com/login/oauth |
The certificate identity in this table is the frozen historical identity
recorded in the exact signature evidence. It is not the current contact
mailbox. Replacing it with projectshadowqa@protonmail.com would make the
verification command incorrect.
The public Rekor entry for the exact admission record is:
| Rekor field | Exact value |
|---|---|
| Log index | 2465982078 |
| Entry UUID | 108e9186e8c5677a5ce4e9ea6d6aaf7b7a6aabe12b6a3f0d9202da3ede22684c3c90780f2f313a79 |
| Public lookup | Open the entry in Sigstore Search |
The public lookup is a convenient inspection path, not a substitute for verifying the preserved bundle against the exact admission record.
From the extracted R1 root on Linux/amd64 (or Windows via WSL on an amd64 machine), replace the first two paths with independently obtained local files whose hashes match the table:
python3 -I -S -B tools/verify_public_release.py . \
--cosign /absolute/path/to/cosign \
--expected-cosign-sha256 4629c757b7618056f8ddd7e2625ae9fdd94c0372a65049520bc7d9df9efc7f71 \
--trusted-root /absolute/path/to/trusted-root.json \
--expected-trusted-root-sha256 6494e21ea73fa7ee769f85f57d5a3e6a08725eae1e38c755fc3517c9e6bc0b66 \
--certificate-identity 'pausebeforeharmprotocol_PBHP@protonmail.com' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer 'https://github.com/login/oauth'After separately confirming the pinned Cosign and trusted-root hashes above, the corresponding direct Level 2 Cosign command is:
cosign verify-blob \
--bundle governance/PROJECT_SHADOW_FABLE7_SCOPED_MAINTAINER_ADMISSION_RECORD_2026-08-12.json.sigstore.json \
--trusted-root /absolute/path/to/trusted-root.json \
--use-signed-timestamps \
--certificate-identity 'pausebeforeharmprotocol_PBHP@protonmail.com' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer 'https://github.com/login/oauth' \
governance/PROJECT_SHADOW_FABLE7_SCOPED_MAINTAINER_ADMISSION_RECORD_2026-08-12.jsonThat raw command does not itself confirm the Cosign executable hash or the
trusted-root file hash. The repository verifier invocation above performs
those two pin checks before it launches the same cosign verify-blob command;
prefer the wrapper when reproducing the independently preserved verification.
On Windows, run that same Linux/amd64 command inside WSL from the extracted R1
directory. Do not substitute native cosign.exe: it is a different binary
with a different SHA-256, while this preserved independent receipt pins the
Linux/amd64 executable actually used in the review. A native-Windows Level 2
path would require its own independently verified receipt and exact binary
pin. The same applies to a native macOS Cosign binary. Level 1 remains
platform-independent.
Before running Level 2, independently hash both supplied files. Do not
substitute a different or merely newer Cosign executable or trusted-root file;
the verifier will reject a mismatch. The verifier does not download either
dependency. A successful fresh run prints
PASS: live Cosign identity/signature/RFC3161 verification.
The exact admission record, Sigstore bundle, and independent verification
receipt are also preserved under this repository's governance/ directory.
The R1 archive's embedded verifier is the controlling packaged copy for the
historical release. The current repository verifier should be used first on the
outer ZIP for the later archive-preflight protections documented above.
Full-Canon v0.3.5 and Generic v0.2.0 are separate optional companions. Neither is embedded in or required by R1.0.1. Use the verification-only tool shipped in the exact sidecar package after its final identity is confirmed.
From an extracted Full-Canon sidecar root:
python3 -I -S -B tools/verify_package.py .For the sidecar's full test and five-profile compatibility replay, first extract the R1 archive, then supply its nested R1 family ZIP:
python3 -I -S -B tools/verify_package.py . --run-tests \
--r1-family-zip /path/to/extracted-r1/05_COMPONENTS/R1/Project_Shadow_R1_BETA2_Runtime_Successor_Candidate_2026-08-10.zipA verifier pass is integrity and compatibility evidence only. The sidecar remains optional, default off, external, unadmitted, mixed-rights, nonauthorizing, and outside R1 conformance.