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SCLite Threat Model

SCLite is a local artifact validation and review package. It helps reviewers detect drift and tampering in public-safe lifecycle artifacts, but it is not a runtime authority.

Assets

  • lifecycle JSON artifacts;
  • canonical SHA-256 artifact descriptors;
  • ordered artifact-chain manifests;
  • scoped execution tickets;
  • receipt-bounded evidence contracts;
  • review records and review bundles;
  • optional kernel_guard_hmac_v1 sidecars;
  • public-safe fixtures and Markdown exports.

Attacker Capabilities Considered

SCLite is designed to help detect:

  • modified lifecycle artifacts after review;
  • digest mismatch inside an artifact-chain manifest;
  • extra, duplicate, or reordered roles in strict lifecycle verification;
  • lifecycle binding drift, such as a ticket bound to a different execution contract;
  • receipt/evidence overclaiming relative to linked ticket or receipt artifacts;
  • simple cross-role target drift visible in explicit host fields;
  • malformed review bundles or missing canonical files.
  • ambiguous JSON with duplicate object keys or non-standard numeric constants;
  • oversized or structurally amplified JSON that exceeds the active VerificationLimits policy.

Out Of Scope

SCLite does not detect or enforce:

  • legal authorization or scope ownership;
  • DNS, redirects, wildcard scope, CIDR/IP ranges, IPv6, IDN/punycode, eTLD+1, port policy, localhost/private-network policy, or URL canonicalization edge cases;
  • runtime command construction safety;
  • sandbox behavior;
  • raw evidence storage safety;
  • complete secret scanning or DLP;
  • signer identity, revocation, transparency logs, PKI, or Sigstore verification;
  • authenticity claims from signature_policy metadata unless an external verifier validates a real signature or guard;
  • replay of an old but otherwise valid integrity-only bundle;
  • forged complete chains when an attacker controls every artifact and manifest before any external signature, guard, or anchor is applied;
  • HMAC key compromise for guarded bundles;
  • replay of an old guarded bundle unless an external GovEngine/runtime replay store rejects the root_tag or chain/run identifier;
  • carrier delivery or protocol correctness;
  • malicious external runtimes that ignore SCLite artifacts.

Trust Boundary

flowchart LR
    Runtime[External runtime] --> Artifact[SCLite artifact bundle]
    Artifact --> SCLite[SCLite local validation]
    SCLite --> Findings[review findings]
    Findings --> Runtime

    Runtime --> Scope[scope authority]
    Runtime --> Execution[execution control]
    Runtime --> Secrets[secret scanning or DLP]
    Runtime --> Identity[identity and PKI]

    SCLite -. not authority .-> Scope
    SCLite -. not executor .-> Execution
    SCLite -. not DLP .-> Secrets
    SCLite -. not PKI verifier .-> Identity
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Security Posture

SCLite improves reviewability by making artifacts small, schema-shaped, hash-bound, and explicit about non-claims. It should be paired with GovEngine for governance/admission and with RExecOp or another host runtime for execution controls, identity integration, redaction strategy, and evidence handling.