Trustless PQ light-client + wallet-keyed rewards/status + merkle-only reward path

Light-client (qnet-mobile): verify a macroblock state_root from the committee
checkpoint_qc (2f+1 Dilithium sigs) with forward-anchored lineage from the
genesis-pinned committee, anchoring each epoch's eligible+banned via
epoch_commitment and binding committee keys to the QC-signed registry_root.
Replaces the MITM-bypassable 2/3 peer-poll. registry_root now binds sha3(vrf_pk)
for super/genesis so committee keys are trustlessly verifiable.

Node status + rewards keyed on the WALLET (on-chain reverse index), not the
RAM activation registry: /node/status?wallet= resolves server-activated supers
and offline/banned nodes; pending rewards + claim are wallet-scoped and
status-independent (earned rewards always claimable regardless of node status).

Rewards are merkle reward_root single-source: removed the dead legacy
Account.pending_rewards accrual (validator Phase-4 + producer v2 path), the
unreachable claim legacy fallback, and pointed every pending-reporting endpoint
at the merkle claimable. state_root byte-identical (accrual was always a no-op).

App: HTTP bootstrap default (genesis nodes serve plain HTTP on :8001).

Validated: cargo check (lib+bins) clean; registry/reward determinism tests green;
adversarial diff review (no fork, no security/coherence regressions).
Requires a fresh-genesis relaunch (registry_root format changed).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Author: AIQnetLab

applications/qnet-mobile/src/components/WalletManager.js

@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ import * as Keychain from 'react-native-keychain';
 // v3.35: Centralized node configuration (no duplication!)
 // v4.10: Added getSolanaRpcUrl for centralized Solana RPC management
 import { GENESIS_NODES, NODE_DISCOVERY, getRandomGenesisNode, getSolanaRpcUrl } from '../config/nodes';
+// Post-quantum BFT light-client: trustless committee-QC state-root verification
+// (replaces the MITM-bypassable 2/3 peer-poll). MITM-proof at any network size.
+import { verifyMacroblockStateRoot } from '../crypto/QcLightClient';
 
 export class WalletManager {
   constructor() {
@@ -3497,11 +3500,15 @@ export class WalletManager {
             data.state_root
           );
 
-          // Step 2: Verify state_root matches latest block (multi-node consensus)
+          // Step 2: Verify state_root is certified by a ≥quorum committee QC,
+          // verified inductively from the binary-pinned trust anchor (MITM-proof).
+          // Replaces the old verifyStateRootFromMultipleNodes 2/3 peer-poll, which a
+          // MITM could satisfy by returning matching fake roots from controlled nodes.
           if (proofValid) {
-            verified = await this.verifyStateRootFromMultipleNodes(
+            verified = await verifyMacroblockStateRoot(
               data.state_root,
-              data.block_height
+              data.block_height,
+              () => this.getRandomBootstrapNode()
             );
           }
         }
@@ -3663,14 +3670,16 @@ export class WalletManager {
   }
 
   /**
-   * Verify state_root by querying multiple nodes (Byzantine fault tolerance)
-   * At least 2/3 nodes must agree on state_root for the block
-   * 
-   * v3.11: state_root is in MacroBlock, not MicroBlock
-   * MacroBlock index = floor(blockHeight / 90)
-   * 
-   * v3.12: FIXED - Use discovered nodes, NOT hardcoded Genesis!
-   * This prevents overloading Genesis nodes and is truly decentralized
+   * DEPRECATED + UNUSED (kept for reference). Superseded by the trustless
+   * committee-QC light client: QcLightClient.verifyMacroblockStateRoot().
+   *
+   * SECURITY: this 2/3 multi-node poll is MITM-bypassable — an attacker on the
+   * path (or controlling the polled subset) can return matching FAKE state_roots
+   * and pass the vote. It verifies agreement, not authenticity. The replacement
+   * verifies a ≥quorum post-quantum committee QC inductively from a pinned anchor,
+   * so a forged root cannot be certified without breaking ML-DSA-65 / SHA3.
+   *
+   * No remaining callers. Safe to delete in a later cleanup.
    */
   async verifyStateRootFromMultipleNodes(stateRoot, blockHeight) {
     try {

applications/qnet-mobile/src/config/genesisConsensus.js

@@ -7,61 +7,36 @@
  * Import from this file: import { GENESIS_NODES, getSolanaRpcUrl } from '../config/nodes';
  */
 
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// v14.5: HTTPS-FIRST BOOTSTRAP (MITM mitigation)
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Previous configuration used plaintext HTTP for all 5 genesis nodes. Any
-// on-path attacker (public Wi-Fi, hostile ISP, compromised router) could:
-//   • read wallet addresses + FCM push tokens as they were registered,
-//   • substitute responses (fake balance, fake peer list),
-//   • replay / manipulate activation flows.
-//
-// v14.5 defaults to HTTPS endpoints (the genesis servers terminate TLS on
-// port 443 behind nginx). The legacy HTTP fallback remains available only
-// when the runtime explicitly opts in via `process.env.QNET_ALLOW_HTTP=1`
-// (e.g. for local development against an unprovisioned host), and even then
-// a console warning is emitted to remind operators of the MITM risk.
-//
-// For mainnet mobile builds `QNET_ALLOW_HTTP` is unset → HTTPS is enforced.
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-export const GENESIS_NODES_HTTPS = [
-  'https://154.38.160.39:8001',   // Genesis 001 - North America
-  'https://62.171.157.44:8001',   // Genesis 002 - Europe
-  'https://161.97.86.81:8001',    // Genesis 003 - Europe
-  'https://5.189.130.160:8001',   // Genesis 004 - Europe
-  'https://162.244.25.114:8001',  // Genesis 005 - Europe
+// Bootstrap genesis nodes. The nodes serve plain HTTP on :8001 (no TLS terminator
+// is deployed). This transport carries only PUBLIC chain data + SIGNED txs — fund
+// safety rests on the Dilithium/Ed25519 signatures, not TLS. Default is HTTP; HTTPS
+// is opt-in (QNET_FORCE_HTTPS=1) for once a real TLS endpoint exists — enabling it
+// without one makes every request fail.
+export const GENESIS_NODES_HTTP = [
+  'http://154.38.160.39:8001',    // Genesis 001
+  'http://62.171.157.44:8001',    // Genesis 002
+  'http://161.97.86.81:8001',     // Genesis 003
+  'http://5.189.130.160:8001',    // Genesis 004
+  'http://162.244.25.114:8001',   // Genesis 005
 ];
 
-export const GENESIS_NODES_HTTP_LEGACY = [
-  'http://154.38.160.39:8001',
-  'http://62.171.157.44:8001',
-  'http://161.97.86.81:8001',
-  'http://5.189.130.160:8001',
-  'http://162.244.25.114:8001',
+export const GENESIS_NODES_HTTPS = [
+  'https://154.38.160.39:8001',
+  'https://62.171.157.44:8001',
+  'https://161.97.86.81:8001',
+  'https://5.189.130.160:8001',
+  'https://162.244.25.114:8001',
 ];
 
-const _allowInsecure = (() => {
+const _forceHttps = (() => {
   try {
-    // React Native / Node contexts
-    // eslint-disable-next-line no-undef
-    return typeof process !== 'undefined' && process?.env?.QNET_ALLOW_HTTP === '1';
+    return typeof process !== 'undefined' && process?.env?.QNET_FORCE_HTTPS === '1';
   } catch (_) {
     return false;
   }
 })();
 
-if (_allowInsecure && typeof console !== 'undefined') {
-  // eslint-disable-next-line no-console
-  console.warn(
-    '[QNET][WARN] QNET_ALLOW_HTTP=1 — using plaintext bootstrap URLs. ' +
-      'Traffic (wallet addresses, push tokens) is susceptible to MITM. ' +
-      'For mainnet do NOT set this flag.'
-  );
-}
-
-export const GENESIS_NODES = _allowInsecure
-  ? GENESIS_NODES_HTTP_LEGACY
-  : GENESIS_NODES_HTTPS;
+export const GENESIS_NODES = _forceHttps ? GENESIS_NODES_HTTPS : GENESIS_NODES_HTTP;
 
 // Node discovery settings
 export const NODE_DISCOVERY = {