From 126701232d5eb6c373ffbf29421da90fc6571ad9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "google-labs-jules[bot]"
 <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Sun, 28 Dec 2025 15:39:04 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] feat(security): disable external entity loading in SVG
 parser

- Initializes `XMLDocument` with `.nodeLoadExternalEntitiesNever` in `SVGParser.swift`.
- Prevents XML External Entity (XXE) attacks when parsing untrusted SVG files.
- Hardens the codebase against local file inclusion and SSRF vulnerabilities via malicious SVGs.
---
 .jules/sentinel.md             | 4 ++++
 Sources/SVGKit/SVGParser.swift | 4 +++-
 mise.lock                      | 1 +
 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 .jules/sentinel.md

diff --git a/.jules/sentinel.md b/.jules/sentinel.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b153641d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.jules/sentinel.md
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+## 2024-05-22 - [XXE Protection in SVG Parser]
+**Vulnerability:** The `XMLDocument` initializer in `SVGParser.swift` used empty options `[]`, which potentially allows XML External Entity (XXE) attacks if the underlying parser defaults are permissive.
+**Learning:** Even when using higher-level abstractions like `XMLDocument`, one must explicitly disable dangerous features like external entity loading when processing untrusted input.
+**Prevention:** Always use `.nodeLoadExternalEntitiesNever` (or equivalent flags in other parsers) when parsing XML/SVG data from external sources.
diff --git a/Sources/SVGKit/SVGParser.swift b/Sources/SVGKit/SVGParser.swift
index 8f4e9d65..b4161dbd 100644
--- a/Sources/SVGKit/SVGParser.swift
+++ b/Sources/SVGKit/SVGParser.swift
@@ -327,7 +327,9 @@ public final class SVGParser: @unchecked Sendable { // swiftlint:disable:this ty
             data
         }
 
-        let document = try XMLDocument(data: svgData, options: [])
+        // Disable external entity loading to prevent XXE attacks
+        let options: XMLNode.Options = [.nodeLoadExternalEntitiesNever]
+        let document = try XMLDocument(data: svgData, options: options)
         guard let root = document.rootElement(), elementName(root) == "svg" else {
             throw SVGParserError.invalidSVGRoot
         }
diff --git a/mise.lock b/mise.lock
index 7dbbf666..13429c24 100644
--- a/mise.lock
+++ b/mise.lock
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ backend = "core:python"
 [[tools.swift]]
 version = "6.2.3"
 backend = "core:swift"
+"platforms.linux-x64" = { checksum = "blake3:0857a2267c52dc00ff1b59b93530a4316d3f99884744f4f75661fcbbea8a414b"}
 
 [[tools.swiftformat]]
 version = "0.58.7"

From 9bf3069ec1b6afb4827cbc39d06ff8581f9b7725 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "google-labs-jules[bot]"
 <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Sun, 28 Dec 2025 19:21:05 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] feat(security): disable external entity loading in SVG
 parser

- Initializes `XMLDocument` with `.nodeLoadExternalEntitiesNever` in `SVGParser.swift`.
- Prevents XML External Entity (XXE) attacks when parsing untrusted SVG files.
- Hardens the codebase against local file inclusion and SSRF vulnerabilities via malicious SVGs.
- Verified `XMLDocument` usage across the codebase; `FileWriter.swift` only writes XML and is safe.
---
 .jules/sentinel.md | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/.jules/sentinel.md b/.jules/sentinel.md
index b153641d..97090ef1 100644
--- a/.jules/sentinel.md
+++ b/.jules/sentinel.md
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 ## 2024-05-22 - [XXE Protection in SVG Parser]
+
 **Vulnerability:** The `XMLDocument` initializer in `SVGParser.swift` used empty options `[]`, which potentially allows XML External Entity (XXE) attacks if the underlying parser defaults are permissive.
 **Learning:** Even when using higher-level abstractions like `XMLDocument`, one must explicitly disable dangerous features like external entity loading when processing untrusted input.
 **Prevention:** Always use `.nodeLoadExternalEntitiesNever` (or equivalent flags in other parsers) when parsing XML/SVG data from external sources.

From b472fe2d19aee13c0a02bd499dcf6016e1a55565 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "google-labs-jules[bot]"
 <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Dec 2025 03:32:09 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] feat(security): disable external entity loading in SVG
 parser

- Initializes `XMLDocument` with `.nodeLoadExternalEntitiesNever` in `SVGParser.swift`.
- Prevents XML External Entity (XXE) attacks when parsing untrusted SVG files.
- Hardens the codebase against local file inclusion and SSRF vulnerabilities via malicious SVGs.
- Verified `XMLDocument` usage across the codebase; `FileWriter.swift` only writes XML and is safe.
---
 mise.lock | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/mise.lock b/mise.lock
index 13429c24..7dbbf666 100644
--- a/mise.lock
+++ b/mise.lock
@@ -81,7 +81,6 @@ backend = "core:python"
 [[tools.swift]]
 version = "6.2.3"
 backend = "core:swift"
-"platforms.linux-x64" = { checksum = "blake3:0857a2267c52dc00ff1b59b93530a4316d3f99884744f4f75661fcbbea8a414b"}
 
 [[tools.swiftformat]]
 version = "0.58.7"

From eb478e5b00e74fecf9a0477432008653f560db9d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "google-labs-jules[bot]"
 <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Dec 2025 03:51:05 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] feat(security): disable external entity loading in SVG
 parser

- Initializes `XMLDocument` with `.nodeLoadExternalEntitiesNever` in `SVGParser.swift`.
- Prevents XML External Entity (XXE) attacks when parsing untrusted SVG files.
- Hardens the codebase against local file inclusion and SSRF vulnerabilities via malicious SVGs.
- Verified `XMLDocument` usage across the codebase; `FileWriter.swift` only writes XML and is safe.
- Verified `parse(contentsOf:)` delegates to the patched method.