| title | GitHub Enterprise Cloud — SOC 3 (Security) Report |
|---|---|
| doc_type | third_party_assurance |
| publisher | GitHub, Inc. |
| service | GitHub Enterprise Cloud |
| assurance | SOC 3® — Trust Services Criteria (Security) |
| auditor | Coalfire |
| report_date | 2025-06-02 |
| period_start | 2024-10-01 |
| period_end | 2025-03-31 |
| method | Carve-out (Subservice orgs excluded) |
| scope_note | Security (TSC) only |
| repo_owner | FoundLab-PoweredByGoogleCloud |
| repo | Foundlab-GooglePartner |
| status | ACTIVE_REFERENCE |
| classification | Partner Docs / Due Diligence |
| foundlab_owner | Office of the CTO |
| last_reviewed | 2025-12-31 |
Report Date: 2025-06-02
Period Covered: 2024-10-01 → 2025-03-31
Auditor: Coalfire (Independent Service Auditor)
Assurance: SOC 3® (Trust Services Criteria — Security)
Method: Carve-out (subservice organizations excluded)
This document is a FoundLab-hardened representation of the SOC 3 report for partner due diligence. It focuses on: (1) scope, (2) carve-outs, (3) required complementary controls (CUECs), (4) what FoundLab must do.
- 1. Executive Summary
- 2. Auditor Opinion (What it actually says)
- 3. Scope & System Boundaries (Attachment A)
- 4. Carve-outs & Dependencies
- 5. FoundLab Inheritance Model
- 6. Operational Checklist (Build + Run)
- 7. Risk Register (If auditors get hostile)
- 8. Excerpt Policy (Copyright-safe)
- Appendix: Quick Facts
GitHub’s SOC 3 report provides reasonable assurance that security controls for GitHub Enterprise Cloud were effective throughout the stated period under explicit assumptions:
- Customer implements CUECs (Complementary User Entity Controls)
- Subservice organizations implement their complementary controls (because they are excluded from scope)
Takeaway for FoundLab:
FoundLab can rely on GitHub Enterprise Cloud as a third-party component with security assurance, but MUST implement and evidence CUECs to avoid being flagged as the weak link during customer audits.
The independent auditor’s opinion states that GitHub’s controls were effective throughout the period to meet applicable Security Trust Services Criteria IF:
- complementary controls at subservice organizations operated effectively, and
- complementary controls at user entities (customers) operated effectively.
This is the critical compliance detail: SOC 3 is not end-to-end assurance when using carve-outs and CUECs.
GitHub Enterprise Cloud, including (as described in the report boundaries):
- core collaboration features (repos, PRs, issues, discussions, wikis, projects, docs, etc.)
- GitHub Actions
- GitHub Advanced Security (if enabled)
- GitHub Copilot (if enabled)
- optional Data Residency offering (if enabled)
The report describes the system boundary across:
- Infrastructure
- Software
- People
- Procedures / policies
- Data
- GitHub uses a combination of third-party infrastructure hosting and GitHub-managed colocation sites.
- Governance references: internal policies, standards, operational procedures, security program structure.
GitHub uses subservice organizations for:
- colocation data center services
- infrastructure hosting
These subservice organizations are excluded from the examination scope (carve-out method). GitHub expects these providers to operate certain control categories (primarily physical and environmental controls, among others).
FoundLab MUST treat this as a dependency that requires:
- vendor evidence review (SOC 2/ISO where applicable)
- a risk register entry
- compensating controls where necessary
The report states that GitHub’s control design assumes that customers implement certain controls. The auditor explicitly did not test customer controls.
These are non-negotiable for enterprise due diligence, especially Tier-1 banks.
- Enforce SSO/SAML for the GitHub org/enterprise
- Enforce MFA
- Minimize organization owners (break-glass only)
- Least privilege for teams and repos
- Quarterly access reviews (or more frequent in high-risk programs)
- Branch protection rules (no force push)
- Required reviews / approvals
- Required status checks (CI)
- Signed commits/tags (where applicable)
- Secret scanning enabled (and push protection if available)
- Audit log retention configured
- Alerting on sensitive administrative actions
- Incident workflow referencing GitHub telemetry / audit events
- Restrict
GITHUB_TOKENpermissions (least scope) - Pin actions by SHA (avoid mutable tags)
- Use protected environments for deploy
- Harden self-hosted runners (if used) or explicitly avoid them
- Admin policy governance enabled
- Exclusion of sensitive files/content configured
- Confirm non-retention claims per product terms are acceptable to customer policy
- Validate that customer policy accepts AI tooling in SDLC
This section answers the audit question:
“What controls do you inherit from GitHub, and what do you own?”
| Control Domain | Inherited from GitHub | Owned by FoundLab | Evidence Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Platform security controls (service-side) | ✅ | ❌ | SOC 3 reference + vendor artifacts |
| IAM enforcement for FoundLab org | ❌ | ✅ | SSO/MFA config exports, access review logs |
| Repo hardening (branch protection, CODEOWNERS) | ❌ | ✅ | Policy screenshots/export + rulesets |
| CI/CD hardening (Actions policies) | ❌ | ✅ | Workflow policies, pinned SHAs, env protections |
| Secret scanning posture | Partially (feature availability) | ✅ (enable/config) | Feature enablement proof + alerts config |
| Incident response for GitHub events | ❌ | ✅ | Runbook + ticket evidence (tabletop OK) |
| Subservice org physical controls | Assumed | ✅ (risk mgmt) | Vendor review checklist, risk register |
Create/maintain: evidence/github/ (private repo or internal vault)
Minimum artifacts:
- SSO/SAML enforcement proof
- MFA enforcement proof
- Org owners list + break-glass policy
- Quarterly access review record (date, reviewer, outcomes)
- Ruleset export (branch protection, required checks, review rules)
- Actions security posture:
- token permissions default
- allowed actions policy
- pinned actions evidence
- Secret scanning + push protection status
- Audit logging retention and review SOP
- Incident runbook mapping GitHub events → FoundLab response actions
- Vendor dependency review notes (subservice org carve-out awareness)
- Enforce SSO/SAML at enterprise/org level
- Enforce MFA
- Configure org rulesets (branch protection + required checks)
- Enable secret scanning (and push protection if licensed)
- Configure Actions policies (least privilege + pinning)
- Configure audit log retention and review cadence
- Create incident runbook for GitHub compromise scenarios
- Quarterly access reviews completed
- Monitor audit events for high-risk actions (owners added, tokens created, settings changed)
- Rotate credentials and review tokens periodically
- Validate Actions workflows are pinned and reviewed
- Execute tabletop for “GitHub org compromised” scenario at least annually
| Risk | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigation | Residual |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SOC 3 is carve-out; subservice org controls not examined | Medium | Medium | Maintain vendor evidence + document dependency | Low |
| CUECs not implemented → audit fail at customer | Medium | High | Implement baseline CUECs + evidence pack | Low |
| Actions supply-chain compromise (unpinned actions) | Medium | High | SHA pinning + allowed actions policy | Low |
| Excess org owners / weak break-glass | Low | High | Minimize owners + strict process | Low |
| Copilot policy conflicts with customer requirements | Medium | Medium | Default off; explicit opt-in with policy docs | Medium |
This file is a structured summary and control interpretation for FoundLab due diligence.
If short excerpts are required for internal evidence:
- Limit to small snippets only (≤ 25 words each)
- Always attribute source to the original report file
- Avoid reproducing entire sections verbatim
- Report: SOC 3® (Security)
- Service: GitHub Enterprise Cloud
- Period: 2024-10-01 → 2025-03-31
- Report date: 2025-06-02
- Auditor: Coalfire
- Key audit caveat: effectiveness asserted conditional on CUECs + subservice controls