- DPAPI key wrapping and AES-256-GCM envelope construction, nonces and authenticated data.
- Vault atomic-write, backup verification and restore behavior.
- Windows Named Pipe locality, single-instance behavior, challenge HMAC and handle inheritance.
- All MCP schemas and proof that no result returns credential material.
- URL canonicalization, DNS rebinding resistance, private-address filtering, redirect behavior and response limits.
- CDK one-use state transitions and TOTP generation.
- Fixed executable hashing, process environment clearing, stdin/environment injection and output redaction.
- SSH Agent command allowlisting.
- WPF secret-entry lifetime and managed-memory limitations.
- Installer, upgrade, uninstall, signing and build provenance.
The reviewer should perform source review, dependency review, negative testing, fuzzing corpus review, Windows ACL/IPC inspection and dynamic tracing with synthetic secrets. Findings need severity, exploit prerequisites, affected version, regression test and remediation verification.
- No CLI or MCP path returns plaintext, TOTP codes, CDKs or private keys.
- An unauthenticated or remote process cannot use the broker pipe.
- Redirects, caller-selected auth headers and non-HTTPS origins cannot bypass stored policy.
- A consumed CDK cannot be reused after a successful upstream response.
- CLI and SSH callers cannot select arbitrary executable arguments or remote commands.
- Backups authenticate before replacing live state.
- Threat-model delta and architecture findings.
- Dependency and unsafe-code findings.
- Reproduction artifacts containing synthetic data only.
- Final report distinguishing fixed, accepted and unresolved risk.
Project maintainers must not mark this gate complete themselves. Completion requires a named independent reviewer and a report hash recorded in the release checklist.